May 19, 2008
Borut Grgic, Chairman of ISS Group and Alexandros Petersen, Program Director of the Caspian Europe Center, Brussels
The Eurpoean Weekly New Europe

The prevailing interpretation of last month’s NATO summit at Bucharest was that most participants, including Russia, went home satisfied.

Despite deep disagreements within the Alliance, a compromise was reached in that Georgia and Ukraine were not formally put on the path to membership, but received assurances that they would eventually become NATO members. For their part, the Georgians would have preferred Western action, as opposed to Western spin.

The reasons for this have become painfully apparent in the weeks since the summit. Having clearly interpreted NATO’s reticence as unwillingness to support Tbilisi, Russia promptly stepped up its dominance over de-facto authorities in Georgia’s separatist territories: Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Now, after Georgian officials released a film showing a Russian MiG-29 shooting down a Georgian unmanned aircraft over Abkhazia, the two sides are trading belligerent barbs over troop build-ups and further aerial attacks. Russia vehemently opposes NATO membership for Georgia, and through stoking tension in its separatist territories has found the best way to undermine the South Caucasus country’s bid.

But, Abkhazia and South Ossetia are more than just issues for Georgia. The citizens of every European Union country are faced with trans-national threats – arms, drug, human trafficking, money laundering and organised crime – that flourish in the territories’ uncertain status. Georgian authorities have uncovered attempts to smuggle uranium through the territories and international terrorists have found refuge in both areas.

Since the EU’s enlargement to the shores of the Black Sea, the so-called frozen conflicts of the South Caucasus are now part of the Union’s new neighbourhood. The defence doctrines of almost every EU member-state stress ungoverned spaces as one of the primary security concerns of the 21st century. Both Abkhazia and South Ossetia are dangerously close to key pipelines that bring oil and natural gas to the West. And, as part of the European Neighbourhood Policy, the EU supports Georgia’s internationally- recognised territorial integrity. It is therefore baffling that the EU has not done more to resolve the simmering uncertainty over the separatist territories.

However unjustifiably, Russia sees NATO as a threatening military bloc – but the EU has much more latitude of action in the Black Sea region. First and foremost, the EU can use its growing international legitimacy and substantial expertise in negotiation to convene talks on resolution that include Georgia and the de-facto leadership in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The EU’s role as an arbiter is key, as it would satisfy Georgia’s demands that its territorial integrity be respected, as well as allow for the separatists to voice their views without Moscow dictating their actions. Second, the EU can help ensure that events on the ground do not sabotage progress made at the negotiating table. Over a year ago, the EU’s foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, floated the idea of EU peacekeeping forces being deployed alongside their Russian counterparts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It is time that Europe begin planning such deployments.

EU members Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania have expressed interest in contributing to a peacekeeping force for Georgia. If it is considered in the interest of Europe to send peacekeepers to the Congo and Indonesia, it would seem eminently sensible to dispatch at least a robust observer force to ensure stability in its immediate geographic neighbourhood. At the NATO summit, Western leaders effectively delayed decision on Georgia’s membership until their foreign minister meet again in December. If those seven months see similar activities in Georgia’s separatist regions as the last few weeks, then Russia will have succeeded in blocking Georgia’s bid for Western integration.

What Moscow may not have realised is that a Georgia detached from the West will likely not return to take its place within Russia’s “orbit,” but will instead find little reason for restraint when it comes to shoring up its territorial integrity. As the stakes over Georgia’s internal divisions grow greater, the EU find itself the greatest potential force for stability and progress in the South Caucasus. It is time that Brussels exercised its potential.