IN THIS ISSUE

* Scandinavian governments give green light to anti-green “Nord Stream”
* Kremlin signals interest in deepening cooperation with NATO over Afghanistan
* Chechen officials report major increase in number of rebel fighters being killed
* Lukashenka balances relations with Russia and the E.U.
** New in the Jamestown blog on Russia and Eurasia (http://www.jamestown.org/blog):
- Russians Claim Georgia Plans to Buy Sophisticated Weapons from the U.S.

Scandinavian Governments Allow Russo-German Nord Stream Pipeline

Vladimir Socor

On November 5 the Finnish and Swedish governments gave Nord Stream, the Gazprom-led consortium, permission to lay the pipeline through their respective economic zones on the Baltic seabed, on an approved route from Russia to Germany. The Danish government had given its permission in late October. The Kremlin and Gazprom had been seeking that permission arduously for the last three years.

Those three Nordic governments had resisted or procrastinated on the basis of ecological and security considerations. The influential Scandinavian Greens objected strongly. Ultimately, however, each government’s bilateral political relations with Russia weighed heavily in their decisions. Of these three countries, only Denmark seeks to be connected with the Nord Stream pipeline and import Russian gas, in modest volume initially.

Countries on the Baltic Sea’s opposite rim –Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland– had raised manifold objections to the project on ecological, economic, and strategic grounds. The four countries’ prime ministers have promptly criticized the Scandinavian governments’ decision on those grounds (PAP, November 6; BNS, November 6, 9).

Strategically, Nord Stream –should it materialize– would allow Russia to interrupt gas supplies to those countries through the existing pipelines, while maintaining full supplies via Nord Stream to Germany and potentially other West European countries. E.U. risk-sharing and solidarity could be subjected to considerable strain in such a situation, or under the threat of a supply crisis.

Politically, the Scandinavian collective approval of Nord Stream amounts to a significant success for Russia. It rewards Moscow’s efforts to divide the European Union, frustrate the formation of a common E.U. energy policy, and capitalize on Berlin’s neo-Ostpolitik to lock Germany into a dependency relationship with Russia.

In practical terms, however, Russian gas supply sources and financing for the Nord Stream pipeline look highly dubious. Moscow will probably try to use certain West European political friends and some energy champions to lobby for subsidies to the pipeline. But approval of E.U. financing looks dauntingly difficult and would still not ensure long-term gas supplies from Russia through Nord Stream.

The pipeline would run for 1,220 kilometers on the Baltic seabed, from Vyborg near St. Petersburg to Greifswald on the German coast. Nord Stream is planned to consist of two twin lines, each with an annual throughput capacity of 27.5 billion cubic meters (bcm). Under the construction schedule as currently proposed (following multiple amendments), work would start in spring 2010, to complete and commission the first line by late 2011. Construction of the second line is promised to start in 2012, for completion in 2014. The full throughput capacity should be reached by 2015 at 55 bcm annually, for a presumed 25-year period. Construction costs are estimated at 7.5 billion Euros by the consortium ($15 billion), by many European analysts (Handelsblatt, Financial Times Deutschland, November 6, 7)

Gazprom controls the consortium with 51 percent of the shares; Germany’s Ruhrgas and Wintershall (gas-trading subsidiaries of the E.On energy conglomerate and BASF chemicals giant, respectively) with 20 percent each; and the Dutch company Nederlands Gasunie with 9 percent. The consortium is Swiss-registered as are other Kremlin-sponsored, opaque energy ventures.

E.On and BASF have predicated their corporate strategies on long-term over-reliance on Russian gas. For Gasunie, by contrast, contracting for Russian gas is a move to diversify Dutch imports while North Sea gas reserves decline.

Consecutive German governments have also drifted into a policy of dependency on Russian gas, at almost 40 percent of annual national consumption (with a similar percentage for Russian-delivered crude oil) prior to the 2008-2009 economic recession. Such a dependency level is much higher than in any country in the “old” E.U. The Nord Stream project, should it materialize as intended, would increase Germany’s dependency even further.

