IN THIS ISSUE

* Russia raises its strategic profile in Latin America
* Yanukovych promotes balanced relations with the West and Russia
* …while the Kremlin applies increased pressure on its neighbor
* US draft resolution on genocide may stimulate Turkish-Armenian rapprochement
** New in the Jamestown blog on Russia and Eurasia (http://www.jamestown.org/blog):
- Troubling Signs in Ukraine as New President Flouts Constitution

Sergei Lavrov Travels to Latin America

Stephen Blank

During his presidential tour of Latin America in 2008, Dmitry Medvedev said that Russia’s Latin American policy was only beginning. Although the pace of these relations cooled in 2009, due to the global economic crisis, Moscow is now making good on Medvedev’s promise. On February 11-17, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, toured the region making stops in Cuba, Mexico, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. Besides this tour, President Medvedev and other key officials, such as Deputy Prime Minister, Igor Sechin, have also been very active lately regarding Latin American policy. Medvedev hosted Guyana’s President, Bharrat Jagdeo, and announced that Russia has taken a strategic decision to intensify its links with Latin America, pursuing cooperation vital to the balance of forces and interests in the world and global problems like climate change (Rossiya 24 TV, February 2; Interfax, February 1, 2).

According to Lavrov, and other officials, two key areas where Russian ties to Latin America will be intensified are overall trade, and in particular “military-technical cooperation,” (arms sales) (ITAR-TASS, February 20; ITAR-TASS, February 17). Thus, this upgraded trade and economic relationship aims at weakening the US in the global arena, and is fundamentally political in its ultimate orientation.

Russian firms are moving forward in friendly countries like Ecuador, where the OAO Gidroproyekt Institute has joined a consortium with Mexican and Ecuadorian firms to build hydropower plants there (ITAR-TASS, February 18). Sechin is particularly active in the energy field. As Chairman of the Board of the Russian Consortium for Venezuela he has recently held talks with Venezuela’s Energy Minister, Rafael Ramirez, and is supervising the new Russian investment in the Junin-6 oil field that could produce 450,000 barrels per day (ITAR-TASS, February 1; Interfax, February 17; Interfax, January 31). GazpromNeft is also investing in Cuba (Interfax, February 2). Sechin publicly defended Lavrov against charges that Moscow is seeking to entice Cuba to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia, by offering Russian investment in return for such recognition. Instead, he claimed that Russo-Cuban relations are based on long-standing mutual ties that go beyond cold economic calculations (Kommersant, February 15; Havana Prensa Latina, February 18).

Of course, such denials immediately arouse the suspicion that this is indeed one motive, as was the case with Nicaragua after 2008 when it recognized these two provinces as independent states. Indeed, in Havana, Lavrov negotiated further economic agreements with Cuba, mainly in regard to economic infrastructure, and both sides agreed to reestablish a “strategic partnership.” This partnership entails more cooperation at the UN and other international organizations on the basis of their shared viewpoint. They also reached agreement on joint activities to shape a “polycenric world order based on equality and respect for the observance of international law” (an anti-American thrust to policy) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (www.mid.ru) February 10; www.mid.ru, February 15; ITAR-TASS, February 10, 11).

In Guatemala, Lavrov discussed trade issues and signed an anti-drug agreement that includes the provision of “special equipment” to its security forces. In fact, Russia had offered to sell Guatemala arms in 2009. Without being specific, Lavrov also alluded to general military-technical cooperation between the two states and the Russian media pointed out that arms sales to Ecuador and Venezuela were also described as being designed to fight crime and drugs, and therefore we may see more arms sales to Guatemala (Guatemala City Prensa Libre, February 16; www.mid.ru, February 14, 18). In Nicaragua, Lavrov and President Daniel Ortega also stated their intention to combat drug trafficking and pointed to increased military-technical cooperation and overall trade and investments (ITAR-TASS, February 15). Indeed, Moscow is preparing joint military drills with Nicaragua, as a step beyond arms sales (RIA Novosti, February 15). Moreover, Nicaragua is apparently acting as a promoter of enhanced Latin American ties with Russia, particularly in such groupings as Chavez’s ALBA, an organization intended to promote his “Bolivarian revolution” throughout the region (www.mid.ru, February 16).

