May 8, 2008
Ilana Bet-El, European Voice

Russia knows how to exploit European divisions in foreign affairs.

Russia's meddling in Georgia's breakaway region of Abkhazia is one of the most predictable developments of the past months – because of both Kosovo and NATO.

Russia has long objected to Kosovo's independence, not least because it might serve as a precedent for other breakaway regions. Encouraging Abkhazia as a test case of this objection was therefore deeply tempting. Equally, and with possibly greater reason, Russia has always emphatically underlined its neuralgic opposition to any further NATO expansion, especially to its immediate neighbours and former colonies. The alliance's willingness at its Bucharest summit to open the door to Georgia and Ukraine last month, albeit without offering immediate membership, was therefore tantamount to showing a red rag to a bull.

Technically, it could be argued that there is little direct link with the EU on either issue. Kosovo declared its independence unilaterally and not all EU member states have recognised it. And NATO business is definitely outside the remit of the Union. Indeed, countries belonging to both organisations tend to have totally separate departments for the two, with staff rarely mixing with each other – which may explain the schizophrenia occasionally discernible in policies towards a range of problems, from Afghanistan through Iran to Russia.

But technical reasons are irrelevant, especially to Russia, with its outstanding capability in foreign relations to sense weakness and to play issues and states off against each other. So it has effortlessly brought the EU into the fray. The EU as such does not recognise states – that is a matter for its individual member states - but it does send missions into other states. For Kosovo, it is deploying a rule of law mission known as Eulex. Its aim is to take over some of the functions of Unmik, the longstanding United Nations administration mission there. But there is no UN Security Council resolution recognising the independence of Kosovo, or establishing any mandate for a replacement for Unmik, since Russia has promised to veto any such proposal. Eulex is therefore stumbling to establish a role for itself. Meanwhile, NATO troops continue to maintain security.

Given this situation, Russia argues that it is simply doing the same in Abkhazia: sending troops to maintain security and extending selective recognition to a breakaway state. In other words, it is claiming parallelism to the activities of the West in Kosovo.

Then there is NATO. If Russia has a security strategy, it is to keep NATO as far as possible away from its borders. For Russia, NATO simply equals the US, aided and abetted by former Soviet colonies which are now members of the alliance and the EU. Since it has business interests with the EU, and since it is alert to the deep confusion between EU and NATO policy, Russia adroitly channels its hostility to the alliance through alternative routes, such as Georgia and Ukraine, while maintaining good relations with the Union.

It is a careful balancing act which is very largely facilitated by the EU. For by now even the janitor in the Justus Lipsius, the EU's Council of Ministers building, is likely to be familiar with the empty mantra: that the only hope of changing the dynamic in EU-Russia relations and ensuring the interests of the Union and its member states is a united attitude to Russia on all issues, from energy to security. Given Russia's exercise in Abkhazia, it is time to make real the mantra – before the exercise becomes too real.