Energy security considerations could have prompted Germany to cooperate with Brussels and the E.U.’s new member countries in the common interest of reducing dependency on Russian energy. Instead, however, German governments of both main parties and key interest groups are prepared to increase Germany’s dependence on Russian gas while ignoring and sometimes undercutting E.U. diversification goals and new member countries’ interests.

German policy reflects apprehensions that commercially viable Russian gas reserves and production will not suffice to cover European import demand in the years ahead. These worries are being expressed privately, but covered publicly by business and government with declarations of confidence in Russia. While anticipation of a Russian supply crunch is well-grounded, thus far the German response has been to rush for access to the available Russian reserves ahead of other European customers. Moscow itself is stimulating a competitive race among national energy champions in Europe –and also between European and U.S. companies– for access to Russian supplies.

The German government’s policy in this regard has remained consistent under both major parties thus far. Social-Democrat Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder became Nord Stream’s German godfather in 2005, for a purely bilateral Russo-German project. His successor, Christian-Democrat Chancellor Angela Merkel –temporarily with the Social-Democrats in a coalition government– has attempted to put a slight European veneer on this Russo-German project. The entry of Gasunie, and Merkel’s lobbying the E.U. to declare Nord Stream a project in Europe’s interest, cannot obscure the project’s bilateral Russo-German essence, to the detriment of a common E.U. energy policy.

Moscow Offers Helicopter Cooperation to ISAF

Roger McDermott

Moscow plans to sell helicopters on a commercial basis to NATO in support of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operations in Afghanistan. Sources within the Russian aviation industry indicated that the Alliance is interested in procuring civil transport helicopters to enhance prompt and safe troop and cargo movements in theater. Mikhail Dmitriyev, the Director of the Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation (FSVTS), confirmed that NATO representatives have shown interest in the supply of Russian helicopters to Alliance forces in Afghanistan, although this appears to be in its initial phases. Dmitriyev noted that consultations are likely to continue early next year, after which he hoped that following preliminary agreements talks will begin with specific Russian companies (Interfax, October 29).

On November 3 Vyacheslav Dzirkaln the Deputy Director of FSVTS said that large-scale delivery of Russian built transport helicopters could soon commence. He explained that this might also involve contracts with NATO member states on a bilateral basis to upgrade platforms to NATO standards. This boost to NATO-Russia cooperation over Afghanistan is rooted in reported shortages and operational challenges in relation to helicopters. “There is some evidence that European and American helicopters are not so well suited to operating in such difficult climate conditions,” he explained. A number of NATO members and the Afghan National Army (ANA) use Russian manufactured aircraft in the country, while they have reportedly demonstrated high quality in terms of reliability and endurance combined with the ease of maintenance in mountainous terrain or severe weather conditions. Dzirkaln, referring to the sanctions imposed on Rosoboroneksport by the U.S. State Department during the presidency of George W. Bush, said that although current negotiations do not include military transport helicopters, if these sanctions were lifted it might stimulate such cooperation (Interfax, November 3).

On October 28, Dmitriy Shugayev the Deputy Director of the Rostekhnologiy (Russian Technologies) corporation attended a conference in Brussels for the heads of rear services in NATO countries. During his presentation Shugayev highlighted the difficulties facing the Alliance in supplying helicopters in Afghanistan and that according to the European Defense Agency nine Eastern European ISAF members have “about 400 Russian made helicopters in service,” and many will be used in Afghanistan. As well as confirming the potential to cooperate in this key area, he suggested that Moscow might also offer to train crews in Russian service centers (RIA Novosti, October 28).

