IN THIS ISSUE

* Endemic corruption contradicts Medvedev’s modernization plans
* New fingerprinting requirement causes uproar throughout the North Caucasus
* Moscow faces declining strategic influence in Central Asia
** Visit the Jamestown blog on Russia and Eurasia (http://www.jamestown.org/blog):
- Is the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan Standoff the First of Many?

Medvedev’s Euro-Modernization Hits the Corruption Wall

Pavel K. Baev

An interesting feature of President Dmitry Medvedev’s trademark idea of “modernization” is that each time it starts to work, he feels compelled to push the brakes and engage in back-pedaling, and once Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, intercepts the initiative, Medvedev tries to add spin to his discourse. What has caught him off-balance in recent weeks is the proposal from the European Union to develop “Partnership for Modernization” as a possible way out of the deadlocked negotiations on the new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, March 5). Swedish Prime Minister, Fredrik Reinfeldt, elaborated on this proposal while visiting Moscow last week, and Medvedev confirmed his positive attitude mentioning that “we need to create conditions so that business can operate normally.”

What he really wants to discuss is Western participation in his dream-center for creating innovations, often called a Russian Silicon Valley, and other practical matters pertinent to the import and dissemination of modern technologies (Ezhednevny Zhurnal, February 24). The EU, however, stays on the message that the emphasis on the rule of law is a practical matter and not simply a continuation of sterile debates on values, because investors are wary of the commercial climate, which shows few signs of “warming.” The issue that is seen as crucial is corruption, and the Swedes are suggesting making the business practice of IKEA, which shows zero tolerance to the culture of bribes and otkat (kickbacks), into a model Russian-European code of conduct (Kommersant, RBC Daily, March 10).

Medvedev has been temporizing with traditional “in principle, yes” non-answers, when the US State Department Human Rights Report asserted that “corruption was widespread throughout the executive, legislative, and judicial branches at all levels of government” (www.newsru.com, March 11). An instant and indignant response by the Russian political class proved typically Soviet, as if Mikhail Gorbachev did not set perestroika in motion exactly 25 years ago. The foreign ministry issued a statement alleging that “It is no secret that this opus is primarily intended to solve the internal political problems of the American establishment” (RIA Novosti, March 12). Parliamentarians and spin-doctors have rushed to accuse Washington of malicious bias that undermines the progress of the “reset” and puts pressure on Moscow in order to secure concessions in contentious negotiations (www.newsru.com, March 12).

The report covered a broad range of issues, but as far as corruption is concerned, many Russians would argue that it underestimates the scope of this economic disaster and social ill – and would rather agree with the assessment of Transparency International that puts Russia 146 out of 180 countries, together with Sierra-Leone and Zimbabwe (Corruption Perception Index 2009). Resentment against this intrinsic feature of the bureaucratic machine built by Putin is climbing to new heights, and the popular rock-star, Yuri Shevchuk, started his recent concert by saying: “corruption is everywhere… brutal anti-human power has built a system in our country” (www.gazeta.ru, March 11). His words, concerning the unfairly persecuted Mikhail Khodorkovsky, and police violence, exploded all over the country via the uncontrollable YouTube.

It is exactly the mistrust and anger against the various law enforcement agencies, ranging from traffic police to the Interior Minister, Rashid Nurgaliev, which has become the most visible part of the brewing discontent. Every week brings several new outrageous police crime scandals, and even TV news bulletins that traditionally open with information about the president’s activities now often first announce this type of news (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, March 12). In Moscow, and other major cities, the internet has become a major vehicle of public mobilization, and Medvedev, who typically starts his day by surfing the internet, feels compelled to respond by taking the more sensitive investigations under his personal control. Still, his attempt to launch a meaningful reform of the multi-functional interior ministry lacks both a sound plan and funding, consequently an opinion poll by Ekho Moskvy (12 March) showed that more than 90 percent of respondents believed that this reform had not yet started.

