IN THIS ISSUE

* Medvedev upbeat on military reform in Russia
* Death of Buryatsky will become a powerful ideological tool for insurgents
* Yanukovych signals tough stance with Moscow on economic issues
* Kyrgyz government opens new US-backed anti-terrorist center in Batken
** New in the Jamestown blog on Russia and Eurasia (http://www.jamestown.org/blog):
- Liberal Development: Georgian Response to Putin’s Agenda

Medvedev Acknowledges Problems in the “New Look” Armed Forces

Pavel Felgenhauer

Last week, President Dmitry Medvedev addressed a gathering of the Russian top brass in Moscow – the so called “extended defense ministry collegium.” Medvedev was upbeat about the military reform that began in September 2008 by presidential decree. According to the Defense Minister, Anatoly Serdyukov: “We presented our achievements in 2009 and the president recognized them as satisfactory.” Medvedev also discussed the details of the next May 9, World War II Victory-Day military parade in Moscow on Red Square (RIA Novosti, March 5).

Medvedev’s opening speech was the only part of the entire “collegium” open to the press. He praised the defense ministry for “successfully changing the organizational structure of the armed forces within a limited time frame.” The number of service personnel was cut from 1,130,000 in 2008 to one million and “more than 80 new brigades have been formed.” According to Medvedev, the reformed units have shown overall good training and combat readiness during extensive military exercises in Belarus in September 2009 (Zapad 2009). “I was present during the exercises and witnessed these achievements,” stated Medvedev, “though there are problems.” Medvedev called for an extensive reform of military education “to train, new well educated, and motivated officers” as well as sergeants. He proclaimed his support for paying officers additional bonuses for good work after 2012, when an overall massive pay boost is planned. Medvedev demanded that all officers entitled to receive free housing must have it by 2012. Equally, he acknowledged there are problems with rearming the Russian military with modern weapons: “We are acting very slowly and not effectively enough.” The president expressed confidence that by 2020 the Russian armed forces will have no less than 70 percent new weapons, including modern computerized command and control equipment. According to Medvedev, Russia does not need to expand its present nuclear arsenal, but must keep a credible nuclear deterrent “to maintain sovereignty” and “help regulate after-conflict situations” (www.kremlin.ru, Interfax, March 5).

According to Serdyukov, in 2008 half the manpower of the armed forces were officers and praporshiki – Soviet-style warrant officers mostly occupying low-level administrative positions. In total there were some 355,000 officers and 140,000 praporshiki. The rank of praporshiki was abolished last year, though some of them stayed in service as sergeants (Interfax, March 5). In 2009, Serdyukov announced, “some 65,000 officers were retired – those who volunteered to go, those who had reached pension age, or could not continue service because of health problems or violated their contract provisions.” Some 135,000 officers must still be fired from the defense ministry armed forces to achieve the planned level of 150,000 active service officers and Serdyukov is sure that this will be achieved “in the coming several years.” Serdyukov announced the defense ministry is doing everything possible to help the ousted officers adapt to civilian life (RIA Novosti, March 5).

In 1992, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian military began an “experiment” with hiring contract soldiers to supplement and eventually replace conscripts to form a more capable, professional military. Hundreds of thousands of contract solders have been employed, but according to Serdyukov, the entire plan to have a contract armed force has failed: “Conscript soldiers were persuaded in different ways to sign contracts; they continued to live in barracks as conscripts, received low pay and left as soon as they could. With such a system it was impossible to train good specialists.” The draft will continue, stated Serdyukov, and only the navy will become all-volunteer. To achieve positive results, according to Serdyukov, contract soldiers must be paid 35,000 rubles per month (over $1,170), while “young officers” should receive 50,000 rubles per month (some $1,700) (Interfax, March 5).