Although this support might be restricted to civil aircraft, Moscow is clearly considering possible military transport helicopters as another mechanism to deepen its cooperation with NATO in Afghanistan. Indeed, such cooperation will dominate the forthcoming NATO-Russia Council in Brussels on December 15-17. Last month, the Russian Ambassador to NATO Dmitry Rogozin told NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen that Moscow is keen to learn the aims of the new U.S. strategy in Afghanistan and that the Alliance should make practical proposals on future cooperation. Ragozin noted that Russia currently assists NATO in the transit of non-military cargoes for ISAF through the northern distribution network (NDN), participates in joint efforts to train anti-drug personnel, and “is ready to assist ISAF, especially in the fields where they experience a severe shortage of military-technical support, such as air transportation and helicopters” (ITAR-TASS, October 28).

Dzirkaln explained that cooperation between Russia and NATO has entered a new phase, involving Moscow moving beyond bilateral cooperation with individual members and entering “directly into concrete interaction with the structural subdivisions of NATO.” Specifically, this relates to upgrading Russian built platforms among NATO’s East European members. He added that a common NATO program for adapting Soviet and Russian weapons and equipment to Alliance standards might expand (ITAR-TASS, October 28).

In exchange, Dzirkaln singled out France among the NATO countries with which Russia is successfully developing military-technical cooperation. “In particular, we purchase thermal vision devices for some types of weapons and military hardware from French companies. Thus, we buy from France onboard equipment for the Su-30 fighters supplied to India and Malaysia,” Dzirkaln recalled. He highlighted French interest in the Krasnopol guided high-precision munitions systems developed at the Tula Instrument-Making Design Bureau, and clearly the ongoing talks on the possible Russian procurement of the Mistral class helicopter carrier is an example of growing naval cooperation. Over the past five years, work was conducted on a bilateral basis with France and Germany in the development and construction of a Mi-26 (Halo) transport helicopter, which included demonstration flights by French pilots. However, this only resulted in Paris and Berlin submitting reports to the relevant NATO committee. Moscow recognizes that such decisions are required at NATO level (Interfax, November 3).

Equally, domestic factors are also at play. On November 2, the Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov told a meeting of the military-industrial commission in Moscow that the lack of domestic serial production of helicopter engines represented a major problem: “The majority of Russian helicopters are equipped with engines made in Ukraine... about 250 engines per year,” Ivanov said. Despite this being raised three years ago, Ivanov complained that a solution had been “delayed unjustifiably” (RIA Novosti, November 2).

Ivanov also identified that another important task is eliminating the technology lag in onboard electronic instruments and precision weapons, which hinders the all-weather and 24-hour capabilities of Russian-made helicopters. He said that “the existing pool of helicopters and state aviation is morally and physically obsolete to a considerable degree. In army aviation, modern helicopter systems account for less than 10 percent.” Surprisingly, he also revealed that the same situation exists in the aviation of the Federal Security Service (FSB), interior and emergencies ministries. He told the commission, however, that helicopter production had doubled in the past three years, reaching around 200 helicopters in 2009 (ITAR-TASS, RIA Novosti, November 2).

Since ISAF supplies are now intertwined with Russian air and overland access through the NDN, such military-technical cooperation appears realistic. It suits Moscow’s interests, accessing NATO countries and Alliance level programs to expand its export market and gain vital quid pro quo advanced western technologies urgently needed for its own airpower modernization. Moreover, by offering helicopter-based assistance, Moscow is not only plugging a niche in NATO operations in Afghanistan, but inadvertently recognizing that the Alliance will be there for the long haul and its success is also in Russia’s national security interest.

Rights Activists; Chechen Authorities Passing Off Slain Young People as Rebels

The Jamestown Foundation

Chechen officials claim to have killed and captured a large number of rebels in the republic in recent weeks. However, human rights groups have cast doubts on the claims, saying that some of those identified as rebels were in fact civilian non-combatants.

The Kavkazsky Uzel (Caucasian Knot) website today (November 10) quoted an unidentified Chechen security official as saying that 35 rebels were killed and another 42 rebels and their accomplices were captured in Chechnya in October alone. The source said six rebel bases and nine arms caches were discovered last month, from which 37 small arms, seven anti-tank grenade launchers with 30 rounds and more than 6,000 rounds of small arms ammunition were seized.