Finally, in Mexico, Lavrov found that the country also wants cooperation with Russia in the fight against drugs and crime as well as enhanced trade. Thus, Mexico is apparently interested in buying Russian helicopters (ITAR-TASS, February 16; EFE, February 17; www.reforma.com, February 17). Lavrov cited Mexico as a friendly state that is growing in importance and interested, as is Russia, in fighting terrorism, strengthening the UN, and promoting the observance of international law. He also noted Mexico’s membership in 2009-2010 as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, G20, and APEC. Thus, his discussions in Mexico dealt with the anti-drug and anti-crime issues, but also with collective efforts to overcome the global financial crisis (www.mid.ru, February 18, 19; ITAR-TASS, February 4).

In general, these talks clearly encompassed routine bilateral issues like trade, investment, tourism, and Russian assistance in the struggles against crime and the drug trade. In each country, specific issues such as Russian support for overturning the US embargo on Cuba, also arose. Nevertheless, it seems clear that Moscow’s underlying agenda is strategic. The economic relationships are a means to an end of eliciting Latin American support for Russian positions on key issues in world politics, while at the same time Moscow is cementing its relations with partners like Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Cuba, and increasing its overall arms sales offensive in Latin America. Inasmuch as many of those earlier arms sales to Venezuela in particular have aided drug running organizations like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) (with Moscow’s undoubted knowledge), it is of considerable interest to see whether or not the continuing sales of arms allegedly under the auspices of anti-drug assistance, will actually be used to strengthen or in fact to weaken Latin American security and the interests of the US and its partners in the region.

Yanukovych in Moscow: More Than Balancing his Brussels Visit

Vladimir Socor

Ukraine’s newly elected President, Viktor Yanukovych, paid a visit (and, to a degree, homage) to Moscow on March 5. Inaugurated in office on February 25, Yanukovych chose Brussels as his first destination for a working visit abroad on March 1 (EDM, March 4). Having tilted strongly toward Russia in the electoral campaign, Yanukovych nevertheless responded positively to the European Union’s overtures in Brussels, then reverted to type as an “eastern Ukrainian” politician during his Moscow visit.

Yanukovych held talks with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin in separate sessions. The Ukrainian president seemed to adopt a subordinate, at times supine, attitude toward both Russian leaders during the joint briefings that concluded the talks. Aggressive questions from Russian media, bordering on political demands, increased the pressure on Yanukovych. The questions were few and clearly pre-arranged by the Kremlin to extract promises of concessions from Yanukovych on issues of Russian interest (Russian presidential website, March 6).

Apparently, the leaders’ talks were brief and rushed during the one-day visit. No decisions were made or even approached. Both Medvedev and Putin stated that any decisions must await the formation of a new parliamentary majority and government in Ukraine. Whether this process will necessitate new parliamentary elections, remains an open question. The issue of natural gas, which looms so large in Ukraine-Russia relations, was left almost unmentioned publicly during Yanukovych’s visit. The joint communiqué reads as a perfunctory document in its brevity and vagueness (Interfax, March 6).

The visit’s atmosphere was remarkably subdued, Russian media coverage low-key, and the official rhetoric tinged with mutual wariness. Moscow clearly discouraged any expectation that Yanukovych’s presidency and a possible Party of Regions-led government would qualify for Russian economic assistance on political grounds.

Both sides spoke of a fresh start, after a five-year nadir in their relations during Viktor Yushchenko’s presidency in Ukraine (this unequivocal assessment discounts Yushchenko’s January 2006-January 2008 record: bringing RosUkrEnergo into Ukraine, scuttling the US-led Sea Breeze exercises, and bringing Yanukovych back as prime minister with presidential prospects). In Moscow, Yanukovych pledged a complete turnaround in the relationship. But, far from being upbeat, the mood seemed grim and even somewhat ominous on the Russian side: “We must make up for the lost time,” urged Putin. “What we mean is not so much improving relations, but reviving or resuscitating them, using strong-impact measures (pri silno deystvuyushchikh stredstv),” pressed Medvedev (Interfax, Russian presidential website, March 5, 6).

