IN THIS ISSUE

* Bulava crash puts future of Russia’s nuclear arsenal in doubt
* Circassian opposition movement see Kremlin hand behind recent attacks
* Kyrgyzstan witnesses an increase in regime oppression of human rights activists
** New in the Jamestown blog on Russia and Eurasia (http://www.jamestown.org/blog):
-Moldova’s fractured parties

The Bulava SLBM and the US-Russian Arms Talks

Pavel Felgenhauer

US-Russian nuclear arms reduction negotiators seem close to concluding a follow up strategic arms reduction treaty (START). The Russian press reports that Washington has agreed to serious concessions and that the new START treaty will be signed soon. The new verification measures will be less intrusive and “based on trust.” The US military control mission will be permanently removed from the Votkinsk missile factory in Udmurtia in the Urals. The US is reported to have agreed to allow Russia in the future to cipher telemetric data of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test launches. Both sides will be allowed 700 to 750 strategic delivery systems (ICBM’s and bombers). The United States is reported to have agreed to include in the quota strategic delivery systems armed with conventional warheads. Moscow will be allowed to operationally deploy and move without constraints its land-based maneuverable Topol, Topol-M and RS-24 ICBM’s. The new START will not restrain Russia in developing and deploying new types of ICBM’s as long as the overall limit of warheads and delivery systems is not exceeded (Vedomosti, December 11; Moskovsky Komsomolets, December 15).

Washington appears to have moved further than halfway to meet Russian demands on a number of important issues. But this apparent success has been overshadowed last week by a major setback: the newest Russian Naval Bulava R-30 3M30 (SS-NX-30) sea launched ballistic missile (SLBM) disintegrated once again during a test launch. The Bulava was launched by a modified Typhoon-class submarine –Dmitry Donskoy– from the White Sea and was destined to hit the Kura test ground in Kamchatka, but it strayed off course, creating magnificent fireworks as it burnt high in the skies over northern Norway, amazing the local population (Interfax, December 10).

This was the twelfth test of the Bulava and only one of the previous ones was declared by a defense ministry official to have been “fully successful” (RIA Novosti, November 28, 2008). In most cases, the Bulava has ether exploded during its launch or the dummy warheads failed to hit their designated targets. The main designer of the Bulava Yuri Solomonov (63) resigned as general director of the Moscow Institute of Teploteckhnika –the Topol, RS-24 and Bulava research and development facility– after a failed test, though he continued to be the Bulava chief designer. The latest failed launch was prepared with care. Defense officials announced that the causes of the previous Bulava mishaps had been identified and removed (Interfax, November 24). The chief of the Navy, Admiral Vladimir Visotsky publicly expressed confidence in the Bulava’s success and promised to resign if the project fails (RIA Novosti, November 26).

A special commission has been formed to establish the cause of the latest failure and all further tests have been suspended (Interfax, December 14). After all previous Bulava failures commissions were formed, reports issued and causes corrected, but each time another technical mishap occurred.

The Bulava is produced for deployment on a new class of Borei (project 955) nuclear strategic submarines. The first Borei-class submarine Yuri Dolgoruky is nearly complete. Two more Borei-class submarines –Alexander Nevskiy and Vladimir Monomakh– are being constructed at the Severodvinsk shipyard near Arkhangelsk. After the latest Bulava failure the general director of the shipyard Nikolai Kalistratov told reporters the Russian navy has “frozen” the building of the Borei-class submarines, since without the Bulava they are worthless assets (Izvestiya, December 15) The defense ministry officially denied the “freeze,” but acknowledged that the planned public initiation of the building of the fourth Borei-class submarine planned for December 22, “has been postponed until the first quarter of 2010” (RIA Novosti, December 15).

