IN THIS ISSUE

* Kremlin negotiates new arms reduction treaty while facing domestic instability
* Moscow extends its political influence in Moldova
* …while expressing support for its favored presidential candidate
* …as Medvedev’s annual address fails to quell violence in the North Caucasus
** New in the Jamestown blog on Russia and Eurasia (http://www.jamestown.org/blog):
- Militant Rhetoric in Baku and Yerevan

Strategic Countdown and Russia’s Escalating Instability

Pavel K. Baev

This week is the last in the life of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) that was signed on July 31, 1991 by Presidents George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev. This most complex treaty in the history of arms control expires on December 5, and the simple solution of extending its duration was rejected by Presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev as unhelpful for the broader agenda of nuclear non-proliferation. Seeking to give substance to the idea of a “reset” in US-Russian relations, the two leaders committed last July to the “joint understanding” for a follow-on treaty, thus setting an extra-hard task and ultra-tight schedule for the working group laboring in Geneva. It is still possible –as Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov asserts– that a new document will indeed be signed before Obama arrives in Oslo to accept the Nobel Peace Prize on December 10 (RIA-Novosti, November 27). The rushed deal, however, would inevitably contain such an amount of omissions, loopholes and dubious compromises that its ratification by the US Congress and its compatibility with Russia’s strategic ambitions are problematic (Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, November 27).

Obama’s decision to cancel the deployment of a radar in the Czech Republic and interceptor-missiles in Poland removed a major stumbling block for the negotiations, but he also has reiterated the commitment to building a strategic defense system, which is a major issue for Russia –and there is no way to address it in a new treaty (www.gazeta.ru, November 27). Another issue is the deterioration of Russia’s strategic arsenal as many antiquated systems are scrapped, while modernization programs –including the Bulava submarine-based missile– are stalled; this shrinking compels Moscow to agree on numerical limits that are far higher than its actual holdings in the near future and leaves many in the US questioning the rationale for unnecessary self-limitation. There are also numerous issues about verification (these technicalities take up the bulk of the 700 pages of START I) and the legal force of a new agreement in the period between signing and ratification; Moscow harbors deep concerns about US high-precision conventional weapons, including sea-based cruise missiles; there is no progress towards a common view on limiting non-strategic nuclear weapons (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, November 25; Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, November 20). Russia is also at a serious disadvantage in the bargaining on these diverging positions because the old Soviet school of tough negotiators has dissolved, and the foreign ministry cannot mobilize quality expertise, while the military “bean counting” and risk assessment are distorted by the multiple reshuffling of the top brass (Vremya Novostei, November 27).

Political will emphatically demonstrated by the two leaders will probably overcome not only technical hurdles, but also entirely rational reservations expressed by veterans of arms control who understand the value of a new deal, which should help in building cooperation in other strategic matters –primarily Iran (Kommersant, November 12, 16). This triumph of de-nuclearization would, nevertheless, be no more helpful for Russia in addressing its real security risks than the START I was for the USSR, which spectacularly fell apart only a few months after the signing ceremony. These risks were illuminated by the colossal explosion at an ammunition depot in Ulyanovsk two weeks ago, and when a second explosion interrupted the work on securing the unexploded ordnance last week, Medvedev fired three generals and four colonels (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, November 26). This uncharacteristic toughness was perhaps meant to demonstrate that the young Commander-in-Chief could become so angry at sloppiness that punishment would precede investigation (Novaya Gazeta, November 27). What it actually revealed was the panic in the leadership about losing control over the rising instability, so that only strategic arsenals and the walled “villages” of the rich-and-powerful remain safe.

This instability has been escalating in the last few months along two parallel tracks: armed violent attacks and police brutality. Moscow had remained slightly concerned about the first trend so long as it was contained in the North Caucasus. The situation in this troubled region is indeed steadily deteriorating, particularly with a new wave of suicide bombings, and consequently Medvedev promised to implement additional measures in his address to the Federal Assembly on November 12, which has made little impression on the warring parties, as the assassination of the commander of a special police unit in Makhachkala, Dagestan showed (Kommersant, November 27). The real shock, however, was inflicted by the explosion that derailed the express train going from Moscow to St. Petersburg last Friday evening with more than two dozen casualties. This train is often used by politicians from St. Petersburg with careers in Moscow, who have suddenly discovered that this transport route cannot be made safe (Ekho Moskvy, November 28).