The Chief of the General Staff, First Deputy Defense Minister Army-General, Nikolai Makarov, has publicly acknowledged that the kontraktniki program has failed to produce good soldiers or stem the constant level of hazing in the barracks. “Too many mistakes were made and the goal to build a professional force was not achieved,” announced Makarov, “Moreover, we will now increase the draft, while reducing the number of kontraktniki – we will sign contracts only with sergeants that will be educated for two and a half years.” Makarov quoted problems with low pay and bad service conditions, as the main reason for the failure of the contract system (RIA Novosti, February 24).

Indeed, the “experiment” with contract soldiers in the Russian army was doomed from the outset, by generals that most likely never wanted it to succeed and believed dogmatically in the Soviet conscript system. Low pay and bad service conditions were not the only problems: since 1992 no one in the defense ministry has bothered to create a professional recruiting system to find potential contract soldiers or candidates to be promoted to sergeants. Most contracts were signed directly within the units, supervised by unit commanders, promoting massive corruption and inefficiency. By 2004, some 80,000 kontraktniki were officers and praporshiki wives, employed as soldiers to bring second salaries to their families. Of course, no one ever intended to send those women into combat. Real service conscripts were forced en masse to sign contracts, but after conscript service in Russia was reduced to one year in 2007, it became much harder to force soldiers to sign up (Novie Izvestia, February 26).

The Russian officer corps is in a state of disarray, anticipating massive forced retirements. The military education system is in the midst of radical change and confusion. The defense ministry still does not have a recruiting system capable of finding good contract soldiers or sergeants. Russia does not possess any experience in educating career sergeants, and has not created a career path or re-education program for sergeants to encourage them to stay in the ranks and professionally develop. The new combat-ready brigades are manned by one-year-serving conscripts and some kontraktniki of dubious value, and it is virtually impossible to form modern combat units with such soldiers. Despite this, the defense ministry officially states there are no plans at present to increase conscript service (Interfax, March 1).

Does Medvedev, as Commander-in-Chief, understand that rearming is not, in fact, the most immediate pressing problem facing the armed forces?

Killing of Said Buryatsky Unlikely to Deter North Caucasus Insurgency

Mairbek Vatchagaev

A key event in early March, was the death of one of the chief ideologues of the armed resistance in the North Caucasus, Said Buryatsky (Aleksandr Tikhomirov) (www.1tv.ru, March 5). He was killed in the village of Ekazhevo in Ingushetia’s Nazran district during a major Russian joint siloviki operation that involved units of the Federal Security Service (FSB), the interior ministry (MVD) and defense ministry, targeting militants discovered in the home of the Kartoyev family.

The operation itself, which lasted two days, spoke volumes about the significance of the situation. Usually, such government endeavors lasting days are a sign that top leaders of the militant underground are among those targeted, which explains their fierce resistance. The militants involved in the resistance have no chance of being given a fair and democratic trial. In accordance with the traditions of Russian jurisprudence, the captured militant is blamed for all possible actions undertaken against the authorities in recent years. The authorities have their own reasons for doing this, since it allows the police to write off multiple attacks and shootings that remain unsolved. Therefore, it is not surprising that the besieged militant is taken into FSB custody alive. The militant has no choice, and he chooses death.

Multiple MVD, FSB, and defense ministry units were involved in the Ekazhevo village operation. Over the course of the two-day operation, four Kartoyev brothers were killed: Tukhan, Nazir, Akhmed and Magomed. Several more brothers –Tarkhana, Tatarkhana and Beslan– were detained. Additionally, two other village residents were killed, presumably the Dobryev’s. According to eyewitnesses, all three houses of the Kartoyev brothers were destroyed. Two residents of the village were detained –Yakub Aushev and his son. Eyewitnesses report that gunfire was returned only from the Dobryev house, where a firefight broke out between the occupants and members of the security services (www.ingushetia.org, March 3).