The Russian navy has announced plans to have up to eight new Borei-class submarines by 2020 to replace its older Delta-3, Delta-4 and Typhoon-class strategic submarines. The navy today has six operational Delta-3 and six Delra-4 strategic submarines that form the sea-based arm of the strategic nuclear deterrent. There are no plans to renovate the older Delta-3 class submarines that were built during the 1970’s and early 1980’s, and they are planned to be scrapped as the Borei-class submarines enter service. The six Delta-4 submarines are being renovated and refitted with modernized SS-N-23 Sineva SLBM’s to serve for at least 10 more years. The Sineva is today the only Russian sea-based liquid fuel SLBM produced in Krasnoyarsk. Continued Bulava failures have led to calls to scrap the ill-fated project and make the Sineva, with its good flight record, the only future naval SLBM (Interfax, August 14). But the defense ministry has rejected the possibility, since the Sineva cannot possibly fit the missile silos of the Borei-class submarines and the new ships will have to be scrapped (Interfax, August 26).

The Bulava is a new generation solid fuel SLBM built to avoid possible future US BMD weapons, especially air-based lasers designed to destroy missiles during their boost-phase. The Bulava uses a number of the same missile components as the Topol-M and RS-24 land-based ICBM’s. The defense ministry has denied that the Bulava failures have compromised the single warhead Topol-M (Interfax, April 10). However, the Bulava has multiple warheads (MRV) as the RS-24 that is being readied for deployment after only a couple of tests. The continued failure of the Bulava MRV may put into doubt the battle effectiveness of the RS-24.

The Deputy Prime Minister in charge of the defense industry Sergei Ivanov told reporters: “The navy gets more than 40 percent of the defense budget and most of that money is spent on strategic nuclear submarines” (RIA Novosti, June 3). The development of the Bulava SLBM and the Borei-class submarines has undercut plans to rearm the Russian military, while at the same time putting into doubt the future of the nuclear deterrent. The apparent gains during negotiations on START may turn out to be empty, if the defense industry fails to produce modern SLBM’s to fill the designated quota.

Circassian Opposition to the Kremlin Mounts in the Northwest Caucasus

Fatima Tlisova

The authorities and opposition movements in the Circassian republics of the northwestern Caucasus have returned to negotiations after a series of protest demonstrations and violent attacks targeting the leaders of Circassian non-governmental organizations (EDM, November 18 and 25, December 3).

On October 30, the parliament of Kabardino-Balkaria (KBR) issued a new law taking around 30,000 hectares of pastures from Circassian villages and giving them to their Balkar neighbors. On November 12, three articles were removed from the KBR as “separatist” laws. On November 17 two non-profit movements, the Circassian Congress (CC) and Khasa, organized a mass demonstration in Nalchik against the new land law, with CC leader Ruslan Keshev declaring: “We are ready for radical actions” (EDM, November 18, 25).

On November 26, approximately 3,000 young Circassians and Abazas gathered in Karachaevo-Cherkessia (KChR) to protest against violations of their ethno-political rights. A group of 300 Circassians who were driving from KBR to join the protest walked for miles after being stopped at a military checkpoint, where their vehicles were blocked from entering the KChR (EDM, December 3). On December 1, Keshev was hospitalized with multiple injuries after being attacked by a group of well-built men. That same day, the KChR parliament lodged a complaint with the Russian prosecutor-general against the Circassian movement in the KChR, accusing its leaders of crimes under articles 280 and 282 of the Russian criminal code (EDM, December 3).

The demonstration scheduled for December 5 in Nalchik was cancelled after organizers were alerted to the possibility of a provocation being planned to discredit the group. An hour before the demonstration, the leader of the Circassian NGO Khasa, Ibragim Yaganov, was hospitalized after being attacked by a group of young sportsmen who, according to Yaganov, started beating him and used the following words: “We are Muslims, but you nationalists separate our people” (Gazeta Yuga, December 10).