The crisis of law enforcement is unusual not in the scope of crime in which the police are implicated as in the sharp public criticism of brutality and corruption characterizing this criminalization. A polemical point made by a Duma deputy from the “ruling” United Russia party that the whole interior ministry system could not be reformed but only disbanded, has found surprisingly strong public support (www.gazeta.ru, November 25). Political commentators tend to interpret this media campaign as an attempt by several competing clans of siloviki to replace Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliev, who is a firm Putin loyalist (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, November 27). Intrigues of this sort are ever-present but even the not-so-liberal professional elites were outraged by the death of the lawyer Sergei Magnitsky, who received no medical treatment in the detention cell where he had been held for months in the course of a dubious investigation against the Hermitage investment fund (Vedomosti, November 24).

Prime Minister Vladimir Putin had to answer some sharp questions during a business trip to France, but claimed unfamiliarity with the Magnitsky case, while comparing the shameful trial of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev with the conviction of Bernard Madoff for fraud (www.gazeta.ru, November 25). This parallel is clearly false, but Putin’s own system of power distinctly resembles a financial pyramid where the top crooks extract vast profits by cheating a great number of naive stakeholders; the moment of meltdown is hard to predict – but the collapse is typically very fast.

Moldovan Prime Minister Filat Reaches Out to Putin

Vladimir Socor

Moldova’s simultaneous crises –economic and constitutional– have opened a door for Russia to influence politics in Chisinau and arbitrate the power struggles there. The dual crisis, ongoing since early spring, has deepened after two inconclusive parliamentary elections, four failed attempts to elect the head of state in parliament, and a drastic fall in budget and remittance revenues.

At present, Russia is actively inserting itself into the Moldovan crisis, offering good offices and seeking allies of convenience. Russia’s top officials participate in this effort, far outweighing Western representatives by sheer rank.

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin held substantive talks with Moldovan Prime Minister Vlad Filat during the meeting of CIS countries’ heads of government in Yalta on November 20. Filat offered to “open a new chapter in Moldova-Russia relations.” He criticized former president (2001-2009) Vladimir Voronin for having misled Russia with “empty promises that Voronin refused to implement,” seemingly suggesting that he could do better with Russia as prime minister (ITAR-TASS, November 19; Moldpres, November 23).

Filat, leader of the nominal Liberal-Democrat Party, is believed to aim ultimately for the state presidency, although Democratic Party leader Marian Lupu is the AEI’s collective nominee for head of state. Filat collected internal political dividends by recounting his meeting with Putin extensively to Moldovan media.

Flattering Putin as a “strong, pragmatic personality, well informed about our country,” Filat asked him to re-open Russia’s market for Moldovan wine (which the Kremlin had embargoed in 2006 to punish Voronin’s disobedience); and asked for the first $150 million tranche of a $500 million Russian loan (which Moscow had discussed with a chastised Voronin this year). Filat also asked Putin to simplify residency permit requirements for Moldovan migrant workers in Russia; and urged Russian energy companies to invest in Moldova, as a possible springboard into European Union territory (Interfax, November 20; Moldpres, News-In, November 20-24).

Five days after the Yalta meeting, Filat followed up with a telephone call to Putin, thanking him for his favorable consideration of allowing Moldovan wine back to Russia. According to Filat’s account, he and Putin “agreed on holding a permanent dialogue” (Interfax, Moldpres, November 26).

Filat and officials of his party are now claiming political credit internally for the promised resumption of Moldovan wine exports to Russia. They blame the “communist government’s bad faith” for Russia’s 2006-2008 embargo (News-In, October 27), although the embargo was widely recognized at the time as political retaliation against Chisinau’s U-turn away from Moscow. The Moldovan government’s rewriting of this history excuses Russia for hitting Moldova with that embargo. It also casts Filat’s party in the position of proving that it will be more cooperative with Moscow than the predecessor Moldovan government was.

Russian policy toward Moldova is currently being coordinated by the presidential administration in the Kremlin, eclipsing both the Security Council (which had directly handled Russia’s relations with Moldova in recent years) and the foreign ministry. Presidential administration head Sergei Naryshkin is now personally supervising policy toward Moldova and has met with Moldovan political leaders in Chisinau and in Moscow.

Russia’s presidential administration collects first-hand, detailed information on Moldova, in part through the Moscow-based Priznanie [Recognition] Foundation, which has recently set up shop in Chisinau. This foundation has held a series of policy seminars with representatives of Moldovan parties and NGO’s, has conducted opinion polls, and has shepherded visits to Chisinau by Russian parliamentary members, presidential administration functionaries, and policy consultants from Moscow. Meanwhile, the foundation’s representatives have been denied entry into Ukraine during the presidential election campaign there.