Public protests in various locations, from Kaliningrad to Irkutsk, typically gather only a few thousand participants, but the authorities dare not suppress these rallies, and their nervous readiness to make concessions encourages new action. Local elections –like those last Sunday– set a trap for governors, since Medvedev demands a reduction in blatant fraud, but the shrinking support for the quasi-ruling United Russia party makes crude manipulations necessary in order to secure “acceptable” results (Ekho Moskvy, March 12). Medvedev has rather ambivalent relations with this party of the ruling bureaucracy, which keeps Putin as its leader, and often finds opportunities to show his commitment to pluralism. Such pretensions are, however, of scant practical importance, since the three officially approved opposition parties are merely going through electoral motions never deviating far from the mainstream.

Medvedev tries to show his concern about social tensions by instructing Deputy Prime Minister, Dmitry Kozak, to investigate the sharp increases in housing and utility payments, adding that officials who ignore these issues would be looking for other jobs (www.newsru.com, March 12). It is hard for him to compete in this field with Putin, who excels in the “father-of-the-nation” role and has recently ordered an increase to pensions by 6.3 percent from April 1, despite objections from the Finance Minister, Aleksei Kudrin (Vedomosti, March 5). Such populist gestures cannot, however, arrest the trend of escalation of social inequality, and millions of Russians are irked by the fact that the number of dollar-billionaires in the country doubled in 2009 (Vremya Novostei, March 12).

Replacing governors and firing generals, Medvedev cannot recast himself as a tough leader, and his performance as “technical innovator” or “people’s protector” is also far from convincing. The only matter that really engages his interest, if not ardor, is reforming the legal system, so the emphasis placed by the EU on cultivating a partnership in the rule of law area connects with this personal priority. The problem is that Putin’s system of bureaucratic control is not compatible with independent courts or prosecution of corruption, but Medvedev would never go as far as dismantling this system, seeking instead merely its “modernization.” Even Gorbachev is disappointed and admonishes that “fear is a poor counsel in politics” (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, March 12).

Russian Government and Public View North Caucasians With Suspicion

Valery Dzutsev

On March 10, the independent union of the Dagestani police and prosecutors petitioned President Dmitry Medvedev, asking him to dismiss the head of Russia’s Investigative Committee, Aleksandr Bastrykin. The union members accused Bastrykin of inciting ethnic hatred and undermining basic human rights as described by the Russian constitution and laws. In particular, the authors of the petition referred to Bastrykin’s controversial proposal to fingerprint all inhabitants of the North Caucasus to improve fighting crime in the region, which he made at a meeting of the Russian Prosecutor-General’s office in Moscow on March 4 (EDM, March 5). His petitioned stated that Bastrykin had “developed behavioral and psychological patterns which equate certain ethnic groups of the population (indigenous peoples of the Northern Caucasus) with “bad people, like criminals, terrorists and extremists” (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, March 10).

Apart from fingerprinting the North Caucasians, Bastrykin also proposed to take DNA samples, reregister all vehicles in the region to fight car theft and set up a rigorous patrolling network using interior ministry troops (RIA Novosti, March 4).

Heavily dependent on Moscow’s benevolence, Kremlin-selected leaders of the North Caucasus republics normally approve of all proposals from Moscow with alacrity. This time, however, only the president of Ingushetia, Yunus-bek Yevkurov, succumbed to Bastrykin’s menacing proposal about fingerprinting (RIA Novosti, March 4). This may be another indicator of Yevkurov’s low political savvy and complete dependence on Moscow.

Even those forces in the North Caucasus that are utterly loyal to Moscow reacted with an uproar upon hearing the discriminatory proposal. Rights activists, and even well-known Russian statesmen like the head of the Russian State Duma’s committee for legislation, Pavel Krasheninnikov, criticized Bastrykin. As a result, the Investigative Committee’s spokesman, Vladimir Markin, was forced to retract his boss’s statement the next day by saying that he meant fingerprinting not only the North Caucasians, but all Russians (Kommersant, March 5).

Despite the fact that Bastrykin’s idea was an immediate fiasco, the problem of distrust toward the North Caucasus appears to be deeply rooted in Russia. Having polled its audience, the well-known liberal Russian radio station Ekho Moskvy found that 57 percent of its listeners, who are among the most democratic-oriented people in the country, approved the idea of fingerprinting people from the North Caucasus (http://www.echo.msk.ru/polls/661419-echo/result.html, March 5). Some restrictions have in practice been imposed on the North Caucasus. The newspaper Kommersant recalled that since January 2009, all flights arriving from the North Caucasus undergo special security checks at Moscow airports (Kommersant, March 8).

