IN THIS ISSUE

* Bulava failure raises doubts over Russian defense industry
* Central Asia-China gas pipeline changes the gas trade picture in Europe and Eurasia
* Moscow regroups for new foray into Croatian energy market
* Suicide bombing in Ingushetia revenge for attack on opposition leader’s family
* The Karachai jamaat re-emerges in Karachaevo-Cherkessia
** Visit the Jamestown blog on Russia and Eurasia (http://www.jamestown.org/blog):
- Moldova’s Fractured Parties
*** Note to readers: This is last issue of EDM this year. EDM resumes publication on Monday January 4.

Bulava Launch Failure and the Crisis of Russian Defense Industry

Jacob W. Kipp

The recent Bulava launch failure has implications for US-Russian arms control talks (EDM, December 17) and will determine whether the Russian defense industry is capable of delivering advanced weapons systems at qualitative levels competing with analogous systems produced abroad. The issue involves the quality of such systems, their relative costs, and the time for their research, development and deployment. This year the Russian defense ministry has selectively answered that question negatively and has bought advanced unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) from Israel and entered into discussions with France over the purchase of a Mistral-class amphibious assault ship, which so far has not resulted in a contract.

Objections to foreign purchases naturally come from the affected sector of the defense industry and from defense intellectuals, who warn about the risks of relying on foreign purchases when changes in the international situation might mean terminations of contracts or denial of required spare parts. In an article devoted to the draft military doctrine expected to be published soon, unnamed sources said the text stipulates that foreign purchases will be restricted to areas where the Russian defense industry cannot deliver quality products. Commenting on the leak, the Deputy Chairman of the Defense Committee of the Duma, Yury Savenko, said that the General Staff supported the policy, but noted that defense contractors sat on state orders. He said that the challenge was to deliver quality products with which the armed forces could fight (www.gazeta.ru, December 17).

In the case of strategic missile systems there is, of course, no possibility of foreign purchases, given the limited number of producers and the strategic sensitivity of the systems. Therefore, the crisis with the solid-fueled submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) Bulava (R-30 3M30 - NATO SS-NX-30) has deep strategic ramifications for Russia’s sea-based nuclear strike forces. Bulava was planned as the chief maritime nuclear weapon on board the new class of SSBN’s (Project 955 Borei, the first of which, the Yuriy Dolgorukiy, is undergoing sea trials. Two others are under construction and a fourth was due to begin construction at Severodvinsk shortly). The shipyard announced that the navy had suspended the initiation of that project. Further tests of the Bulava were postponed until March 2010. Given the importance of that force to Russia’s national security, the current crisis with the Bulava questions the ability of the Russian defense industry to deliver high-quality weapons in a cost-effective and timely matter. In the absence of operational SLBM’s, this class of warship has no military-strategic value, and the money spent on the missile’s development and the submarines' construction becomes a net loss.

In preparation for the most recent and delayed test, every signal was about anticipated success. The problems that caused past failures (eleven out of twelve launches) had been analyzed and solutions found (RIA Novosti, November 24). When the test occurred on December 9, the missile exploded shortly after launch, leading to speculation in northern Norway about a UFO. In fact, the missile’s failure became a case of friendly fire, doing serious damage to the navy, Russia’s strategic forces and defense industry (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, December 10).

The Bulava has become a hot topic for discussion within defense industry circles. Experts involved in the development of the Bulava have come forward to chronicle the mistakes that were made in its development. The initial decision made economic and technical sense: developing a single base type ICBM for both ground and sea launch. Topol-M, the solid-fuel prototype for Russia’s future land-based ICBM force would also provide the basic design for the SLBM. Technical experts in the development of past sea-based systems warned about the very different stress that a submerged-launched missile had to withstand. However, ten years ago with limited funds and cozy relations among politicians, senior military leaders, and some defense contractors, it resulted in a decision presented as securing a quality product at reduced costs. Production of the R-39, which was deployed on the Typhoon-class SSBN’s, was curtailed and the follow-on development of a modernized version was canceled after three unsuccessful launches, leaving the navy with no other SLBM under development. Thereafter, the defense ministry withdrew the Typhoon-class SSBN’s from service, retaining only one, the Dmitry Donskoy, modified to serve as a test-launch platform for Bulava (Nezvasimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, December 11).

The Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology defense contractor promised the speedy development of both land and sea-based systems, while lacking any experience in the research and development of sea-based missiles. The chief designer for MITT, Yury Solomonov, promised to cut costs by combining the development of solid-fueled, land and sea-based ICBM’s around one prototype, Topol-M: eliminating of the risks associated with liquid-fueled missiles at sea, and providing the navy with a missile and platform equivalent to the first-generation Trident-class SLBM’s. In the aftermath of the failed twelfth test-launch, critics made their objections public. Albert Dubrovin and Sergei Makeev, men with impressive defense industry credentials called Bulava “the non-combat ready missile, which has already destroyed the submarine navy and a series of scientific-research institutes.” The authors detailed the decision to develop Bulava, the fate of other naval missile projects, and the critical flaws in the development of Bulava, which has left the navy without the key weapons system for a vital part of the strategic deterrent force. MITT designed a soft submerged launch technique (container), untested in sea conditions, which put entirely different tensions upon the missile during launch. They view the future prospects for Bulava very critically. Even if successful, it will be an inferior system with huge cost-overruns, and a very slow delivery rate. The authors estimate that at current rates of production for Topol-M and Iskander missiles, it will take twenty years to produce all the missiles needed to arm the eight planned Project 955 Borei class submarines (Nezvasimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, December 11).

The latest launch failure of Bulava reflects badly on the capacity of the Russian defense industry to produce quality weapons systems in a timely fashion at competitive costs. A decade lost on a key strategic system represents a profound failure, which the new military doctrine will have to address if it is to be taken seriously by the Russian military, the nation, and the rest of the world. In weapons development, as in warfare, the greatest loss from which it is almost impossible to recover is time.

Strategic Implications of the Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline

Vladimir Socor

The breakthrough on the Central Asia-China gas pipeline (EDM, December 15), as part of Turkmenistan’s policy of gas export diversification, undermines Russia’s position not only in the European gas trade (EDM, December 16), but also on two Asian fronts. These are the negotiations on future Russian imports of Turkmen gas (in scaled-down volumes) and on possible Russian gas exports from eastern Siberia to China.

The Kremlin had offered in 2008 to pay European netback prices for Turkmen and other Central Asian gas, starting in 2009 at more than $300 per one thousand cubic meters. This offer doubled at one stroke the Russian purchase price for Central Asian gas (and quadrupled it from the 2005 level), erasing Gazprom’s windfall profits from the re-sale or swapping of Turkmen gas in Europe in previous years. Moscow was also launching an ambitious program to expand the capacity of gas pipelines from Central Asia to Russia, so as to increase Russian imports far beyond the then-prevailing level of 70 billion to 80 billion cubic meters (bcm) annually, which included 45 to 50 bcm from Turkmenistan. Anticipating a gas shortfall soon in Russia itself, Gazprom tried to maximize its intake of Turkmen gas to help meet Russia’s supply commitments. Moscow’s leverage was already weakening at that juncture thanks to the rapid advance of the Turkmenistan-China pipeline project.

The economic-financial crisis changed Moscow’s plans in spring 2009. With demand and prices declining for Russian gas in Europe, Moscow pressed to reduce either the volume of imported Turkmen gas or the purchase price for it. When Ashgabat resisted, Moscow halted the gas flow unilaterally and without the necessary advance notice on April 8-9, resulting in a blast on the over-pressurized Turkmen export pipeline. The line has been repaired since then, but the gas flow to Russia has not resumed until now.