According to Moldovan participants in the Chisinau seminars, the Russian side has outlined a political basis for cooperating with Moldovan political forces and assisting in the resolution of the political crisis. Moscow’s expectations include: maintenance of Moldova’s status of permanent neutrality; a guaranteed political-legal status for Transnistria; preserving the role of the Russian language in [right-bank] Moldova’s public life; and creating comfortable conditions for the entry of Russian business interests in [right-bank] Moldova. Specifics would, presumably, be negotiated with a Moldovan president and government elected and consolidated through Russian good offices.

The longer the political and constitutional crisis continues the wider Moscow’s scope for manipulative interference with Moldova’s political processes. The prospect of repeat elections increases the value of Russian political support and the Moldovan contestants’ temptation to court Russia for such support.

Moscow is competing against the EU for the role of mediator between Moldovan political groups. The EU’s Special Representative to Moldova, Kalman Mizsei, has been stationed in Chisinau almost permanently since April (rather than visiting periodically from the home base, as EU special representatives do elsewhere). Mizsei had earlier gained the confidence of all the mutually hostile political groups and served as an informal mediator throughout the crisis, from the April clashes to date.

Neighboring Romania, meanwhile, holds considerable clout with some Moldovan political forces. But Romania’s resources are meager, and Romania’s own ongoing crisis of governance seems to disable Bucharest from pursuing a coherent policy in Chisinau at this stage. The United States continues to relegate Moldova policy to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State level and providing Millennium Challenge Account assistance.

If Lupu’s presidential candidacy falls short again in parliament, new parliamentary elections must be called in line with the constitution. In that case, Moscow would predictably maneuver with the pivotal Russian (or Russian-speaking) voting bloc in Moldova. The government would have to scramble in all directions for economic assistance, so as to defuse social discontent and preclude a communist revanche in the elections. It would need to ask Russia even more urgently to facilitate access for Moldovan products and guest workers; and in return for this, it would have to de-emphasize the demand for Russian troop withdrawal.

Filat personally and his party support that demand as strongly as the preceding Moldovan governments did. Filat did raise the troop-withdrawal issue in the meeting with Putin and requested a follow-up meeting with Putin to discuss both this and economic issues. Previous Moldovan governments had to de-emphasize the troop-withdrawal demand at election time every four years. At this stage, moreover, Moldova is going de facto through a non-stop electoral campaign, debilitating the country vis-à-vis Russia.

Russia Signals Support for Moldovan Presidential Candidate Lupu

Vladimir Socor

On November 21-22 in St. Petersburg, the Moldovan governing alliance’s candidate for head of state, Marian Lupu, attended the congress of Russia’s party of power, United Russia, which is officially headed by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Lupu initialed together with Duma Chairman Boris Gryzlov a draft cooperation agreement between United Russia and Lupu’s Moldovan Democratic Party (Interfax, ITAR-TASS, November 21, 22).

At this congress, Gryzlov (who doubles as chairman of United Russia’s Higher Council) defined the party’s doctrine as “Russian Conservatism,” whereas Lupu’s party defines itself as left-of-center and seeks to join the Socialist International. Such doctrinal contrasts, however, seem irrelevant to the purpose of establishing direct political channels between Russia and a Moldovan leader-in-waiting.

In Moldova’s political landscape, Lupu is a thoroughly Western-oriented figure. Internal political calculations impel his party (third-largest in the four-party AEI) to seek Russian blessings at least symbolically. Should Lupu actually sign the draft cooperation agreement between his party and the Kremlin’s party of power, however, he would have to face uncomfortable questions internally and externally. He would in that case join such company as the Serb nationalist opposition leader Vojislav Kostunica and the Russian party “Harmony Center” in Latvia, among signatories to cooperation agreements with United Russia.

During the St. Petersburg congress, Lupu held political talks with Yevgeny Shevchuk, leader of Transnistria’s Obnovlenie [Renewal] party, which holds the majority in Transnistria’s Supreme Soviet. Shevchuk, a Russian citizen, had signed an inter-party cooperation agreement with United Russia in 2008 while chairing Transnistria’s Supreme Soviet. But he lost that post afterward, in a still-ongoing power struggle with Transnistria’s “president” and fellow-citizen of Russia, Igor Smirnov. By hosting talks between Chisinau’s and Tiraspol’s aspiring leaders under a common political umbrella, Russia adds a new type of lever to its panoply of levers on the negotiations regarding Transnistria.