Looking intimidated or awkward from time to time, Yanukovych tried hard to explain that his sequence of visits (Brussels before Moscow) was merely coincidental, and that ultimately “all roads lead to Moscow” (Interfax, March 5).

In the wake of Yanukovych’s visit, the Gazprom-owned, pro-governmental Izvestiya commented on the visit in prosecutorial terms. It accused the Ukrainian president of infringing Ukraine’s non-bloc status by visiting Brussels before Moscow; leaving open the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO; refusing to promise outright to prolong the stationing of the Russian Black Sea Fleet; and turning down the option of Ukraine joining the Russian-led Customs Union. This indictment is so clearly exaggerated that it must be seen as a deliberate attempt to pressure Yanukovych and his business supporters (Izvestiya, March 9).

The Brussels and Moscow visits have probably set a pattern for Yanukovych’s presidency. He is moving almost without transition from a pro-Russian electoral campaign to a double-vector policy toward Russia and the West. Meanwhile, Yanukovych has no real popular mandate for new policy initiatives, having been elected with less than one half of the votes cast, and lacking a parliamentary majority (although he and Donetsk business may cobble together a parliamentary majority). For all these reasons, the president is not in a position to deliver on any agreements with Russia at this time. Thus, Moscow must postpone any decisions on Ukraine policy until the formation of a parliamentary majority and government in Kyiv. Meanwhile, Yanukovych and Party of Regions leaders are closely watching US and European policies toward Russia and drawing their conclusions (see “Salient Issues in Ukraine-Russia Relations and Yanukovych’s Moscow Visit,” EDM, March 10).

Salient Issues in Ukraine-Russia Relations and Yanukovych’s Moscow Visit

Vladimir Socor

Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych’s visit to Moscow on March 5 (see “Yanukovych in Moscow: More Than Balancing the Brussels Visit,” EDM, March 10) focused almost entirely on bilateral relations, practically overlooking or avoiding international issues. The following issues were discussed in public:

• Governance model: Yanukovych praised Moscow’s handling of the financial-economic crisis as a worthy example for Ukraine to follow. Political stability has helped Russia to cope better than Ukraine did with the crisis, he observed. “My task is now to catch up with Russia, bring our living standards, pensions and social assistance up to Russian levels,” the gaffe-prone Yanukovych pledged. Sarcastically he offered to send some Ukrainian “demagogues” (politikany, politikanstvo) to Russia, so that the Russian people could even better appreciate the stability they enjoy. When Yanukovych said at one point that he must await the formation of a new coalition, Medvedev retorted: “I do not need to form a coalition to resolve any problems” (BBC Monitoring, March 9).

According to the Levada Center’s latest surveys of Russian public opinion, only 8 percent believe that Ukraine is more democratic than Russia. Conversely, between 50 percent to 65 percent believe that Russia is more democratic than Ukraine and feel compassion for the country because it must live with uncertainty about election results (Vedomosti, March 9). Such findings spell the end of Western assumptions, and Moscow’s fears, that the Orange Revolution might have provided a democratic example to Russia.

• Language Policy: Responding to the Russian media’s leading questions, Yanukovych assured Moscow that he would keep his presidential campaign promise to implement the European Charter on Regional and Minority Languages. This will result in conferring official status to the Russian language (apparently on a par with Ukrainian) in many of Ukraine’s regions, particularly in the Party of Regions’ strongholds.

Following his return from Moscow, Yanukovych made an appearance at the shrine to Ukrainian national poet Taras Shevchenko, assuring Ukrainians that their language would alone retain the status of the state language on a country-wide basis, while Russian would receive official status in certain regions (Interfax, March 9). This will, however, not allay concerns about linguistic de-Ukrainization and re-Russification in Ukraine’s east and south, resulting from this measure. As a sop, Medvedev and Yanukovych have decided to hold a joint Taras Shevchenko Year in Ukraine and Russia.

