IN THIS ISSUE

* Mistral plans arouse fierce opposition in Moscow
* Continuing disappearances outrage Ingushetia’s residents
* Turkey responds to the “genocide” resolution by House Foreign Affairs Committee
* Visit the Jamestown blog on Russia and Eurasia (http://www.jamestown.org/blog):
- Hard Questions Loom as the Russo-Georgian Border Crossing Opens

Mistral Procurement Disguises Weak Condition of the Black Sea Fleet

Roger McDermott

Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev’s, recent trip to Paris for bilateral talks with his French counterpart Nicolas Sarkozy, followed by receiving the Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych in Moscow on March 5, intensified speculation over the procurement of the amphibious helicopter landing ship, Mistral, and the future of the Black Sea Fleet base in the Crimea (Interfax, March 2-5). Also, on March 5, the Russian Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov stated that Moscow wants to purchase one helicopter carrier abroad and build three identical platforms on its own territory. While reiterating that in addition to the ongoing negotiations with France, talks were also in progress with the Netherlands and Spain, he dismissed the criticism made by some analysts that the Mistral acquisition represents mere pleasure boats. Serdyukov specifically noted that the Mistral-type vessel “can perform a lot of functions, from a command ship to a hospital, a landing ship, or a helicopter carrier” (Rossiya TV, March 5).

An anonymous Russian military-diplomatic source told Interfax that the talks with Paris were progressing satisfactorily, and are expected to result in contracts being signed by the end of the year. According to the source, the first Mistral-type vessel will be built in France, the second produced jointly in Russia and an additional two ships built domestically in Russian shipyards. Moreover, the number was not coincidental, since one vessel each will be procured by the Northern, Pacific, Baltic and Black Sea Fleets (BSF), “primarily as command and control ships” (Interfax, March 3). This makes sense as the Russian armed forces in general are in the early stages of adopting network-centric warfare capabilities, on which point President Medvedev told an expanded session of the defense ministry board on March 5 to step up the work of modernization in this area, while more specifically in naval terms it would significantly enhance the capability of the Russian navy to conduct sixth generation warfare.

On February 26, NATO Secretary-General Special Representative Robert Simmons downplayed Moscow’s declarations concerning the strengthening of the BSF with frigates and submarines in response to Romania's decision to deploy US ballistic missile defense components on its territory (Interfax, March 3).

Alexander Khramchikhin, the Deputy Director of the Moscow-based Institute for Political and Military Analysis, questioned the justification for deploying Mistral-type vessels in the Black Sea, in the absence of the necessary supporting ships and infrastructure. Admiral (retired) Vladimir Solovyev, who headed the BSF intelligence for 12 years prior to his retirement, highlighted the weakened condition of the fleet: arguing that it is not capable of fulfilling its minimum number of tasks. He lamented the lack of progress on renovating existing ships, and suggested it now relies on naval aviation and infantry to carry out any offensive mission (Svobodnaya Pressa, March 3).

Apart from the guided missile cruiser Moskva and the Kerch, Ochakov has been written off and there are plans to scrap three more destroyers. There are up to 50 units of various vessels, cutters and support ships based at Sevastopol. Solovyev noted that the Moskva entered service in 1983. Yet, the Kommuna rescue ship is almost 100 years old, originally designed to aid submarines in the Imperial Russian Navy; it remains operational and is included in the constant readiness forces (Svobodnaya Pressa, March 3). According to Mikhail Babich, the Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee for Defense, and a known critic of the ongoing military reform, in 2000 the defense budget reached 141 billion rubles ($4.74 billion) of which 81 billion rubles ($2.72 billion) was spent on the state defense order. In 2008, the budget was 1.136 trillion rubles ($38.2 billion), while in 2009 the state defense order amounted to 365 billion rubles ($12.2 billion). Despite these figures reflecting only nominal growth, after calibrating annual inflation, and increases in production costs this did not result in any breakthrough in supplying the armed forces with new weapons and equipment (Zaftra, March 5).