Lupu is the joint presidential candidate of the four parties in the governing Alliance for European Integration (AEI). The powerful communist opposition under former president (2001-2009) Vladimir Voronin is blocking Lupu’s candidacy in parliament. Moscow is trying to persuade the communists to relent.

Support for Lupu seems less than unanimous within the AEI. The parliament’s chairman and acting head of state, Mihai Ghimpu (nominal Liberal Party leader) has clearly and repeatedly endorsed Lupu’s presidential candidacy, though not ruling out his continuing as acting president for some indefinite period of time. For his part, Prime Minister (and nominal Liberal-Democrat Party leader) Vlad Filat has stopped far short of matching Ghimpu’s endorsements of Lupu’s candidacy. Filat maintains some ambiguity on the issue of the presidency. Local observers have noted the difference between Ghimpu’s and Filat’s public statements on this issue. The AEI’s smallest party, Our Moldova, seems overwhelmingly interested in preserving its seats through avoidance of new parliamentary elections. It could support any joint AEI candidate for president, not necessarily a particular one.

Three weeks prior to the St. Petersburg congress, Lupu and Voronin had paid separate visits to the Kremlin. There, the presidential administration head Sergei Naryshkin undertook to mediate an internal political solution for Moldova. The Kremlin proposes to overcome the political deadlock by having Lupu elected as head of state in parliament with the Communist Party’s support (EDM, November 4; Kommersant, November 11).

The Kremlin has apparently settled on Lupu as its preferred candidate for Moldovan president. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev had demonstratively treated Lupu as a head of state during the CIS presidential summit in Chisinau in early October, although Lupu’s chances seemed distant at that stage and are still a long shot. Naryshkin had descended on Chisinau ahead of Medvedev and initiated meetings with the leaders of Moldovan political parties to explore their views about relations with Russia in the future.

Moscow could not have missed Filat’s ambivalence about Lupu’s presidential candidacy. Filat had launched a campaign in 2007-2008 to change the constitution, preparatory to a presidential bid of his own. The constitutional revision remains on the political agenda. This uncertainty necessitates mustering massive support from communist deputies to ensure Lupu’s election as head of state in parliament, at the next and final round in December.

Moldova’s parliament is almost evenly divided between the AEI of four parties with a total of 53 parliamentary seats, in power since September, and the opposition Communist Party with 48 seats in its own right. Under the constitution, at least 61 votes are required for electing the head of state. Thus, the communists hold more than enough seats to block the election. They seek either a deal that would turn Lupu into their captive, or a deadlock that would force repeat parliamentary elections to be held, which would be followed by yet more attempts to elect a head of state.

The Communist Party is divided on the presidential election, although it maintains painstakingly an appearance of unity. Voronin seems intent on blocking the presidential election and forcing new parliamentary elections. Most communist deputies follow this line. A growing minority of communist deputies, receptive to Russian advice, seem likely to go along with Lupu’s election, if only to avoid new parliamentary elections. For the first time in 20 years, Moscow is in a position to influence and sway –although not dictate or impose– a leadership selection process in Moldova and possibly the balance of political forces in Chisinau.

The North Caucasus Remains Russia’s Perpetual Problem Region

Mairbek Vatchagaev

The resounding speech made by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in his annual address to the country’s parliament had no impact whatsoever on the situation in the North Caucasus (www.kremlin.ru, November 12). While local officials are left guessing who will become the Kremlin’s man in charge in the North Caucasus (www.kp.md, November 12), reports of shootings and special security operations targeting members of the armed resistance keep arriving from the region.

Nearly all the attacks on siloviki perpetrated by members of Ingushetia’s Sharia Jamaat occur in the republic’s flatlands, which refutes the established belief that the insurgents operate in the mountains or woodlands. The attacks are more common on the Kavkaz (Caucasus) federal highway, particularly in the stretch of highway from the village of Ordzhonikidzevskaya to the city of Nazran. According to local sources (www.ingushetiyaru.org and www.ingushetia.org), several attacks on policemen were registered recently in the area of the Ekazhevo settlement, which is in Ingushetia’s Nazran district. On November 20, two policemen were wounded inside their vehicle when it was fired on in broad daylight. One of them, M. B. Shauhalov, subsequently died in the hospital. That same night, unknown individuals shot up the courthouse of Ekazhevo with assault rifles and then set it on fire. Meanwhile, armed attacks on military motorcades and police stations no longer shock anyone in Ingushetia (www.ingushetiyaru.org, November 14, 15). Since the forced resignation of Ruslan Aushev, Ingushetia’s first president, in April 2002, the kidnapping of young people by the siloviki remains the most pressing problem in the republic.