The heads of Russian law enforcement agencies harshly criticized their colleagues in the North Caucasus at a special meeting of the interior ministry, Federal Security Service (FSB), Prosecutor-General’s office and the Federal Service for the Control of Narcotics (FSKN) on February 25. Russian Prosecutor-General Yuri Chaika said that a third of all criminal cases in the North Caucasus were suspended, and that the rate of suspensions was 40 percent in Ingushetia and up to two-thirds in Chechnya up to two thirds. According to Chaika, especially grave crimes were often attributed to dead militants and were subsequently closed down. The prosecutor-general also noted that the number of crimes committed with the use of arms increased by 92 percent in Ingushetia, by 65 percent in Dagestan and by 43 percent in Karachaevo-Cherkessia last year (Kommersant, February 26).

Russians’ and North Caucasians’ differing understanding of historical facts also continues to create waves of discontent in the region and contributes to the rifts between them.

Chechnya’s human rights ombudsman, Nurdi Nukhadzhiev, condemned the authors of the new Russian encyclopedia that in its entry on Chechnya, he said, “gathered all negative stereotypes about the Chechens that have ever appeared in print since the times of the tsarist colonization.” Nukhadzhiev asked Russia’s prosecutor-general to launch a criminal investigation into the case and confiscate volume 58 of the encyclopedia, which includes the entry about the Chechens (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, March 10).

Even events dating back to the Russian conquest of the North Caucasus in the nineteenth century and related symbolism are still hotly contested. In October 2008, the city of Mineralnye Vody (Mineral Waters), which is located in the Russian-speaking Stavropol region bordering Chechnya, erected a monument to commemorate the nineteenth century Russian general Aleksei Yermolov. After the monument was put up, the press minister in Chechnya’s pro-Moscow government, Shamsail Saraliev, lodged a protest, saying the move showed “disrespect for the Caucasian people, who endured Yermolov’s genocidal policies” (www.rosbalt.ru, October 20, 2008).

Mineralnye Vody is located within a few miles of Pyatigorsk, which in January was designated by the Russian government as the seat of the presidential envoy in the newly created North Caucasian Federal District. Meanwhile, there is also a monument to Yermolov in the city of Stavropol, which is the principal city of the Stavropol region, to which both Pyatigorsk and Mineralnye Vody belong. Yet another monument to Yermolov in Grozny was blown up and vandalized on numerous occasions, presumably by Chechens.

As commander-in-chief of the Russian army in the Caucasus, Aleksei Yermolov was known for his brutal and merciless tactics in suppressing the resistance of the Caucasian peoples during the Russo-Caucasian war in the nineteenth century. It is remarkable that Yermolov, who was a hero of the Napoleonic wars and other Russian military campaigns, is mainly remembered by the Russian communities in the North Caucasus and adjacent territories for suppressing the North Caucasus. It indicates how pervasive the traditional Russian reliance on cruelty and terror in the North Caucasus is, and how it has survived through many historical turns.

The collision between ethnic Russians and ethnic Chechens, Avars and others over the view of the past certainly remains a factor in politics, inhibiting the present with additional strife.

Shifting Regional Dynamics Force Russia to Suspend Promised Loan to Kyrgyzstan

Roman Muzalevsky

The financial crisis and energy deficits have significantly exacerbated political and economic tensions in Kyrgyzstan. It is in these circumstances that the Kyrgyz leadership secured a $2.15 billion package from Russia in 2009, allegedly in exchange for the closure of United States base from the country, but now faces the suspension of the $1.7 billion promised loan for the construction of the Kambarata-1 power station (www.24.kg, January 26, February 18, 20). However, given the continuing and expanding United States presence in Central Asia, improved prospects for US-Uzbek military rapprochement, intensified regional water problems, and China’s growing regional influence, Moscow’s decision to withhold the loan should not come as a surprise.