Turkmenistan’s revenue losses from Russia cannot immediately or fully be compensated by revenue gained from China after the pipeline’s opening. Nevertheless, Turkmenistan’s bold diversification of gas exports to China and Iran –as well as possible export westward from Turkmenistan’s Caspian offshore– are steadily reducing Moscow’s leverage on Ashgabat. Based on its experience, Ashgabat takes the position that Russia does not offer security of demand even in the short term, whereas China’s voracious requirements promise fairly reliable, long-term security of demand for Turkmen gas (Xinhua, December 11–15).

Moscow and Ashgabat are currently negotiating arduously over the price, timetable, and other conditions for resuming Turkmen gas deliveries to Russia. The Kremlin and the Russian government are handling these negotiations directly, rather than through Gazprom. Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin (responsible for the energy sector) held talks with Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov in Ashgabat on December 15 –the day after the opening of the Turkmenistan-China pipeline– and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev followed up with Berdimuhamedov by telephone to arrange a year-end visit to Ashgabat. The official communiqués about the presidents’ telephone conversation hardly mentioned gas, focusing instead on the reopening of a “Pushkin” school in Ashgabat –a clear indication of persisting differences over the gas trade (Interfax, Turkmen government website, December 15, 16).

Moscow evidently wants to retain access to Turkmen gas, but can hardly predict the timeframe of its post-crisis recovery and corresponding gas demand recovery in Europe. That period may well coincide with the Turkmenistan-China pipeline attaining full capacity and providing Ashgabat with a fully-fledged alternative option. Thanks largely to this factor, Russian

leverage on Turkmenistan should from now on recede with every passing year. Further strengthening Ashgabat’s hand, the new export pipeline to Iran is opening during this month, with a capacity of 6 bcm annually in the first stage and another 6 bcm in a follow-up stage. This line is being supplied from Turkmenistan’s Dauletabad field, dedicated to Russia until now (Turkmen Television, December 11; Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran [Mashhad], December 13).

The pipeline to China strengthens not only Ashgabat’s, but also Beijing’s hand in negotiations with Moscow. The Russian and Chinese governments are negotiating the pricing and transportation terms for possible gas exports from eastern Siberia to China. The Russian side did not have to compete against another supplier until now. From now on, however, Russian gas production from newly commissioned eastern Siberian fields would have to compete with Turkmen gas over the sale price of gas to China. This emergent competition will undoubtedly overshadow the Russo-Chinese negotiations, which are scheduled to resume in 2010, on future terms for sale and purchase of gas.

European and US policies –insofar as they operate– have incurred a temporary setback with Chinese (and even Iranian) breakthroughs in Turkmenistan. This situation curtails the availability of Turkmen gas in the near-to-medium term for the Nabucco project and other components of the Southern Corridor to Europe. Any massive Turkmen deliveries into the planned corridor must await the development of the vast, untapped gas reserves onshore, which Ashgabat will likely apportion to various players.

China seems positioned ahead of all others at the supergiant South Yolotan-Osman fields, thanks to Beijing’s credit line for exploration and development there. In Turkmenistan’s Caspian offshore and older onshore fields, however, supplies should be unproblematic for Nabucco’s second phase, if a pipeline link takes shape organically between the outward tips of the Turkmen and Azerbaijani offshore infrastructure.

Moscow Targeting Adriatic Energy Transportation Lifeline to Central Europe

Vladimir Socor

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin received Croatia’s outgoing president, Stjepan Mesic, in Moscow for a valedictory visit on December 13-14 (Interfax, December 14). The discussions focused on energy issues, reflecting Moscow’s preparations for a breakthrough into the Croatian oil and gas sector. The Russian leaders treated Mesic’s visit as an opportunity to prepare Croatian Prime Minister Jadranka Kosor’s Moscow visit, scheduled tentatively for January 2010 and expected to concentrate on energy issues.