Meanwhile, Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov has been losing count of the militants he personally eliminated. Almost all siloviki operations against militants in Chechnya are conducted under his personal supervision. According to Russian news sources, 35 militants were killed in October (www.chechen-republic.com, November 9). This figure will likely be surpassed in November. For example, the authorities reported on November 11 that five militants were killed in the area of Serzhen-Yurt in the Shali district. On November 13, they reported ten more militants had been killed during special operations in Chechnya’s Achkhoi-Martan district of Chechnya, and that estimate was subsequently increased to 20. Meanwhile, Kadyrov announced that Dokka Umarov, the leader of the armed resistance in the North Caucasus, might have been among those killed in the operation in Achkhoi-Martan (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, November 13). According to Chechen authorities, Dokka Umarov was hiding in the very area where the operation took place. It appears that these operations were meant to be a gift timed for Medvedev’s annual address.

In Dagestan, one of the largest republics in the North Caucasus, authorities have followed the lead of their Chechen colleagues and begun setting the houses of militants’ relatives on fire. Among the houses burned down was that of Emir Seifullah, the leader of Gubden jamaat (www.kavkaz.tv, November 19). It is worth noting that the Gubden and Khasavyurt jamaats have become the two most active cells of Dagestan’s Sharia Jamaat. Meanwhile, on November 17, Magomedshamil Shahbanov, the son of the head of Buinaksk administration, Mesterlu Shahbanov, was kidnapped. Also, the mullah of the local mosque in Starye Miatli in Dagestan’s Kizilyurt district, Ibragim Abakarov, was shot at by unidentified individuals. It is worth noting that religious leaders are frequent victims of attacks in the North Caucasus. For example, on November 21, a blast rocked the private house of the son of the mullah of one of Nazran’s mosques. The bombing was aimed at pressuring the Sufis –who, according to the insurgents, are cooperating with the authorities. That allegation cannot be true because the very nature of Sufism practiced in Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Dagestan rejects the notion of open cooperation with any authorities. The Russian authorities at first skillfully used the Sufis in their North Caucasus politics and then simply knocked the Sufi element out of the game as Sufism became one of their biggest problems of the last two hundred years. The belief that Sufis support the authorities is inherently erroneous.

Reports of insurgent activity are arriving these days even from the relatively quiet region of Kabardino-Balkaria. Unidentified persons blew up an electrical substation and the “Azau-Krugozor” cableway in the Adyl-Su Gorge in Kabardino-Balkaria’s Elbrus region. Additionally, they fired on the “Azau” stationary road police post located at the 54th kilometer of the Prohladnyi-Azau federal highway at the Tyrnyauz city exit (www.sk-news.ru, November 18). Moreover, according to Interfax, an act of terror was prevented at the Aushigersk hydroelectric power plant located in the Chereksk district of the republic. A weapons cache containing four kilograms of plastic explosives, blasting caps and a concentrated charge (SZ-4) was found in a forest 200 meters away from the plant. The contents of the cache were sent for examination (www.apsny.ge, November 18).

There have been no recent news reports regarding the Karachai jamaat, which suffered a major blow from numerous campaigns by the authorities and siloviki in 2006-2007, when many of the jamaat’s members were killed. However, on November 11, there was a report about a shootout in Karachaevo-Cherkessia. An unidentified insurgent opened fire at road policemen on duty on Mir Street in the city of Karachaevsk. Three policemen were wounded in the attack (www.smol.kp.ru, November 18).

There has been some turbulence in the Republic of Adygea, where President Aslan Thakushinov suggested creating a center of political technologies in order to develop an information policy in the sphere of terrorism prevention (www.adygeia.kavkaz-uzel.ru, November 8). The authorities there intend to pay more attention to the issues of Islam and interethnic relations in this North Caucasus region.

The topic of the Pankisi (a gorge in the northeastern corner of Georgia bordering Chechnya and populated by ethnic Chechens) has not been left out of the picture in recent days. According to Armenian sources, Tbilisi is ready to open its borders for transit between Russia and Armenia in exchange for Russia refraining from pressuring Georgia politically over the Pankisi Gorge (www.apsny.ge, November 19).

Generally, the arrival of winter results in a considerable slow down in insurgent activity in the North Caucasus. However, this is absolutely not the case this year. We may assume that this has to do with the new tactics of the armed resistance as well as harsh counterterrorist operations being conducted by regional authorities.

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