Judging by reports this week, the battlefield successes of Chechen security forces are continuing. Interfax reported yesterday (November 9) that security forces had killed a militant on the southern outskirts of the village of Tangi-Chu in Chechnya’s Urus-Martan district.

On November 7, two suspected rebel leaders were reportedly killed on the outskirts of the city of Argun in a special operation led by Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov himself. Interfax quoted Kadyrov as identifying the two as the “emir of the Shali and Kurchaloi districts, Rizvan Osmaev, aka Gyurza; and his accomplice Khasan Ozdamirov, aka Gerat [Heart].” The Chechen president said Osmaev had put up armed resistance during an attempt to detain him on the outskirts of the village of Belgatoi near the Kavkaz federal highway, firing on and throwing home-made grenades at security forces, and was killed by return fire. His accomplice, Ozdamirov, was discovered and surrounded in a wooded area near Argun, and killed after he fired on security forces. Chechen Interior Minister Ruslan Alkhanov said Osmaev had been responsible for numerous attacks on policemen, military servicemen and civilians (Interfax, November 7).

ITAR-TASS reported on November 6 that a militant who allegedly belonged to the late Chechen rebel warlord Shamil Basaev’s group in 1998-2000 was captured the previous day in the town of Vedeno. Also on November 5, an alleged rebel who reportedly had recently arrived from Azerbaijan, identified as Artur Duzgaev, was killed by police in the Chechen capital Grozny. Two other alleged rebels –a Grozny resident and a resident of the village of Starye Atagi in Chechnya’s Groznensky district– were also detained (Interfax, November 5). Interfax reported on November 3 that a man who had supplied food to a rebel unit from June-August 2007 was detained in the village of Dyshne-Vedeno in Chechnya’s Vedeno district (Interfax, November 3).

Kavkazsky Uzel quoted Chechen human rights activists as casting doubt on the official claims that 35 rebels were killed in special operations last month. “I do not believe that all of those people killed on the territory of our republic in October were members of armed formations,” an anonymous Chechen rights activist told the website. “And I have every reason [for such doubts]. There are many examples of siloviki passing off as members of the armed resistance young people who had absolutely nothing to do with it,” he added. The source cited several cases, including that of Artur Duzgaev, the 21-year-old killed by police in Grozny on November 5, saying that he had been kidnapped by security forces just days after returning to the Chechen capital from Baku and three days before he was killed. “And after that his body was dumped in Grozny and it was announced that he had put up armed resistance, that he had a pistol and wanted to link up with the militants,” the source said (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, November 10). Kavkazsky Uzel reported yesterday that Duzgaev was a wrestler who recently won a championship in Azerbaijan (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, November 9).

Kavkazsky Uzel also quoted an unnamed representative of a Chechen NGO as saying that the number of cases of extra-judicial killings of young people who are subsequently accused of being rebels has increased recently and that at greatest risk are relatives or friends of rebels suspected of links or sympathies with the armed underground. “In addition, young people who have returned home from abroad are objects of close attention by the police,” the source told the website. “The siloviki consider the most suspicious those who have returned from Azerbaijan, Turkey, Georgia and some European countries. It is believed that they are recruited there and sent home to join the militants,” he continued. The source said that real recruitment by the rebels does occur, but they are the exception rather than the rule (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, November 9).

Minsk Forum Raises New Questions

David Marples

The Minsk Forum has become a regular feature of the late fall in the Belarusian capital. Each November, an increasingly large gathering –including diplomats, politicians, academics, and business people from more than 20 countries this year– assembles to discuss a variety of issues, with its focus on E.U. relations with Belarus and the prospects for democratization in the country. For the second year in succession, the head of the presidential administration, Uladzimir Makei, attended the proceedings. In 2008 he was bombarded with questions, but this year he seems to have had a warmer reception. The forum, which was initiated and is still chaired by German scholar Rainer Lindner, mirrors the efforts of the Eastern Partnership Project to develop closer ties with Belarus. On the horizon –before the end of November– is the prospect that the Council of the E.U. will remove all formerly imposed sanctions on Belarus, which are currently suspended. Speakers at the Forum were insistent that Europeans have not compromised any principles in the new policy of engagement with the Lukashenka regime.