Other independent experts are equally critical of the Mistral procurement as a means of addressing the current condition of the Russian navy. Ruslan Pukhov, the Director of the Moscow-based Center of Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST) summarized the venture: “When we cannot build the necessary number of corvettes and frigates, let alone destroyers, throwing away several hundred million Euros on an obvious luxury item is like living in a hovel and buying a Bentley and parking it in the yard together with old bangers. This is an obvious attempt by a pauper to buy a luxury item” (Center TV, March 7).

Although Serdyukov’s reforms have received clear political backing from President Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, insufficient attention has been paid to naval reform or modernization. The plan to relocate the Navy headquarters from Moscow to St. Petersburg was postponed last year, partly as a result of the economic crisis and fierce opposition from serving admirals. The Mistral procurement also arouses suspicion, both among the naval top brass and within the defense industry. The navy has little to boast about, and seems plagued by the weaknesses of the Bulava program and the new generation Project 885 Yesen-class nuclear powered attack submarines. The trials of the Project 677 Sankt-Peterburg submarine have now entered their fifth year, with no conclusion in sight; the construction and design of other series-built corvettes and combat-support ships have witnessed similar delays (Zaftra, March 5).

Moreover, a Kremlin spokesman reportedly disclosed to Vedomosti in early February that the Mistral issue has caused division within the Russian Security Council. It appears that while Serdyukov has actively backed foreign acquisition, the majority of security officials oppose it. Nevertheless, Medvedev has offered his backing to forging a deal, which although it serves to reveal fractures within NATO, equally exposes a divided approach toward the Alliance in Moscow (www.politkom.ru, March 5).

Indeed, in the context of the slow pace of shipbuilding and the procurement of modern types of naval armament it is unclear how the Mistral acquisition might reignite domestic production capabilities. Equally, it is telling that in June 2009, when the Chief of the General Staff, Army-General Nikolai Makarov, gave an extensive two hour and thirty minute press conference explaining the aims and motives underlying the reforms, that so little of his speech referred to the future of the navy (transcript, Kommersant, July 12, 2009).

Ingush Organize Demonstration to Protest Against Kidnappings of Compatriots

Valery Dzutsev

On March 6, several hundred protestors in Ingushetia’s Plievo settlement, which is situated in the vicinity of Nazran, the republic’s largest town, blocked local highways and demanded that authorities investigate the kidnapping of Mikail Pliev. Ingushetia’s leading opposition figure, Magomed Khazbiev, joined the demonstration. Police used armored vehicles and force to disperse the protestors, but eventually the relatives of the kidnapping victim agreed to unblock the highway after Ingushetia’s President, Yunus-bek Yevkurov, promised to meet with them. However, the protest actions continued on March 7 as no clarification as to Pliev’s fate was provided. Opposition leader Khazbiev received an official warning not to take part in the demonstration (www.ingushetiyaru.org, March 6-7).

A 33 years-old father of five, businessman Mikail Pliev was kidnapped on March 5 while he was visiting the market in Pyatigorsk, in the neighboring Russian-speaking Stavropol region. Pyatigorsk hosts one of the largest marketplaces in the North Caucasus and has been designated as the capital of the newly created North Caucasus Federal District.

Witnesses allegedly saw Pliev being arrested by the police; however, police denied they had arrested him. Pliev’s relatives feared that he was snatched by the security forces. “We simply want to know, where our relative [Mikail Pliev] is,” one of the protesters said, adding: “We have addressed the local police, Pyatigorsk law enforcement agencies. The practice of recent years shows that if a person is not found within the next few days after his disappearance, he is unlikely to ever be found. So we will stand as long as we can” (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, March 6-7).

On March 2, the World Organization Against Torture expressed its fears that four Ingush men (Ali Dzhaniev, Yusup Dobriev, Yunus Dobriev and Magomed Adzhiev) had been “subjected to enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing.” In a letter addressed to President Dmitry Medvedev, the secretary general of the organization, Eric Sottas, wrote that these men, all relatives of the widow of the well-known Ingush opposition leader, Maksharip Aushev, had disappeared in St. Petersburg on the night of December 28, 2009. According to relatives of the disappeared men, they found surveillance camera video footage showing eight cars chasing and blocking the car of the kidnapped men. Investigators reportedly refused to take this video into account. The organization urged President Medvedev to ensure that a proper investigation of the disappearance of the four men was carried out.

