By Miriam Elder

Two weeks after taking over the Kremlin from his mentor Vladimir Putin, President Dmitry Medvedev flew to the Kazakh capital on his first official visit as head of the Russian state. Standing in the heart of central Asia, Mr Medvedev outlined a plank of a foreign policy that would see Russia develop stronger ties with, and broader influence over, the countries that line its outer borders.

"The time has come for ties to be intensified," he said at the time in late May, referring to Russia's ex-Soviet neighbours in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). That goal has become all the stronger since Russia's five-day war with Georgia in August. The conflict, over Georgia's separatist enclaves of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, saw Russian troops pouring across borders for the first time since the fall of the Soviet Union.

"The war between Russia and Georgia created a new situation, in which post-Soviet countries realised who is the real boss in that region," says Fyodor Lukyanov, editor of Russia in Global Affairs magazine.

"Russia somewhat frightened those countries [of central Asia], because any of the post-Soviet states can project what happened in Georgia on to themselves," he says.

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Few in Moscow believe that was Russia's explicit intention but rather that it was an added dimension to a war that signalled Moscow's readiness to back up its increasingly tough rhetoric with military might. "It was a side product," says Mr Lukyanov. "Whether Russia will be able to turn it into something else, an integrationist initiative, for example, is another question."

Mr Medvedev spelled it out most clearly in the days following the war's end. "Russia, like other countries in the world, has regions where it has privileged interests. These are regions where countries with which we have friendly relations are located."

Yet the early signs were bleak. Two organisations linking Russia to its central Asian neighbours - the Shanghai Co-operation Council, which also includes China, and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation - failed to back the independence of South Ossetia. Neither organisation includes Turkmenistan, the most energy-rich of the central Asian countries, which has been courting Russian and western investors since the death of hardline leader Turkmenbashi in late 2006.

Continuing the path laid by Mr Putin, who has sought to undo the chaos of the 1990s by projecting Russia's oil-fuelled power, Mr Medvedev has actively courted the region - not least for its vast oil and gas reserves, which are vital to Moscow's own energy strategy.

Increased demand for energy at home and abroad, coupled with an investment strategy that has failed to bring on-line new fields inside Russia, has prompted Gazprom, the state-run monopoly, to look to Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan - until recently, at reduced prices - to fulfil its myriad supply contracts.

Without the additional gas, analysts say, Gazprom could falter in its commitments, fulfilling Europe's fears over Russia as a reliable supplier. According to Vladimir Milov, a former deputy energy minister turned Gazprom critic, central Asian gas comprises as much as 8 per cent of Gazprom's reserve base, up from 4 per cent in 2002.

Winning access to more reserves, as well as pipeline deals to solidify Russia's role as the main energy power in the region, have been a top priority. Equally important, analysts say, is shutting out western powers that are hoping to convince central Asian states to cut out Russia for energy transit.

Difficulties in contracting Azeri and Turkmen gas, as well as the instability revealed by the war in Georgia, could deal a blow to US and European Union-backed plans for the Nabucco pipeline.

"Russia and the US have different understandings of what defines political success in the post-Soviet space," says Vyacheslav Nikonov, head of the Fond Politika, a Moscow-based think-tank. "For Russia, success is measured by how good our relations are. For the US, success is defined by how much political distance there is between these countries and Russia."

To Russia, Mr Nikonov and other analysts say, winning influence in central Asia is a zero-sum game. Its greatest competitor there may not even be the west, analysts say. "The main player there is China," says Mr Lukyanov. "The question we should all be posing is whether China will be eager to share its influence with someone else - Russia, the US or EU."

Yet Russia can bank on more recent historical and cultural ties. The central Asian republics, especially Kazakhstan, have sizeable Russian populations, and the number of migrant workers streaming northward has grown on the back of Russia's economic boom.

A new state body formed by Mr Medvedev, the Federal Agency for the CIS and headed by a former ambassador to Uzbekistan, is to be given the job of spreading Russian culture throughout central Asia and beyond, as Moscow seeks to strengthen its soft power.

What might give Russia the biggest boost, however, is if it handles the credit crunch correctly, analysts say. Russia is still sitting on vast oil revenues and foreign reserves, although these have taken a hit - along with its exchanges - since the credit crisis hit in September.

Yet the countries of central Asia, heavily reliant on natural resources and, in the case of Kazakhstan, on banks, are suffering as well. "If the situation continues to deteriorate, all post-Soviet countries will be affected heavily, as they were after the Russian crisis of 1998," says Mr Lukyanov. "Russia will get additional opportunities to increase her influence in that region."

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