• Russia-Ukraine Interstate Commission: created and co-chaired by Putin and Yushchenko while presidents, the commission has remained inactive. Some of the sub-commissions have met periodically, however, notably the one tasked to delimit the maritime border and discuss contentious issues related to the Russian Black Sea Fleet based on Ukraine’s territory. Both sides now intend to hold a full meeting of the Interstate Commission during the first half of this year in Kyiv, in connection with Medvedev’s planned visit there. Ahead of that event, the new Ukrainian government (if and when it is installed) will prepare an action plan for the commission’s consideration.

• Black Sea Fleet: Medvedev and Yanukovych agreed that bilateral consultations should continue as before, based on the 1997 agreements on the temporary stationing of the Black Sea Fleet on Ukrainian territory. Characterizing this as a very difficult and complicated problem, Yanukovych implied that it can ultimately be settled by the two presidents among themselves. At the news conference, he promised to help resolve the issue “in a way that would satisfy both Ukraine and Russia,” and even “very soon.” The first part of the answer merely echoes Yanukovych’s campaign rhetoric, when he suggested prolonging the basing agreement beyond the 2017 deadline. The “very soon,” however, is a disconcerting addendum, possibly presaging a quick deal to Ukraine’s detriment.

• NATO: Russian leaders had apparently hoped for an explicit Yanukovych statement that Ukraine will not seek NATO membership (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, March 9). At the press conference, a planted question attempted to goad Yanukovych into endorsing an anti-NATO referendum, signatures for which are currently being collected in Ukraine. Instead, Yanukovych merely declared that “Ukraine will develop its relations with NATO as a non-bloc state and in accordance with its national interests” (Interfax, March 5).

• Soviet Legacy Preservation: Medvedev and Yanukovych agreed to celebrate the Soviet “great patriotic war” together in Moscow on May 8, and to “synchronize” the celebrations on May 9 with Belarus President Alyaksandr Lukashenka on a tripartite basis. This configuration was the only hint at a post-Soviet “Eastern Slavic solidarity” during Yanukovych’s visit.

Yanukovych promised to revoke, before the May celebrations, the Hero of Ukraine titles that Yushchenko had awarded to Stepan Bandera and Roman Shukevych, the leaders of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) during the 1940’s. One of the most tactless decisions of the Yushchenko presidency, the award has become an irritant in Ukrainian-Polish relations, given that the UPA had mainly targeted the Polish civilian population and Armija Krajowa units in 1941-44 (and Bandera was an anti-Polish fighter prior to the war). From 1944 onward, however, the UPA resisted against the Soviet authorities, an activity that Russian authorities today continue to regard as criminal, in Ukraine or anywhere.

• Natural Gas: Yanukovych announced on the visit’s eve that he would urgently raise the issues of Russian gas supplies and transit (Russia-24 TV, March 4), meaning price cuts for Russian gas supplies, in return for sharing control of Ukraine’s transit system with Gazprom in a consortium. The current price is said to be $305 per one thousand cubic meters, with Yanukovych seeking a reduction to $210 (Kommersant, March 5). Key industrialists behind Yanukovych and his Party of Regions need discounted gas to maintain their competitive position internationally. The party itself would promise cheap gas to the populace, if snap parliamentary elections are held in Ukraine this year, as seems distinctly possible. Gazprom control of Ukraine’s transit system would be the price for cheap gas.

Ironically, Yanukovych accused the outgoing Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko of “destroying the contractual basis” of the Russian-Ukrainian gas trade. However, it was Putin who signed the contract with Tymoshenko in January 2009, and Moscow declares itself satisfied with its commercial terms to this day. According to Russian Energy Minister, Sergei Shmatko, after the talks, the gas price and gas transport consortium have not been discussed with Yanukovych. Moscow will discuss this issue after the formation of a new Ukrainian government, and as part of preparations for Medvedev’s planned visit to Kyiv in the first half of the year (RIA Novosti, March 6).

