IN THIS ISSUE

* Ethnic Russians leave the North Caucasus
* Is the Kremlin searching for a replacement for Ingush president Yunus Bek-Yevkurov?
* Nabucco skepticism emanating from Vienna
* Bishkek supports reintroducing the death penalty
** New in the Jamestown blog on Russia and Eurasia (http://www.jamestown.org/blog):
- Under Extreme Conditions: Russian Journalism

North Caucasus’ Ethnic Russian Population Shrinks as Indigenous Populations Grow

Valery Dzutsev

On November 3, Dagestani President Mukhu Aliev held a special meeting of the commission dedicated to the problems of ethnic Russians living in the republic. Despite the optimistic tone of the officials, it appears that ethnic Russians are still leaving Dagestan, although in fewer numbers than immediately after the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. According to President Aliev, Russians comprised 20 percent of Dagestan’s population, and were the second largest ethnic group in this ethnically diverse republic in 1959. However, by 1989, the ethnic Russian population had decreased to 9 percent of the republic’s total and in the following years to less than 5 percent. Today, ethnic Russians rank sixth among numerous ethnicities of Dagestan; the Avars, Dargins, Kumyks, Lezgins and Laks each number more than the Russians. In the period between two Russian censuses in 1989 and 2002, the Russian population in Dagestan declined –according to the official figures, by 27 percent, down to 120,000 (www.riadagestan.ru, November 3).

Dagestan is the largest of the seven North Caucasian republics, with an estimated population of 2.7 million as of January 1, 2009. It has also the largest natural growth in absolute numbers: in 2008, its population added over 30,000 people. The population of the Russian Federation declined by over 300,000 in the same year (Russia’s state statistical service, www.gks.ru).

The same trend of a declining ethnic Russian population can be seen in other republics of North Caucasus. Chechnya saw the most dramatic reduction of the Russian population due to two bloody wars and the ensuing period of lawlessness and low grade warfare. It is estimated that the Russian population of Chechnya dropped by 250,000 in the period between 1989 and 2002. According to the official numbers, the Russian population across all the republics of the North Caucasus declined by 364,000 people during the same period. However, the real numbers are likely to have been higher: experts estimate that the Russian population dropped by 415,000-420,000 or 31 percent of the ethnic Russian population of the North Caucasian republics, which brought the number of Russians in the region from 1.36 million in 1989 down to 940,000 to 945,000 in 2002. By way of comparison, in the previous statistical period 1979-1989, the ethnic Russian population in the North Caucasus decreased only by 53,000 or 4 percent (www.valerytishkov.ru).

The discrepancy between the official numbers and the expert estimates is explained by counting some Slavic groups (Belarusians) as ethnic Russians in the 2002 census data, as well as counting the newly deployed Russian troops as part of the permanent local population. From 1989-2002, the percentage of the ethnic Russian population in the overall population of North Caucasian republics decreased from 26 percent down to 12-15 percent, while the indigenous populations grew from 66 percent up to 80 percent –or, in absolute numbers, from 3.5 million to 5.3 million (www.valerytishkov.ru).

The issue of the declining Russian population in the republics of North Caucasus has been politically sensitive for the Kremlin and the general Russian public, as the retreat of ethnic Russians from this region has been equated with losing control over it. So the state statistical service has tried to improve the picture by downplaying the decrease of the ethnic Russian population in the region. With the general population of the North Caucasian republics nearing 7 million and the constant decline in the ethnic Russian population, this may be an understandable fear. However, it can also be explained by the historical legacy of the Russian empire, which increased its territory in concentric circles and heavily relied on ethnic Russian settlers’ numerical prevalence over the local population and its eventual assimilation.

War and personal insecurity have been cited as the main causes of the ethnic Russians’ outflow from the Northern Caucasus. Indeed, the two largest shedders of Russian population have been Chechnya and Ingushetia, which currently have almost no Russians living in them except for members of the Russian military. The region’s rapid economic decline is thought to be another important factor that has fueled the outflow of ethnic Russians. This also looks like a viable explanation, given that not only ethnic Russians, but also indigenous peoples of the North Caucasus leave the region in search of better economic opportunities. Currently, the majority of the migrants from the North Caucasus to inner Russian regions and abroad are members of non-Russian ethnic groups.

With the exodus of the Russian population from the North Caucasus, the Russian language also appears to be in retreat –to the extent that some republics, like Dagestan, are creating special government programs to support the Russian language. A Russian language council has been created under the president of Dagestan and a special program to support the Russian language has been adopted, that strives, according to an official website, “to support, develop and spread the Russian language in Dagestan” (www.riadagestan.ru, November 3). While the local elites habitually try to appease Moscow by creating similar “pro-Russian” programs, it is still symptomatic that Russian, the lingua franca of the Russian Federation, would need any support at all from a provincial government.