However, it did appear to reflect Moscow’s concern about misuse of funds by Kyrgyzstan. As the First Secretary of the Russian Embassy to Kyrgyzstan, Vitaliy Skrinnik, suggested, the suspension was due to “misallocation” of previously disbursed $450 million through the fund that “could provide loans to others willing to make some extra cash.” Russian Energy Minister, Sergei Shmatko, has in turn made it clear that Kyrgyzstan should have provided a feasibility study on the Kamabarata-1 project before it could receive the funds (www.24.kg, February 18; Belyi Parus, February 17; “Zentr Aziia, February 18). Meanwhile, reports have circulated about the deterioration of Kyrgyz-Russian relations, which Kyrgyz Prime Minister, Daniyar Usenov, dismissed as rumors, especially in the context of the recently adopted Kyrgyz-Russian economic cooperation program for 2010-2011 (www.24.kg, January 3, February 24, March 1).

Indeed, spoiling relations with Moscow might be out of the question for Kyrgyzstan given the country’s weak regional and domestic position. Exploiting Russian regional geopolitical perceptions and vulnerabilities –something the Central Asian states have been particularly good at– is not. Thus, it remains to be seen whether the reported US-Kyrgyz deal on opening an anti-terrorist training center in southern Kyrgyzstan will persuade Moscow, already worried about Uzbekistan’s leanings to the West, to deliver the promised loan to Bishkek, or actually distance itself and other neighbors from the country (Uzinform, March 8).

For now, however, the “replacement” of the US base at Manas with the “transit center” has not changed Moscow’s disposition to Kyrgyzstan. This much was clear in the alleged conversation between Putin and Usenov published in the “Belyi Parus” internet newspaper, in which the former reportedly quipped that, as in the case of changing the capital’s name from Frunze to Bishkek, the essence of the situation at Manas remained the same (Belyi Parus, December 4, 2009).

As a result, without Russian support, Kyrgyzstan finds itself hard pressed to construct the Kambarata-1 station and rectify its energy deficits. This makes gas-rich, but water-needy, Uzbekistan more content, particularly given Moscow’s position that Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan consider the interests of their neighbors on water projects, including the Kambarata-1 (Belyi Parus, February 17; www.24.kg, January 26; ENS, February 13, 2009). This Russian concession to Uzbekistan is also tied to the expanding US-Uzbek cooperation following the Andijan events and the West’s criticism that preceded the eviction of the US base from Kharshi-Khanabad in 2005.

Today, Washington and Tashkent want to collaborate, including on the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), given the former’s commitment to disengage militarily from Afghanistan by 2011 and the latter’s concerns about the resulting impact on regional geopolitics and security. In this light, Uzbekistan’s record of an unsteady foreign policy toward major powers raises concern in Moscow over the prospect of US-Uzbek military rapprochement while the US military continues to use Manas, despite its alleged Kambarata-1 deal with Kyrgyzstan.

More broadly, Moscow also senses that its control over Central Asia’s energy resources and exports is weakening in light of Western and Chinese regional energy schemes and attempts by the Central Asian states to pursue independent foreign policies. Securing the participation of the regional states in major projects is therefore imperative for Moscow, which has become more careful and skilful in balancing the interests of water-abundant and gas-rich states in the region. Thus, the suspension of funds to Kyrgyzstan is in some measure a way for Russia to placate Kyrgyzstan’s neighbors (ENS, February 4, 2009; www.24.kg, October 23, 2009).

Finally, withholding these funds helps Moscow to exercise influence on both upstream and downstream countries without substantially jeopardizing its relations with either, while keeping the regional states “on the hook” and “letting them go” when expedient. However, Chinese-Central Asian cooperation on hydropower, energy projects and the expanding role of the US in this sphere, including through the reported anti-terrorist center in Kyrgyzstan, have already started to undermine Russian leverage.

Moscow’s concerns about the use of funds notwithstanding, the changing regional dynamics (intensified water disagreements, growing regional involvement of China, expansion of the Uzbek cooperation with the West and the NDN, as well as the ongoing and possible increase in the US military presence in Kyrgyzstan) compels Russia to be cautious about Kyrgyzstan’s policy course in the shifting geopolitical contours of Central Asia. The suspension of funds to Kyrgyzstan, may help Russia keep both the tricky Kyrgyz and unruly Uzbeks closer in line as it seeks to shore up its declining strategic influence in the region.

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