Said Buryatsky attracted attention by virtue of his proselytizing activities within the armed resistance. A native of distant Buryatia, born to a Buryat father and a Russian mother, he became neither a Buddhist (Buryats are Buddhists) nor a Christian (like his mother). Buryatsky during adulthood chose Islam as his personal religion and very rapidly (thanks to his YouTube lectures) became popular among the youth throughout Russia. His studies abroad (in Egypt and Kuwait) were not lengthy, thus it is unclear whether or not he received a diploma from al-Azkhara, one of the most important universities of the Islamic world. Well in advance of his decision to join the ranks of the militants, he actively supported the underlying thesis of the militants –a defensive jihad against the unbelievers who occupied territory. Therefore, in accordance with all Islamic laws, not only did he support the militancy, he also criticized those who, in his opinion, intentionally avoided fighting.

Buryatsky arrived in the Caucasus sometime at the end of 2007 or the beginning of 2008, where he provided major ideological support for the Caucasus Emirate, the representatives of which noticeably felt a shortage of such preachers. He often sharply criticized Sufi Muslims, critics of the Emirate, and spoke out against the commanders who disagreed with Doku Umarov’s views (for instance, Emir Arbi Yevmurzayev, better known as Sheikh Mansur, who died on February 23, 2010). His joining the ranks of the militants marked the beginning of a new period in the North Caucasus resistance movement. It resulted in the movement’s internationalization, attracting young recruits from among those living thousands of miles away from the region and demonstrated that the views and ideas of the movement were finding support among Russian youth. It may have played a role in the creation of a multitude of underground militant movement support clubs across the Russian Federation.

Said Buryatsky truly became a hero for many youths when he made a video of a suicide attack on a regional interior ministry (ROVD) building in the city of Nazran. This was received as inspirational, as many at first thought that it was Said Buryatsky himself who sat behind the wheel of the vehicle laden with TNT (http://guraba.net/rus/content/view/630/37/). In reality, he apparently planned the operation and filmed it nearby, which allowed the Russian security services to blame him for the blast. Buryatsky did not even bother to explain himself for having fooled his comrades with this video (www.youtube.com/watch?v=F4wFomfe68Q). But, the incident did not result in him losing any respect from his internet followers.

His death, the details of which have already become public, will likely become a powerful ideological tool in the hands of the armed resistance (www.hunafa.com, August 27, 2009). As it turns out, even in the last minutes of his life, he was preaching to his comrades, telling them to remain calm and to believe that a better world awaited them than the one they were leaving behind (www.kavkazcenter.com, March 6). Meanwhile, the authorities were happy to blame Buryatsky for all the major militant actions in Russia, including the attack on Nevsky Express train in November 2009 (Interfax, March 6).

Details released on the special operation in which Said Buryatsky was killed also contained several interesting revelations. For example, it transpired that among the casualties and those detained were employees of the Ingush police force and the treasury department. These were not youths, as Russian propaganda always tries to suggest. These were people well aware of the choices they made. They were people with ideological convictions, not involved simply by chance. The fact that some of those arrested were from the ranks of the police is a testament to the movement’s growing influence in society, which is permeating governmental structures. In Ingushetia, it was already widely believed that some ministers of the Ingush government were allegedly paid off (and are continuing to be paid off) by the militants. If there is even a shadow of truth in this claim, then it may well be the case that these payments constitute intentional aid, which would indicate a strong and varied support of the armed resistance in the North Caucasus overall.

The death of Said Buryatsky, despite the gravity of the loss, will not become the defining factor in the militants’ future tactics. Any loss among the militants is taken painlessly by the movement as a whole and will not likely affect the overall activities of the militant underground. Moreover, the conditions that foster local support for the resistance will continue. Despite his death, the popularity of Buryatsky and his preaching on You Tube will likely continue and inspire a new generation of militants in Russia and elsewhere.

President Yanukovych in Moscow: First Round of Tough Talks?

Pavel Korduban

Viktor Yanukovych’s first visit to Russia as Ukrainian president on March 5 showed that he is no more prone to making concessions to Moscow than any of his predecessors. Yanukovych quickly came to an agreement with Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev, and Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, on humanitarian issues, but that was natural, as Yanukovych and his voters in east and south Ukraine share with Russia the same post-Soviet mentality and share views on their common history. However, on economic matters, the Russian duumvirate will have to brace themselves for tough negotiations with Yanukovych on matters ranging from gas to customs regulations.