Scores of Maksharip Aushev’s relatives disappeared or died in unexplained attacks since his death on October 25. On December 16, before the four men vanished in St. Petersburg, a car with Aushev’s widow, her mother and two brothers blew up after it was searched at a police checkpoint in Ingushetia. Only the widow survived the attack, which took place a week after the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced a posthumous award for Maksharip Aushev as one of two “exceptional human rights champions” (www.state.gov, December 9, 2009).

There are strong signs that Russian government authorities were involved in the attacks on Ingush opposition leader and his relatives. This can be described as an unprecedented pressure on a single group of relatives.

It is remarkable that the increased number of attacks with the apparent involvement of government forces on citizens of Ingushetia has been reported outside of the republic. This may be indicative of the law enforcement agencies’ extremely weak position in the republic and their fear of a possible popular revolt. This means that the government has lost control over the situation in Ingushetia, with only fear remaining as one of the few instruments for imposing any semblance of order in the republic.

On March 2, the North Caucasus insurgency leader Aleksandr Tikhomirov, aka Sheik Said Buryatsky, was killed in a massive police operation along with several other rebels in Ekazhevo, Ingushetia. It is noteworthy how differently President Medvedev and Ingushetia’s leadership reacted to what the Federal Security Service (FSB) portrayed as its big success. Medvedev hailed the FSB’s achievement and ordered its head, Aleksandr Bortnikov, to prepare a list of servicemen to receive state awards (RIA Novosti, March 6). Ingush President Yunus-bek Yevkurov, expressing his wariness, was quoted as saying: “He [Said Buryatsky] was killed, but some other ideologist, like ‘Said Kitaisky,’ (Said the Chinese) will replace him” (www.news.km.ru, March 6).

While the Russian government is in the pursuit of that special “silver bullet” that would miraculously solve the profound security problem in Ingushetia, as well as in the rest of the North Caucasus, local pro-Moscow leaders seem to understand that there is no single cause of instability and no easy solutions are around the corner.

On March 2, a court ordered the release of the killer of another prominent Ingush opposition figure, lawyer and journalist Magomed Yevloev. The New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists condemned the decision. “With today’s ruling, the Supreme Court of Ingushetia is fueling impunity for those who kill journalists –an endemic problem for Russia,” the CPJ said in a statement (www.cpj.org, March 2). Yevloev, who owned the opposition Ingushetia.ru website, which battled with the authorities, was killed in police custody within hours after his arrest in August 2008. In December 2009, his killer, a high-ranking police officer, was convicted of negligent homicide and initially sentenced to two years imprisonment. This is an oblique sign that the state authorities are strongly in favor of suppressing Ingushetia’s legal opposition, using all accessible means, including unrestrained violence.

Turkish-American relations Face Another Test Over the Armenian Issue

Saban Kardas

The United States House of Representatives’ Foreign Affairs Committee narrowly passed a resolution, which calls on the president to refer to the killing of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire during World War I as “genocide.” Though it remains uncertain whether the resolution will be brought before the full House, already, it has threatened to affect Turkey’s relations with the US and Armenia.

Ankara reacted to this development promptly. Turkish government officials reiterated strongly Turkey’s policy that any formal recognition of “genocide” claims would jeopardize Turkish-American strategic relations. They also repeated that this development would unduly interfere with its own efforts to normalize relations with Armenia, prematurely ending the current reconciliation process. President Abdullah Gul, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, attributed the vote to local political considerations (www.tcbb.gov.tr, March 4).

In search of devising an appropriate response to the developments, Ankara promptly recalled its Ambassador to Washington, Namik Tan. The Turkish foreign ministry also summoned US Ambassador to Ankara, James Jeffrey.

Outraged by the resolution, Turkish public and political actors increasingly adopted nationalist rhetoric, arguing that Turkey could not be dictated to from outside. A discussion on how Turkey might “retaliate,” if the resolution were to be adopted by the US Congress, has already commenced. Speculation ranges from Turkey’s exclusion of US companies from defense contracts to shutting down the Incirlik airbase or withdrawing Turkish troops from Afghanistan. In response to one question, Davutoglu did not rule out any of these options, noting that the cabinet would consider all possibilities (Aksam, March 5).