Croatia has been largely free of a Russian presence in its energy sector thus far. While Croatia’s small energy market can hardly interest Russia’s oil and gas giants from a business perspective, Croatia’s location on the Adriatic coast is what interests the Kremlin. If Russian state-connected companies acquire stakes in the Croatian energy transportation infrastructure, they could cut off several Central European countries from non-Russian energy supplies delivered to Adriatic ports. In that case, Hungary and some of its neighbors would lose their main chance to diversify their energy import options away from overdependence on Russia. This would then open the way for Russian expansion into those countries’ energy systems.

Mesic, who is now completing his final presidential term, briefed Prime Minister Kosor and Croatian media on some details of his discussions in Moscow regarding oil and gas. On December 16 the Russian Ambassador to Croatia, Robert Markarian, visited Mesic in Zagreb to convey the Russian leaders’ satisfaction with the talks just held (HINA, Vjesnik, Jutarnji List, Poslovni Dnevnik, December 16, 17; Politika [Belgrade], December 17).

In Croatia’s oil sector, the Russian side wants to acquire a stake in the Adriatic Oil Pipeline (JANAF), which runs from the port of Omisalj across Croatia’s territory to northern Hungary. The line’s traditional function is to carry Middle Eastern oil into central and southeastern Europe. The Russian government has long sought to reverse the pipeline’s direction, so as to use it for Russian oil exports from the Adriatic Sea (Moscow succeeded with a similar idea on Ukraine’s Odessa-Brody pipeline, which is being reverse-used to carry Russian oil for export through the Black Sea, instead of the original function to carry non-Russian oil into Ukraine and Poland).

Russia’s Lukoil and GazpromNeft companies have recently discussed plans with JANAF to enlarge storage capacities for Russian crude oil and derivatives in the Omisalj area and, on that basis, open an international spot market there (Vjesnik, December 7). Additionally, GazpromNeft lays claim –which Putin raised with Mesic– to some 30 filling stations and other property of the Croatian INA company, the main stakeholder in which is Hungarian MOL.

In the gas sector, the Kremlin proposes to build an extension of the South Stream pipeline system through Croatia (still without identifying the supply source). Chiding the previous Croatian government for its skepticism about this project, Putin and Gazprom are now offering a second-“best” solution –namely, a branch-off pipeline that would terminate in Croatia, rather than transiting Croatia along the main route. Russian Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko and Gazprom Vice-President Aleksandr Medvedev are also urging Zagreb to “work fast” and prepare with Russian experts an agreement on South Stream, for signing during Prime Minister Jadranka Kosor’s Moscow visit. In that case, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev would visit Croatia shortly afterward (Interfax, December 17).

In its earlier discussions with Zagreb (and other parties), Gazprom had asked to use the existing in-country transmission pipelines in the context of South Stream. Thus, Gazprom had hinted at using Croatian Plinacro’s pipeline link under construction toward Hungary –as well as using a Bulgarian transmission pipeline– for South Stream, which could prevent their use for the NETS project or Nabucco, respectively.

Should Gazprom enter Croatia through South Stream, it would likely press for halting the LNG project on Croatia’s Krk Island. That project (and Plinacro’s pipeline) is intended for liquefied gas of Middle Eastern provenance to be delivered via the Adriatic coast to landlocked Central European countries. Like the Adriatic Oil pipeline, it is a crucial supply diversification project for the region.

Croatia’s previous government, headed by Ivo Sanader who resigned in mid-2009, had demonstrated a fairly clear vision of energy security requirements for the country and the region. That government declined to join South Stream, resisted the reversal of the Adriatic Oil pipeline, and realized the importance of the Krk LNG project. Moscow did not hide its displeasure with the Sanader government, and then made a show of warming up to the successor prime minister Kosor. The Kremlin also played up to Mesic’s rivalry with Sanader when receiving Mesic on his valedictory visit.

The challenge to Croatia’s current government, its president to be elected, and the European Union is to preserve and develop the Adriatic energy transportation lifeline to Central Europe, rather than allowing its derailment by the Kremlin.