One of the most fundamental causes of the depletion of the North Caucasus’ Russian population is often overlooked. As the indigenous peoples’ self-consciousness has grown and their educational level practically equaled the levels in the rest of Russia, no social niche has been left for ethnic Russians to fill. This effectively means that regardless of developments in the near future, whether the security or economic situation improves in the North Caucasus or not, the trend of the outflow of ethnic Russians will hardly be reversed. The only way of reversing this trend, which is so negative for Moscow, would be to effectively pacify the region and make huge investments to provide incentives for ethnic Russians to resettle in the region en masse. Even if Moscow succeeded in calming the Caucasus, it would have so many other economic priorities to address that the North Caucasus would hardly be among them.

Ingushetia’s President Loses his Luster in his First Year in Office

Mairbek Vatchagaev

October 31 marked exactly a year since Yunus-bek Yevkurov was appointed as President of Ingushetia. Yevkurov replaced Murat Zyazikov, who was removed by Moscow (www.ingushetia.kavkaz-uzel.ru, October 31, 2008). The change of leadership in this small North Caucasus republic took place after it became impossible to hide from the Russian public that Zyazikov, Moscow’s protégé, who happened to be a silovik –a regular FSB major general– could not make state institutions fight against armed opposition represented by the Ingush jamaat led by emir Magas (Akhmed Yevloev).

In an attempt to distance himself from his predecessor, President Yevkurov tried to establish direct contact with the public at large. He started going to mosques and listening to people’s complaints. He set up a special telephone line, so that people could call him directly and speak out live on the air on local television. Seemingly, all that it would have facilitated, if not respect for the new president, was at least an acknowledgement of his desire to do something for the population of the republic. But neither has happened, because all his positive deeds have been accompanied by a continuation of the tactic of eliminating young people who are accused after their death of having been involved in the armed opposition. The authorities view anyone who simply disagrees with Sufism as a potential ally of the armed resistance.

During Yevkurov’s year in power, the battle between the authorities and the armed resistance in the republic has been particularly fierce. Just a portion of the chronicle of events in Ingushetia in ten days between October 29 and November 9 illustrates this. Early on the morning of October 29, Mahsud Mahloev was kidnapped from his house by unknown security forces. On October 31, the mother of Bilan Kariev, who had disappeared without a trace, appealed to the Malgobek police, while Alihan Tarhoev, a Malgobek local, was detained in his town by armed representatives of the security forces wearing masks. That same day, two people were killed and one wounded when an automobile was fired on in Nazran, while the body of an ethnic Russian resident of Ordzhonikidze was found in the village with bullet wounds. On November 1, the Nazran regional police station was fired on while a citizen of Kazakhstan, Alexei Samborsky, was shot dead in the town of Karabulak. On November 4, Alihan Pliev was taken away from his house by the unknown security forces (www.ingushetia.org, www.ingushetia.kavkaz-uzel.ru, October–November 2009). The chronicles go on and on. It is always all the same: kidnapped, killed, fired on, detained by police.

Today, it is clear that Yunus-bek Yevkurov has disappointed the Kremlin. That is exactly why an outsider, Alexei Vorobyov, who is not from Ingushetia, was recommended to him as Ingushetia’s new prime minister (www.lenta.ru, October 16). Because of the unsatisfactory state of affairs in the republic, Ingushetia’s interior minister was replaced (www.granit.ru, November 12) and all of Ingushetia’s security structures were put under the command of Chechnya-tested Colonel-General Arkady Yedelev (www.kommersant.ru, August 24).

It increasingly appears that the Kremlin is already actively searching for a new president for Ingushetia. This will be relatively easy, given that this past summer’s suicide bombing attack on Yevkurov’s motorcade, in which he was badly wounded, means a medical discharge of the current president will not be a problem.

One possible sign of this search for a new Ingush president might be the dropping of all criminal charges against the richest and most famous Ingush Mikhail Gutseriev (www.rosbalt.ru, October 28), who has taken up temporary refuge in Great Britain. Gutseriev was a member of the administration of Ruslan Aushev, the first president of Ingushetia, who had to resign under pressure from then Russian President Vladimir Putin. If Gutseriev makes up his mind to return to Russia, then he, or his protégé, may be seriously considered for the presidency in Ingushetia. It is worth noting, however, that Gutseriev’s reputation is not unequivocal in Ingush society.

Having fallen out with Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov, Yevkurov can still play his last trump card: refugees from Ossetia. If he succeeds in returning the Ingush refugees who left their homes after the Ossetian-Ingush conflict of 1992, then he can create the illusion of control of the situation in the republic. But those issues are decided exclusively in the Kremlin’s backrooms. If there is no clear signal from the Kremlin regarding concessions to be made by the North Ossetian administration, then Yevkurov will fail in his attempt to play this card.