This was Yanukovych’s second foreign visit as head of state. Unlike Yushchenko, who paid his first foreign visit to Moscow in 2005, Yanukovych first traveled to Brussels to meet with EU officials on March 1. In response, Moscow reportedly considered lowering the status of his visit from official to working (Den, March 4). Yanukovych tried to downplay this, saying that “all roads lead to Moscow,” and that his choice of Brussels simply reflected it being the first invitation (UNIAN, March 5). This was not a comfortable start with a strong neighbor that easily takes offence. In any case, Medvedev told Yanukovych that he hoped that “a black streak” in relations would be over (www.kremlin.ru, March 5). Medvedev had shunned Yanukovych’s predecessor Viktor Yushchenko after August 2008, when Yushchenko had backed Georgia in its war with Russia.

Much was said in Moscow about the need to “turn a new leaf” in relations. Medvedev signaled his readiness to meet with Yanukovych at least twice more this year. Yanukovych said he would visit Russia in early May, and Medvedev stated that he would visit Ukraine in the first half of 2010. Medvedev suggested that he thought about Ukraine every morning (UNIAN, March 5). Boris Yeltsin once also urged Russian officials to think about Ukraine every morning.

Yanukovych and Medvedev agreed to jointly honor Red Army veterans and to celebrate the Victory Day in May together. Yanukovych promised to cancel Yushchenko’s decision to award the hero of Ukraine honor to World War II nationalist leader Stepan Bandera. Yanukovych also reiterated that he would push through parliament the legislation needed to raise the status of the Russian language (Interfax-Ukraine, March 5). These promises cost Yanukovych nothing, being in no way contradictory with his team’s views and his election promises. Regarding Bandera, not only Russia but also the European Parliament condemned Yushchenko’s decision as several EU members including Poland, view Bandera as a Nazi collaborator (www.europarl.europa.eu, February 25).

There was little progress reached beyond humanitarian issues. Commenting on the Russian Black Sea Fleet base in Sevastopol, Yanukovych said that consultations would continue and that Medvedev shared his view: “this issue is complicated” (Interfax-Ukraine, March 5). Moscow wants to extend its navy’s stationing in Sevastopol beyond 2017, as agreed in 1997, but this would contradict the Ukrainian constitution.

The Kremlin duumvirate was reluctant to discuss gas with Yanukovych, who is determined to revise the January 2009 gas contract with Gazprom. Ahead of his visit, Yanukovych had signaled that gas would be among the main issues on his agenda. He said in an interview with the BBC Ukrainian Service on March 1 that he would push for a revision of the contract with Russia, which was concluded by Yanukovych’s arch-rival Yulia Tymoshenko, who was ousted as prime minister on March 3. Yanukovych said the price for Ukraine was not fair.

Ahead of Yanukovych’s visit, the Kommersant-Ukraine daily said on March 5, citing sources in Yanukovych’s team, that his main task in Moscow would be to lower the gas price for Ukraine from the current $305 per 1,000 cubic meters to as low as $205. The daily also predicted that Yanukovych would try to persuade Moscow to either abandon the South Stream gas pipeline project, or correct it to allow the participation of Ukrainian companies. If no agreement was reached, the daily’s sources in Yanukovych’s team said, Kyiv might consider resuming gas exports to central Europe, which were abandoned in the mid-2000’s at Moscow’s insistence, and importing liquefied natural gas from Algeria or Qatar in order to lessen dependence on Russian gas. Despite, Yanukovych’s determination, Russian Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko said the gas price issue was not discussed during Yanukovych’s meeting with Medvedev. Shmatko suggested it might be raised once a new Ukrainian cabinet is formed (Interfax-Ukraine, March 5).

Putin invited Yanukovych to join the customs union of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. However, Yanukovych told the Russian Vesti TV on March 6 that Ukraine as a World Trade Organization (WTO) member could only join the union on WTO conditions. Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, are only in talks to join the WTO, while Ukraine joined in 2008. In an interview to Euronews, Yanukovych said he could not see a clear picture of what Ukraine would be doing in the customs union and how it might benefit from membership. Yanukovych also ruled out recognition of the Georgian breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia (www.euronews.net, March 5).