These developments raise questions about Ankara’s relations with Washington on many levels. In the days preceding the vote, Turkish parliamentarians and government officials had flooded Washington in an effort to block the resolution. Joined by Turkish interest groups based in the US, they campaigned against the resolution. Also, several US companies doing business with Turkey raised objections against the resolution (Cihan, March 2). The passage of the resolution represents a “defeat” for Turkish lobbying efforts. Nonetheless, Turks are seeking refuge in the fact that the resolution only passed with a narrow margin. Turkish lobbyists in Washington argue that the resolution may never see the House floor, under pressure from the administration (Hurriyet Daily News, March 8).

From the Turkish perspective, the real puzzle is how the Obama administration will handle this issue. Administration officials expressed objections to the House resolution. However, the Turkish side found the administration’s efforts half-hearted, as they came at the last minute and failed to prevent an affirmative vote. Davutoglu expressed concern that the administration did not throw its weight against the vote, which, in his eyes, indicated that they did not fully appreciate Turkey’s strategic value. “This picture deeply disturbed us,” he added. Responding to criticism from the US, Davutoglu rejected the assertion that Turkey had caused any “delays” and warned that if Congress insisted on its course, it might “kill” the entire normalization process with Armenia (Aksam, March 5).

In the coming days, therefore, Obama’s position on the “genocide” resolution is likely to be the greatest test of his new vision for a “model partnership” with Turkey. When the Foreign Affairs Committee adopted a similar resolution in 2007, the Bush administration prevented it from being discussed before the House, arguing that it would harm strategic ties with a geopolitically indispensable ally. The Obama administration maintained the same presidential position on this issue.

Although both Obama and US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, had pledged to support the Armenian theses during their 2008 election campaigns, once in office they prioritized United States’ strategic interests. Obama avoided uttering the word “genocide” in his April 24, 2009 statement on Armenian Remembrance Day, though condemning the killings in strong language. The administration managed to avoid criticism from Armenian groups, arguing that the United States should promote efforts by the Turkish and Armenian leaders to seek reconciliation (EDM, April 28, 2009). Following the Foreign Affairs Committee vote, Clinton again used the same reasoning to prevent Congress’ further involvement in the matter: “[we] have made clear, both last year and again this year that we do not believe any action by Congress is appropriate, and we oppose it,” said Clinton (www.voanews.com, March 4).

The next test will be Obama’s statement on April 24. The Turkish side is again mobilizing all its assets to prevent Obama from using the term “genocide,” and sending signals that Turkey will not be the one to lose if the US administration succumbs to pressures from the Armenian lobby. The way out of this looming stalemate seems to hinge on the conclusion of the Turkish-Armenian normalization.

However, Turkey and Armenia have proven unable to maintain their initial momentum, and the prospects of Turkish-Armenian reconciliation are weakening every day. Both Ankara and Yerevan refrained from sending the protocols they signed last year for parliamentary approval, expecting the other side to take the first step. Meanwhile, Ankara objected to a ruling by the Armenian constitutional court, arguing that it violated the spirit of the protocols (EDM, January 26). If the parties fail to secure another breakthrough over the next few weeks, Obama might run out of arguments to justify his failure to satisfy the expectations of the Armenian lobby, coming under increasing pressure as April 24 approaches.

Herein lies the dilemma, which highlights how Turkish-US relations are entangled with Turkish-Armenian normalization. The US administration believes that the overall progress so far has been satisfactory, yet the Turkish government should take further steps, especially forwarding the protocols for parliamentary ratification, to re-energize the process. However, the Turkish government argues that as long as the Armenian lobby pursues anti-Turkey decisions, Ankara will be unable to proceed with the normalization. Thus, reportedly, Davutoglu decided to wait until April 24 to take any further step on the parliamentary ratification process, in order that the US may first take some positive steps (Hurriyet, March 6). It will be interesting to follow how the parties untie this knot.

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