• Steel: Yanukovych solicited lower tariff barriers and higher quantitative quotas for Russian imports of Ukrainian steel products (Interfax, March 7). This remains a contentious issue in bilateral relations at the state level from the mid-1990’s to date. Former president Leonid Kuchma and his governments (including Yanukovych’s) perennially raised this grievance with their Russian counterparts. Leading Ukrainian steel producers expanded into European markets in recent years, reducing their interests in ties with Russia. The economic crisis, however, has increased again the importance of the Russian market to the Donetsk steel industry. It seeks not only to return there but also to bid for contracts to supply steel pipes for Russia’s Nord Stream and South Stream pipeline projects.

• Customs Union: Russian leaders had expected Yanukovych to consent, at least in principle, to join the Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan Customs Union and, in a follow-up stage, the Single Economic Space planned by those countries (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, March 9). Yanukovych demurred twice, citing Ukraine’s membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) as its overriding choice. This must have irritated the Russian leaders. When Yanukovych spoke afterward of a “complete turnaround in Ukrainian-Russian relations,” Putin retorted curtly: “Then join the Customs Union” (Interfax, March 5, 7).

That remark displays Moscow’s approach to the Customs Union as a Russian-owned project, participation in it being a function of each country’s bilateral relations with Russia. The relevant paragraph in the joint concluding declaration, however, reads: “Respecting the freedom of choice, mechanisms and forms of the countries’ participation in economic integration processes, Russia and Ukraine will strive to ensure that this participation does not harm the interests of their bilateral cooperation.” Thus, Moscow desists, at least for now, from asking Ukraine to choose between the WTO and the Russian-led Customs Union.

• Agriculture: A cryptic remark by Yanukovych in Moscow seemed to allude to a Russian-Ukrainian grain cartel. This idea has tentatively been broached earlier, but was not developed. Yanukovych said in Moscow that Ukraine, always a great breadbasket, “must use the huge potential of our agricultural sector” together with Russia. He suggested that “joint actions in the grain market” be included in the action plan, which is to be prepared for the meeting of the Russia-Ukraine Inter-governmental Commission in the first half of this year (Interfax, March 5).

US House Vote Adds New Twist to Turkey-Armenia Diplomacy

Emil Danielyan

A key committee in the United States House of Representatives has once again approved a draft resolution recognizing the 1915 mass killings and deportations of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire as genocide. The dramatic development, condemned by Ankara and welcomed in Yerevan is widely seen in Armenia as heralding a last-ditched attempt by Washington to salvage the Turkish-Armenian normalization agreements signed in October under American mediation.

Armenian politicians and pundits believe that Washington will now use the prospect of the resolution’s adoption by the full House in its efforts to persuade Ankara to drop its conditions for ratifying the agreements. Yerevan, meanwhile, has reaffirmed its intention to annul the landmark deal if the US pressure on Ankara yields no results in the coming months.

The bill, narrowly endorsed by the House Foreign Affairs Committee on March 4, calls on President Barack Obama to “accurately characterize the systematic and deliberate annihilation of 1,500,000 Armenians as genocide.” “The vast majority of experts, academics, authorities in international law and others, who have looked at this issue for years, agree that the tragic massacre of Armenians constitutes genocide,” Howard Berman, the committee chairman, said during the committee debate on the issue broadcast live by Armenian and Turkish television channels.

The Congressional panel has previously passed similar resolutions in 2000, 2005, and 2007. Heavy lobbying by the White House (and uproar in Ankara) kept them from reaching the House floor. Berman seems to have faced no such pressure from the Obama administration. It was not until March 3, almost one month after he scheduled the vote, that US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reportedly telephoned the California Democrat and asked him to drop the proposed legislation. Clinton and other administration officials pointedly declined to oppose it until then, adding to Turkish anger. Turkey’s Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, complained that the Obama administration did not lobby hard enough against a bill which is at odds with the official Turkish version of the events in 1915 (Hurriyet Daily News, March 5).