Relatives of Slain Ingush Opposition Leader Killed and Injured in Blast

The Jamestown Foundation

A suicide car bomber attacked a police checkpoint in Nazran, Ingushetia, yesterday (December 17), wounding 23 people –10 internal troops, three members of the patrol-sentry service of Ingushetia’s interior minister and 10 civilians, including three children. Law enforcement sources were quoted today as saying that they had identified the suicide bomber as 23-year-old Batyr Dzhaniev and that the motive for the attack was revenge for the death of his mother –the mother-in-law of slain Ingush opposition leader and human rights activist Maksharip Aushev– in an explosion on December 16 (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, December 17-18).

Russian news agencies reported on December 16 that two people had been killed and two wounded when a car blew up in Nazran, Ingushetia, after it was shot at by police. Ingushetia’s interior ministry was quoted as saying that the incident took place when the car’s driver tried to do a quick U-turn when the vehicle suddenly came upon a police post and the policemen manning the checkpoint opened fire on the car in order to stop it, after which some sort of explosive device inside the car detonated. The blast reportedly had the power of 5-7 kilograms of TNT.

Later on December 16, Ingush opposition leader Magomed Khazbiev identified those killed and wounded in the car explosion as the family of Maksharip Aushev, the Ingush opposition leader and rights activist who was shot to death when his car was ambushed in Kabardino-Balkaria on October 25 (EDM, October 26). According to Khazbiev, shortly before the explosion, the car in which Aushev’s widow was traveling along with her mother and two brothers had been stopped by special services staff members wearing masks and helmets, who ordered them out of the car and carefully searched the vehicle for around ten minutes. Khazbiev said the explosion took place as soon as the driver and passengers were allowed to get back into the car and drove off, and that the blast had killed the mother and older brother of Aushev’s widow while seriously wounding Aushev’s widow and her younger brother (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, December 16).

Kommersant yesterday (December 17) identified those inside the VAZ-21099 car at the time of the blast as 27-year-old Fatima Dzhanieva, the pregnant widow of Maksharip Aushev, along with her two brothers and mother. The newspaper reported that one of Fatima Dzhanieva’s brothers, 24-year-old Muslim Dzhaniev, who was driving the car at the time of the explosion, was killed along with her mother, 51-year-old Leila Dzhanieva, and that Fatima and another brother, 23-year-old Amirkhan, were hospitalized with serious injuries. Kommersant quoted an investigator as saying that a bomb had been placed underneath the driver’s seat or on the bottom of the car beneath the driver’s seat. “Clearly, this was a well-planned attack,” the investigator told the newspaper (Kommersant, December 17). It should be noted that the Novosti Ingushetii portal named the slain brother of Aushev’s widow who was behind the wheel at the time of the blast as 25-year-old Ruslan Dzhaniev, not Muslim Dzhaniev, as Kommersant reported (www.kakaz-uzel.ru, December 16).

The Moscow Times today (December 18) quoted Kaloi Akhilgov, a spokesman for Ingushetia’s President Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, as denying that the blast was caused by a bomb in the car. Akhilgov said the car was running on propane gas, which exploded when police fired at the car.

On December 12, Maksharip Aushev’s brother, Mussa, complained that the investigation of Maksharip’s murder had made no evident progress despite the fact that President Yevkurov and Russian Prosecutor-General Yury Chaika had taken the case under their personal control. Mussa Aushev also alleged that his brother’s killers were “people from the security services, the FSB” – the Federal Security Service (EDM, December 16).

At the time of his murder in October, Maksharip Aushev had renewed his criticism of extra-judicial killings and other abuses by siloviki in Ingushetia despite the fact that he maintained close relations with President Yevkurov. Following his death, Kavkazsky Uzel reported that Aushev had told the website about an attempt to abduct him in the city of Magas on September 15, saying that it had been carried out by unidentified armed people traveling in armored personnel carriers and that it was “a miracle” he had been able to escape. The former chief editor of the Ingushetiya.ru opposition website, Roza Malsagova, said that Aushev knew his life was in danger in Ingushetia and had been hiding in Turkey on the advice of his friends. He had traveled home for the marriage of his son and planned to leave Ingushetia for Europe when he was murdered (EDM, October 26).