US Assists Kyrgyzstan in Constructing Anti-Terrorist Center in Batken

Erica Marat and Den Isa

During his visit to Bishkek on March 10, the Commander of the United States Central Command (CENTCOM), General David Petraeus, reiterated that by helping to build an anti-terrorist center in Batken city, Washington does not seek to open an additional military base. The Kyrgyz President, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, in turn, argued that most security challenges to Kyrgyzstan stem from Afghanistan and that his regime needs to be better prepared to resist terrorism (Times of Central Asia, March 10). The US government will invest $5.5 to build the center and construction work will begin next year (www.korrespondent.net, March 9).

Apart from his international meetings, President Bakiyev rarely mentions Afghanistan’s role in national security. Rather, different views about potential threats permeate Kyrgyzstan’s military and political officials. Thus far, little is known about the real interests among Kyrgyz military officials who were negotiating with CENTCOM. However, the evidence suggests that some key military leaders see the new Batken anti-terrorist center’s future role as the principal deterrent against possible aggression emerging from Uzbekistan.

As one representative of the Kyrgyz defense ministry told Jamestown, military officials in Bishkek hope to maintain a military battalion in the southern part of the country to respond to “local conflicts.” The terminology assumes that such conflicts would be initiated by Uzbek troops. There is a widely held view among the Kyrgyz military that Tashkent is developing its military forces with the aim of one day acquiring Kyrgyzstan’s water reservoirs and protecting the ethnic Uzbek population living in Osh and Batken by military means.

Training at the Batken anti-terrorist center will be conducted under the auspices of the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. IMET programs have already been widely implemented in Kyrgyzstan, including in Tokmok city, where similar training facilities were built. The anti-terrorist center will include advanced medical facilities that have no equivalent in the entire region (www.msn.kg, February 26).

The base is planned to be positioned in a unique part of the Batken area, where the risk of attacks from the air or over land are minimal. Overall, the new military training center will represent the Kyrgyz regime’s continued strategy of strengthening its southern borders by building up its military strength. Negotiations on the construction of the center began in August 2008. One year later, the Kyrgyz and US sides reached an agreement on most issues. Reportedly, Bakiyev’s maneuvering with the US military base at Manas, when he first demanded its withdrawal and then changed his mind, did not affect the final negotiations. The initiative to construct the center mainly came from the Kyrgyz side.

Kyrgyz military officials realize that the center would in many cases serve an important role for the country’s security compared to the prospective Russian airbase in Osh. The Russian base is planned to be constructed within the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) framework and will mostly host Russian personnel. The Batken center will include special training facilities for the anti-terrorist battalion “Skorpion.” It will train specialists to analyze tendencies within terrorism in the Central Asian region. Kyrgyzstan clearly lacks such experts today, and the current Defense Minister, Bakytbek Kalyev, has been pushing for the construction of a special think-tank that would provide cutting-edge analysis on such trends in the Ferghana Valley and beyond.

The prospect that a new class of military and civilian personnel would be trained with the help of US government is another element that interests the Kyrgyz government. So far, US-trained Kyrgyz military personnel have been leaving the military upon returning to service from IMET courses in the United States. Most graduates were frustrated with how the skills they acquired turned out to be largely irrelevant and unappreciated in Kyrgyzstan’s military. “The center will generate a critical mass of US-trained officers,” one Kyrgyz defense ministry representative told Jamestown.

Although most Russian media see the new military center as yet another geopolitical move on the part of Washington, it is important to note that the initiative to build the facility stemmed from the Kyrgyz side (www.gazeta.ru, March 9). The official reason underlying the need for the new center is rooted in the terrorist threat emanating from Afghanistan, and differs from an unofficial viewpoint that suggests the Kyrgyz elites want to militarily protect the southern part of the country more from their neighbor.

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