The problem that Ingushetia is facing today is that the authorities and many civil society leaders in the republic are too fixated on ancient customs and societal arrangements. These things do not have the influence that many political figures would want them to have in Ingush society. The first to understand this were the members of Ingushetia’s Sharia Jamaat. That is why their structure has been functioning successfully for the last nine years. The jamaat recognizes that Ingush society has specific characteristics, but believes that this does not resolve the essence of the problem. Ingushetia’s clan structure is an atavism that not only does not help today’s Ingush society, but disorganizes it. For instance, the owner of the opposition Internet-portal Ingushetia.ru, Magomed Yevloev, was killed by Ibragim Yevloev. Another more famous Yevloev, Ahmed (emir Magas), embodies the armed resistance in Ingushetia. In other words, just by looking at a single family it is possible to conclude that an Ingush teip (clan) cannot represent one position, because all of its members have their own understanding of the development of the Ingush society. No teip is capable of resolving the situation. The problem of Ingush society is tightly bound to the problems of Ingushetia’s neighbors. That means that its resolution within the boundaries of the republic is simply unrealistic today.

Nabucco Investment Decision Postponed

Vladimir Socor

On November 11 the Austrian OMV-led Nabucco management announced that the investment decision on the project will be postponed, from early 2010 to the fourth quarter of that year. There is no clear explanation for this sudden change.

Only seven days earlier, the same Vienna office had sounded confident that the project was advancing on schedule. According to OMV and Nabucco spokesman Christian Dolezal on November 4, “construction work will start in 2011 and, as things now stand, the first gas will flow in 2014” (www.news.Az, November 4). In that spokesman’s interview, and also in its newsletter circulated in early November, the Austrian-led Nabucco management mentions “detailed discussions” ongoing with the European Investment Bank (EIB), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the United States Export-Import Bank (EXIM), and other lending institutions; as well as discussions in prospect with the U.S. International Finance Corporation (IFC), Hermes, and SACE (Nabucco Newsletter, November 2009).

If the level of investor confidence is truly such as to necessitate postponing the decision by one year, the reasons behind this remain unexplained publicly by the project company or by the European Commission, which strongly backs the Nabucco project.

One obvious confidence-undermining factor is Turkey’s AKP government, which blocks the westbound route for Azerbaijani gas, the main source of supply for Nabucco’s first stage. After almost two years of obstruction, and despite signing the inter-governmental agreement with the European partners in July, Ankara seems entrenched in its refusal to sign a transit agreement for Azerbaijani gas to Europe.

Ankara’s position on this issue seems irrational at first sight, given the AKP government’s ambition to turn Turkey into an energy transportation corridor on a colossal scale. Its strategy, however, relies mainly on Russia (and, as a more distant prospect, Iran) to fulfill the AKP’s grand ambition. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s government is in discussions with the Kremlin on building the South Stream, Blue Stream Two, Samsun-Ceyhan, and other gas and oil pipelines in Turkey or through Turkish waters. Ankara even favors using part of Nabucco’s capacity to carry Gazprom’s gas to Europe.

Compared with the Russian projects (grandiose on paper), Nabucco with Azerbaijani gas may seem a small currency of exchange to the AKP government. Indeed, the government is using Nabucco as a bargaining chip in the negotiations with the European Union on the Cyprus issue and on Turkish accession to the E.U.

E.U. officials (and some U.S. counterparts) routinely tell the AKP government how crucial its cooperation is to Europe’s energy security and other major Western goals. That flattering language does not appear conditional on Ankara’s actual performance on Nabucco and other issues. It inspires the AKP government to entertain an exalted view of its importance to Europe and overplay its hand.

Nabucco may indeed look expendable –or a tradable card– to Turkey, and not fully convincing from upstream to downstream, unless clearly integrated into the broader framework of the Southern Corridor project for Central Asian gas to Europe.

Azerbaijan has presciently advocated that integrated Caspian-Central Asian strategy for years. The European Commission has clearly set this policy in its November 2008 communication on energy security strategy. However, this message has not been articulated with the necessary consistency and clarity by E.U. officials and Nabucco project management in recent months. Nabucco’s appeal can fade, if promoted as a self-contained project without explicit links to the comprehensive Caspian-Central Asian gas strategy.

The proposed White Stream pipeline on the seabed of the Black Sea is a component of the Southern Corridor plan. White Stream can provide a transportation solution for future Turkmen gas –via Azerbaijan and Georgia– to Europe, circumventing Turkey. It does not rival the Turkish overland transport solution, but can significantly supplement it. E.U. funding for White Stream’s feasibility study can signal that gas producer and consumer countries would not be pressured by a Turkish transportation monopoly. Diversification of gas transportation routes is a policy as valid in the Black Sea basin as elsewhere (EDM, October 30).