On December 9, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton posthumously named Maksharip Aushev as one of the two 2009 recipients of the Human Rights Defenders Award (EDM, December 16).

Meanwhile, Kavkazsky Uzel reported that Ingush opposition leader Magomed Khazbiev is currently abroad, but plans to return to Russia despite appeals from many human rights activists that he remain abroad. According to the website, Moscow Helsinki Group Chairwoman Lyudmila Alekseyeva has strongly urged Khazbiev either to leave Russia altogether or to remain abroad for a longer period in light of the murder of Maksharip Aushev and the 2008 murder of another Ingush opposition figure, Magomed Yevloev.

However, Khazbiev said he plans to return to Ingushetia. “Ingushetia is my homeland; I do not plan to leave it or run away anywhere,” Kavkazsky Uzel quoted him as saying, adding “I will do everything possible so that there are no enemies of my people digging their fangs into the body of the people like parasites. And I will achieve that. You see, two days ago in Washington they conferred an award on Maksharip, and today they killed his family: the enemies awarded themselves. There you have it –a dirty game” (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, December 16).

Meanwhile, unidentified gunmen fired at a car carrying four officers of the Ingush branch of the FSB in Nazran yesterday (December 17). According to official reports, two of the FSB officers were killed and one wounded in the ambush. According to unofficial reports, however, all four FSB officers were killed (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, December 17).

Former Militant Group Re-establishes Itself in Karachaevo-Cherkessia

Mairbek Vatchagaev

December 11 marked the anniversary of the beginning of the first Chechen War. It was then, in December 1994, that President Boris Yeltsin decided to militarily force the Chechen people to abandon the idea of independence. As is known, the Russian army lost that war to the Chechen resistance. However, Moscow decided to get its revenge in the second military campaign in 1999. But things went wrong again: Vladimir Putin’s blitzkrieg plan did not materialize and, moreover, the battleground with the insurgents spread to the whole North Caucasus region. Today, Moscow is forced to combat a growing insurgency stretching from the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea, which indicates a major problem for the Kremlin in the entire Caucasian region (www.rusrep.ru, September 30).

A lengthy lull in Karachaevo-Cherkessia has been occasionally interrupted by sporadic incidents, but it seems that these were not the actions by the jamaat in the republic. The fact is that after major blows dealt by the Russian special services on the Karachai jamaat, which is one of the oldest jamaats in the North Caucasus dating back to the early 1990’s, from 2005 to 2007, it ceased to exist completely. Evidence of this was the creation of the united armed jamaat of Kabarda, Balkaria, and Karachai under the supervision of the leadership of the North Caucasus armed resistance (www.generalvekalat.org, November 20), which was an indirect acknowledgement that the jamaat had sustained losses so significant that it could no longer exist as a separate military entity.

However, this did not necessarily mean that it would be unable to revive, given that there are a number of former jamaat members who might try to resurrect their fighting unit. That resurrection may be underway. For example, on September 4 there was an attempt to sabotage a gas pipeline in Karachaevo-Cherkessia’s Ust-Dzheguta region. Two weeks later, on September 13, a brigade of the detached battalion of GIBDD (State Inspection for Road Traffic Safety) of Karachaevo-Cherkessia was fired on. That same day, unidentified persons shot at the head of the Karachaevo-Cherkessia interior ministry’s department of counter-extremist activities, Colonel Alikbek Urakchiev, who later died of his wounds in the hospital. On September 18, two suspects in the attacks on Urakchiev and the GIBDD battalion were shot dead while resisting arrest and a third suspect was detained (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, November 9). On September 20, Ismail Bostanov, the deputy mufti of Karachaevo-Cherkessia and Stavropol region, was killed. Bostanov also happened to be the director of the Institute of Islam in Cherkessk (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, September 20).