On December 6, another leader of the Circassian Congress was attacked in Maikop, Adygeya, 200 miles west of Nalchik. A grenade exploded in the backyard of Murat Berzegov’s home, burning his car and the front door of his house. On December 9, an office of the Council of Elders of Balkaria in Nalchik was burned down by unknown perpetrators. On December 12, the KBR parliament suspended the law on land, which had been opposed by both Circassians and Balkars. Zalim Kashirokov, a representative of the KBR president, announced that the law on land had been abolished in order to solve inter-ethnic problems. Now, any decision on the ownership of a tract of land must be negotiated between villages and only after the decision is reached can the parliament approve the status of that territory (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, December 12)

Two questions have been the source of extensive controversy in Circassian blogs and forums (such as www.heku.ru): who was behind the attacks on Circassian leaders? And what was the role of the Islamic insurgency? There is a whole chain of events that goes beyond any of the theories that have been put forward.

For instance, according to one theory, KBR President Arsen Kanokov was involved in the attacks, using his bodyguard unit to break up the opposition. That theory seemed logical considering the impending end of Kanokov’s presidency and the strong opposition to his rule within the local business elite affiliated with the Kremlin. However, the fact that Circassian Congress leader Ruslan Keshev, who has been in Kanokov’s circle of advisors, was the first to be attacked ruins the “Kanokov’s guard” theory.

The motive for the attack on Murat Berzegov in Maikop obviously cannot be explained in any way other than in connection with his political activities, which are fully and only concentrated on general Circassian issues such as the recognition of the Circassian genocide, opposition to the Sochi Olympic Games, and so on. Finally, there is no way to connect with the Wahhabi or Kanokov theory to the complaint that the KChR parliament issued against the Circassian NGO’s in the republic. The most logical explanation demands something more general than local political or ethnic frictions.

The way the situation has been solved in KBR (without an appeal to the Kremlin to resolve it) raises suspicions that the triangular scheme –with the Circassians and their neighboring Turkic speaking Karachai-Balkars playing the opposite roles against each other and both appealing to the Kremlin for a justice, and with Moscow escalating tensions in order to support its rule over the Caucasus– does not work properly anymore. Notes of tolerance have been appearing in the public exchanges between the leaders of the national movements, although they still indicate a strong determination to continue standing for their rights (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, December 12).

Until very recently, the anti-colonial resistance in the Circassian republics could best be described as consisting of two non-crossing parallels, one represented and being carried out by groups of Islamic rebels and the other being non-violent resistance represented by the NGO sector. The NGO resistance has often obeyed the Kremlin more than the local governments and it has been easy to fit the NGO’s into different types of agendas – from declaring national independence goals to simply opposing the local governments or confronting them with different ethnic groups.

There are obvious examples, such as the most influential political organization, the Worldwide Circassian Association changing its agenda from national independence to cultural preservation only (Harvard University, Conference on the Circassians, April 2008) or the Adyge Khasa of Cherkessk suddenly entering into an ethnic conflict with the Karachais soon after appealing to Boris Yeltsin’s administration with a declaration of independence of Circassia (1996-1999 KChR media archives).

On December 12, the leader of the Islamic resistance in Kabarda, Karachai and Balkaria, Anzor Astemirov aka Seifullah, released a statement explaining the position of the Islamic resistance regarding the situation in the Circassian republics. He made it clear that the local confrontations that occurred are outside the Islamic resistance’s agenda. The first and only priority, he said, is to overthrow the “illegal Russian regime and as long as any ethnic movement is sharing the same goal, the jamaat will not interfere with them” (www.islamdin.com, December 12).

It is quite possible that the parallel structure in Circassia described above converged into a mixture of ethno-political and militant religious resistance similar to that which exists in Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia. Moreover, the growing influence among the Circassians moves an Islamic insurgency from the position of an insignificant segment of society to the place of a powerful player in the political arena, with the ability to undermine the Kremlin’s influence in the Northwest Caucasus.