Many in Armenia take a similar view, suggesting that Washington itself engineered the House committee vote to gain a potent bargaining chip in its Armenia-related dealings with Ankara. In the words of Razmik Zohrabian, a deputy chairman in the ruling Republican Party of Armenia, the Americans have “realized that they should talk to Turkey with pressure and force” (www.armenialiberty.org, March 5). Stepan Safarian, a senior lawmaker from the opposition Heritage Party, likewise construed the genocide resolution as a US attempt to “make Turkey sober up” (Haykakan Zhamanak, March 6).

“The American side is clearly trying to … secure the ratification of the Turkish-Armenian protocols by the Turkish parliament in return for preventing a resolution debate reaching the full US House of Representatives,” Haykakan Zhamanak, a leading Armenian daily, editorialized on March 6. An unnamed senior official from the Turkish foreign ministry cited by Hurriyet Daily News made a similar point. Davutoglu also appeared to allude to such a possibility during his March 5 news conference in Ankara. He said his government will not be “pressured” into establishing diplomatic relations with Armenia and opening the Turkish-Armenian border –something which is envisaged by the two protocols.

Turkish leaders, notably Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, have for months made clear that Turkey’s parliament will not ratify the accords without a resolution of the Karabakh conflict acceptable to Azerbaijan. “Turkey’s insisting on conditionality, which was not part of the protocols, has led us to where we are today,” Hugh Pope, the Turkey analyst with the Brussels-based International Crisis Group, told the Christian Science Monitor, commenting on the House committee vote.

Yerevan’s swift and highly positive reaction to the genocide resolution was a measure of its growing frustration with Ankara’s Karabakh linkage. “This is additional proof of the devotion of the American people to universal human values and is an important step toward the prevention of the crimes against humanity,” Armenian Foreign Minister, Edward Nalbandian, said in a written statement. Armenian officials were previously more cautious in their public pronouncements on the bill formally introduced by pro-Armenian US lawmakers in early 2009.

During an informal conversation with Davutoglu in Kiev on February 25, Armenian President, Serzh Sargsyan, voiced his most explicit threat yet to walk away from the deal, if Ankara fails to honor it “within the shortest possible time” (Statement by the Armenian presidential press service, February 25). On the same day, the Armenian parliament passed legal amendments that make it easier for the Sargsyan government to terminate international treaties before their ratification (Aravot, February 26).

Speaking to Armenian state television on March 5, Nalbandian stood by his view that the international community would blame Turkey for the possible collapse of the normalization process. The authorities in Yerevan have clearly been buoyed by continued US calls for the rapid and unconditional ratification of the protocols. The genocide bill and the increased expectation of stronger US pressure on Ankara seem to have only boosted their confidence.

Some Armenian officials implied, until recently, that the Turkish side has until late March to validate the protocols or face their unilateral repeal by Armenia. But the latest indications are that Yerevan is ready to wait at least until the April 24 annual remembrance of more than one million Ottoman Armenians killed in what many historians consider the first genocide of the twentieth century. Ankara hopes that Obama will again refrain from using the word “genocide” in a statement that he is due to issue on the occasion.

Obama expressed his “firmly held conviction that the Armenian genocide is … a widely documented fact supported by an overwhelming body of historical evidence,” when he ran for president and sought the backing of the influential Armenian-American community. “As President, I will recognize the Armenian genocide,” he said in a January 2008 statement. Obama broke his campaign pledge after taking office, citing the need not to hamper the ongoing Turkish-Armenian rapprochement.

Hillary Clinton, who likewise pledged to recognize the genocide during the US presidential race, made the same argument when she indicated on March 5 that the Obama administration will try to prevent a full House vote on the controversial resolution (www.armenialiberty.org). Justifying this stance will be much more difficult if the stalled normalization process ends in failure. This alone should make the administration keenly interested in its successful promotion.

To view other artciles published by Eurasia Daily Monitor, The Jamestown Foundation click here