A deceptive appearance of progress on Gazprom’s South Stream has contributed to the recent spell of Nabucco skepticism. Slovenia is about to sign up for South Stream while Croatia is seriously considering the possibility (this would require Russia to enlist local support for ousting Hungarian MOL from Croatia). Routing South Stream through Slovenia would implicitly put Austria under some pressure to join.

All this seems to make Vienna nervous again. On November 11 Chancellor Werner Faymann held talks with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin in Moscow on the possibility of Austria joining South Stream. At the concluding news conference, Putin declared that both Russia and Austria are convinced of South Stream’s merits and have agreed to complete an agreement on Austria joining the project (Interfax, NTV, November 11).

On that same day, the Austrian OMV-led Nabucco management surprisingly announced by e-mail to mass media the postponement of an investment decision on the Nabucco project.

Death Penalty Receives Widespread Political Support in Kyrgyzstan

Erica Marat

Debates to renew capital punishment are intensifying in Kyrgyzstan. The idea was first raised last month by the then Secretary of the Security Council Adakhan Madumarov and the Chairman of the National Security Service (SNB) Murat Sutalinov. Then, both officials agreed that capital punishment is the “Kyrgyz” way of dealing with crimes, finding Western recommendations to be irrelevant in the local context. Security officials even mentioned the possibility of public executions (EDM, October 5).

On November 11, the ruling Ak Zhol party ended its support for the U.N. General Assembly’s International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) that calls for abolishing capital punishment (www.akipress.kg, November 11). The party resorted to a wide range of arguments to justify the death penalty. Kyrgyzstan’s financial inability to support the lives of prisoners serving life sentences that would otherwise be executed was among the most common argument. According to the Kyrgyz Justice Minister Nurlan Tursunkulov, who has a military background, each inmate costs the Kyrgyz government 200 soms per day ($4.60). With about 200 inmates who could be executed, the state is instead spending 1.4 million soms annually (roughly $336,400) to sustain their lives in prison (www.akipress.kg, November 11).

Ak Zhol members of parliament (MP’s) agreed with Tursunkulov’s arguments, claiming that since abolishing the death penalty in Kyrgyzstan, serious crime has became more frequent because criminals know the state will punish them only with “humanity” (www.fergana.ru, November 11). Other arguments included MP’s referring to public opinion polls which, according to them, supported capital punishment. Citing the United States as an example of a country that still allows the measure, also served as an additional factor for Ak Zhol members. Some MP’s questioned the reasoning as to why capital punishment was ever abandoned, since Kyrgyzstan lacks sufficient finances to maintain large numbers of prisoners.

Those supporting ICCPR suggested that the evidence of an increase in the level of crime due to capital punishment being abolished is unconvincing and Kyrgyzstan’s historical and cultural background does not allow such penalties for members of its society (www.akipress.kg, November 11). According to Leila Sydykova another Ak Zhol MP with a background in jurisprudence, capital punishment is not justified in Kyrgyzstan, where over 80 percent of all killings take place in everyday situations, while many others are contract killings. The number of contract killings and violent attacks against political opponents increased after Kurmanbek Bakiyev came to power in March 2005. Overall, five MP’s and a dozen political and criminal opponents of the Bakiyev regime were assassinated. This year alone, seven journalists who criticized the regime were brutally beaten by unknown assailants and subsequently two of them died.

However, the reasoning on both sides fails to resonate with the very principles of ICCPR, which emphasizes the importance of the “inherent dignity of the person” and “every human being’s inherent right to life.” The Kyrgyz politicians’ detachment from these principles testifies to their general misunderstanding of the main reasons as to why the international community has called for abolishing the death penalty.

As one civil society activist from Kyrgyzstan told Jamestown, the current regime is in favor of capital punishment simply to threaten its own adversaries from the political opposition, the criminal underworld, and those deemed to fall under the category of religious extremists. The judicial system in the country is deeply corrupt, with the ruling elite exerting strong influence over the courts. Previous persecution of political opponents on charges of corruption was used mostly as a tactic against those opposed to the government’s attempt to fight corruption. This year the former Foreign Minister Alikbek Jekshenkulov was arrested on allegations of large-scale corruption after he joined the opposition. As the leader of Ata Meken opposition party Omurbek Tekebayev told Jamestown, “the government has a special folder with corruption charges against virtually every politician that can be used when it wants to silence unwanted opposition.”

After several years of the moratorium on capital punishment, it was finally abolished in the constitution adopted in 2007 under the current Bakiyev regime. The initiative to overturn the constitutional statute was abrupt, quickly turning into one of the most widely discussed government initiatives. The parliament is yet to vote on the issue, but it is likely to follow direction from the government and finally support Tursunkulov. While it is difficult to imagine a court decision to execute any of the 200 prisoners currently serving life sentences, potentially the measure is most likely to become an instrument of fear used against opponents of the regime.

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