More Rights Activists Attacked in Kyrgyzstan

Erica Marat

Three public figures were attacked in Bishkek in the past week. On December 9, former president Askar Akayev’s aide Bolot Januzakov was severely beaten. On the same day Aleksander Knyazev professor of the Kyrgyz-Slavic University, who often criticizes the current regime for usurping power, was also assaulted. On December 15, the Russian journalist Aleksander Evgrafov was attacked by policemen and warned not to criticize Kyrgyzstan in his work (www.24.kg, December 10, 16).

The number of violent attacks against critics of the regime has escalated in 2009. Several journalists have been severely beaten and NGO leaders persecuted. In March, President Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s former aide died in a suspicious car accident (EDM March 16). Several human rights activists have been denied entry to Kyrgyzstan in the past months.

According to Knyazev, his assailants made it specifically clear that he was attacked for his political activism. Knyazev linked the attack to his criticism of both the regime and political opposition. He also said that the attack might be connected to his research on the Russian diaspora (www.24.kg. December 10). Knyazev has also been an ardent supporter of Russia’s greater engagement in Kyrgyzstan. Januzakov, in turn, was found unconscious near his apartment with only his cell phone stolen (www.centrasia.ru, December 10). His wife said that she was not sure if the attack was linked to his professional life. Finally, Evgrafov claimed that he was beaten by several policemen who knew his identity.

The recent series of attacks once again shows the Kyrgyz regime holders’ sense of impunity. Aside from local NGO’s, whose visibility considerably declined in the past year, there is little pressure exerted on Bakiyev’s leadership. Local mass media avoid direct criticism of the government. While local activists are unlikely to pose an immediate threat to the incumbent political elite, they act more as irritants which the regime tries to silence by resorting to the help of the security structures and hired criminals. Bakiyev is also immune to international criticism as his regime is able to self-finance itself through corruption and control of major economic sectors.

Meanwhile, on December 15, the US Senate held hearings examining United States policy towards Central Asia. In the list of five policy priorities, good governance and respect of human rights ranked third, behind expanding security cooperation and diversifying energy resources in the region. At the hearings US government representatives thanked the Kyrgyz government for allowing Manas airport to continue to transit cargo and troops within the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), and expressed enthusiasm in Kazakhstan’s upcoming chairmanship of OSCE next year. Along with recognition of Kyrgyzstan’s efforts within the NDN, Kyrgyzstan (and Tajikistan) was thought to have the greatest risk of becoming a “failed state”.

There is a growing criticism of the listed priorities among both US and Central Asian experts. At the hearings Martha Brill Olcott, senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment, said that “the US priorities [in Central Asia] with the exception of adding the NDN have been largely unchanged since 2001.” Equally, Olcott noted that Central Asian countries have changed significantly since then, with some countries becoming poorer and more authoritarian.

According to Stephen Blank, professor at the Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College, who also testified before the Senate, Central Asia is of critical importance for the United States not just because of Afghanistan. Blank stated that “there are multiple security issues and threats that could impact upon international security in general and US foreign policy in the region in particular. Many of them are domestic in origin: to varying degrees the states suffer from illegitimate governance, they are authoritarian states in which we see despotism, clan, family rule and nepotism.” It remains to be seen to what extent the US will consider experts’ assessment of this policy.

Days after the violent attacks, numerous local and international human rights activists and scholars addressed Bakiyev with an official letter demanding an investigation of the incidents under his personal control. The letter interprets the attack against Knyazev as “having all the signs of a contract crime and is linked to his professional life as a scholar specializing in themes that include the Russian diaspora in Kyrgyzstan” (www.centrasia.ru, December 16). As the number of violent attacks and assassinations has been on the rise since Bakiyev came to power, a very small portion of them have been solved. Similar letters have been submitted on a number of occasions, including last week when a human rights activist from Tajikistan was denied entry into Kyrgyzstan. They brought little change in the Bakiyev regime’s treatment of human rights abuses.

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