Thus, German MP Mariluise Beck, in a speech at the forum, emphasized the significance of freedom of the media, open work with informal associations, and freedom for political parties in Belarus. Charge d’affaires of the Delegation of the European Commission to Belarus, Jean-Eric Holzapfel, stressed that the Europeans have not forgotten the original 12 principles they elaborated in order for full working relations to be established with the Minsk government (www.charter97.org, November 6).

One question raised by the forum was the issue of Belarus’ recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the breakaway regions of Georgia. Only three countries to date have recognized their independence, namely Russia, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Swedish ambassador Stefan Eriksson praised the Belarusian government for its stance to date, despite pressure from Russia to take such a step (Belapan, November 6).

There is every indication that the E.U. will remove the sanctions permanently. It has recently lifted similar sanctions on Uzbekistan, which has a much worse human rights record than Belarus. The E.U. has also found in Belarus an amenable partner: the Lukashenka administration is happy to trade and talk with the Europeans, and in particular it would like to see the elimination of the restrictive visa regime, which requires 60 Euros ($90) for entry of Belarusians into the Schengen zone (Narodnaya Hazeta, November 9). The vast majority of Belarusian residents would favor such a step. On the other hand, the Belarusians are not prepared to change either the nature of their regime or their foreign policy. They have never wavered from this position.

Thus, speaking at the forum, Makei stated that Belarus’ participation in the Eastern Partnership Project does not signify a change in foreign policy. Similarly, Uladzimir Ulakhovich, the Director of the Center for International Research at the Belarusian State University, commented that the Belarusians favor pragmatism and the lifting of barriers and restrictions to trade between Belarus and the countries of the E.U. (Narodnaya Hazeta, November 9). He also reported (November 4) that the Belarusian parliament will consider recognizing South Ossetia and Abkhazia. On the following day, the legislature formed a working group that is to travel to these regions to examine the situation at first hand. The move seems illogical, if Belarus is really paying attention to the comments made at the Minsk Forum (www.charter97.org, November 4-5).

On November 4, President Alyaksandr Lukashenka stated that the E.U. and other international organizations, as well as European governments, were beginning to recognize that it was necessary to treat Belarus as an equal partner (Belarusian Telegraph Agency, November 4). From his perspective, that status signifies that it is not the place of the E.U. or the EPP to impose any conditions on his country. It seems evident that the position of Belarus is to maintain relations with both Russia and the E.U., using the former as a major political partner and the latter as a source of trade and extra income.

Meanwhile, some political parties are still struggling for recognition. A case in point is the Belarusian Christian Democratic Party, a radical rightist organization that campaigns against abortion and “for family values.” Having been turned down twice by the ministry of justice, the party leaders considered holding a repeated founding congress in Kastrichnitskaya Square in the center of Minsk. However, on October 31, it held a more formal meeting and again applied for registration (Belorusy i Rynok, November 2-8). Pressure on political parties opposed to the government remains intense. One of the leaders of the BCDP, Pavel Sevyarinets, has frequently been harassed and arrested.

One can hardly blame Lukashenka for exploiting the vacillation and uncertainty of Europeans, whose policies have been markedly inconsistent. One wonders, however, whether the latter really believe that the Belarusian government pays any attention to issues of human rights or democratization. It has no need to do so when it has maneuvered itself into a very favorable position without reforms or developing a more tolerant society. As analyst Uladzimir Padhol told Jamestown, those opposition factions that do not back membership in the EPP with minimal concessions on the part of Minsk, are consigned to the role of dissidents in their own country, increasingly marginalized if not ignored altogether. That is what the government has been seeking for the past thirteen years and it is now very close to attaining its goal.

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