On September 27, a liquor store was burned down in the Tereze settlement of the Malokarachaev district of Karachaevo-Cherkessia. Arson attacks on liquor stores by militants have become a widespread practice in the North Caucasus. All these incidents taken together made September the most difficult month for the authorities and siloviki in Karachaevo-Cherkessia in recent years. But given such a rise in violence, losses among the militants are also inevitable. On November 8, four jamaat members were shot dead during a special operation conducted not far from the abandoned settlement of Indysh in the Khudessky Gorge in the Karachaevsk district. Among the four slain militants was Ahmed Bayily, who fought with militants in Chechnya under the command of Shamil Basaev in 1999. It is interesting that Denis Bogdanov, a former Karachaevsk policeman and ethnic Russian, was also among the four militants who were killed. Meanwhile, three policemen on duty were shot at by unidentified people in the city of Karachaevsk on November 9 (www.vesti.ru, November 9). One may view this as retaliation by the militants for the death of their fellow fighters. On December 9, three alleged shooters in that attack were killed in another special operation by siloviki in the Ust-Dzheguta region of Karachaevo-Cherkessia (www.polit.ru, December 9).

According to a source in the armed resistance, there was a battle near the settlement of Dzheguta on December 11. The jamaat detachment that took part in that clash reportedly numbered around 30 persons. If it is true that there were 30 fighters involved in the battle, one might argue that the Karachai jamaat is gaining strength. Meanwhile, the rebel Kavkaz-Center website reported that the authorities in Karachaevo-Cherkessia are trying to implement preventive measures to avoid a deterioration of the situation in the region. Those measures have included the arrests of alleged militants and people suspected in aiding and abetting them (www.kavkaznews.com, December 12). People who do not follow the official religious agenda are commonly perceived as adherents of Wahhabism (Salafism).

The fact that the jamaat’s website has started operating under the old title “Karachai” indicates that the brotherhood is regaining its former strength (www.djamagat.wordpress.com, December 1). In the very advertisement about the revival of the website, which was posted on its main webpage, there is a picture of the old website, which had not been functioning for the past two years. This can be seen as a kind of succession. Also, it is interesting that in reporting on incidents in Karachaevo-Cherkessia, the website refers exclusively to the Karachai jamaat. The authors do not refer either to the united jamaat or to the vilayets of Kadarda, Balkaria and Karachai.

And all this is happening against the background of a worsening interethnic conflict in Karachaevo-Chekessia. Attention there has been focused not on actions by the militants but rather on the actions of one of the ethnic groups of Karachaevo-Cherkessia –the Circassians. Demonstrators recently held a meeting at which it was decided to separate from the republic and either join the Republic of Adygea and Kabarda or become an autonomous region (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, November 25). According to the Circassians, who are a minority in comparison to Karachais, all the major positions in the Karachaevo-Cherkessia are occupied by the Karachai people, who do not let the Circassians rise to senior level positions in the Republic of Karachaevo-Cherkessia.

The issue of the relationship between the Karachai and Circassians and the Kabardins and Balkars arises almost every year. However, the question of ethnicity is not a problem inside the jamaat, which is international in its composition and consists of Kabardins, Balkars, Karachai and Circassians. In fact, this is one of the main principles of the jamaat’s ideologists. They believe that only Islam can unite the peoples of North Caucasus and help them avert interethnic conflicts. The only problem is that nationalists are not ready to abandon their interests in favor of pan-Islamic values.

Therefore, we should anticipate more serious moves on the part of the united armed underground of the North Caucasus regarding the announcement of a complete restoration of the Karachai jamaat. Judging by recent events it is unlikely that anybody will talk about the death of Karachai jamaat anytime soon.

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