IN THIS ISSUE

* Local election fraud causes increased tension within the Russian elites
* Federal successes overshadowed by further attacks across the North Caucasus
* Bakiyev advances family interests in Bishkek
** Visit the Jamestown blog on Russia and Eurasia (http://www.jamestown.org/blog):
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Fissures Appear in the Power Vertical in Moscow

Pavel Felgenhauer

Local government elections held on October 11 in 75 regions of Russia were massively rigged by the authorities in favor of the ruling United Russia party. There is, of course, nothing particularly new about election fraud in Russia –the nation is not a democracy and vote rigging is widespread. By producing the best possible result in favor of United Russia, local authorities demonstrate their loyalty to the supreme national leader Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who is the chairman of United Russia. What was indeed surprising in the elections last month is that the opposition factions of Communists (KPRF), pro-Kremlin Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) and Just Russia (SR) staged a walk out in the State Duma, while their leaders angrily protested against the vote rigging (EDM, October 14).

Of course, United Russia has an overwhelming majority in the Duma (314 seats out of 450) and while the opposition factions boycotted the procedures, the chamber continued to rubber-stamp pro-government legislation. KPRF, LDPR and SR are normally very constructive, loyal opposition factions, while their election fraud protest fizzled out after several days and today they are all back in the Duma –presenting to the outside world a seemingly normal face of Russia’s so-called “sovereign democracy.” The Duma opposition leaders were received by President Dmitry Medvedev in the Kremlin and told that they could protest against the election results in the courts if they wish (Interfax, October 24). The Kremlin and United Russia have publicly dismissed election fraud accusations as a hysterical reaction orchestrated by those who cannot accept political defeat.

Clearly, the Russian legal system is totally corrupt and politically controlled by the authorities. Challenging electoral fraud in court is futile. KPRF and the liberal Yabloko party have frequently been unsuccessful in challenging election results in court. It is clear that the fraudulent election results on October 11 will stand, but the political aftershocks continue as more factual evidence of the magnitude of the vote rigging is exposed. The results of an opinion poll held after the election in Moscow by the independent Levada Center on October 22-27 show that the real turnout was about 23 percent, while official results claim a 31 percent turnout. Officially, United Russia secured 66.25 percent of the vote, but the poll gave them only 46.1 percent. The Levada Center report concluded that only in Moscow were ballot boxes stuffed by “hundreds of thousands” of fraudulent votes. These fake votes (the difference between the actual turnout of 23 percent and the reported turnout of 31 percent) –almost a million votes in Moscow– were given by the authorities to United Russia, giving it 20 percent more votes. The Levada Center results corroborate the findings of a similar pole organized by KPRF (Vedomosti, November 3).

The rigging of the October 11 election has caused a slight decrease in the approval ratings of Medvedev and Putin, as reported by two polling services –Levada Center and the Foundation of Public Opinion. Of course, the fluctuation is not significant (Medvedev’s approval decreased from 62 to 56 percent and Putin’s from 72 to 66 percent). This decline was dismissed by the Kremlin as a statistical error (Vedomosti, November 2). What is probably more important, are the continuing rifts the October election is causing within the ruling elites.

After meeting Medvedev on October 24 to complain about election fraud, the leader of the pro-Kremlin LDPR Vladimir Zhirinovsky publicly accused the Moscow Mayor and United Russia kingpin Yury Luzkov of “ruling in Moscow for 20 years, creating the most corrupt local government in Russia and rigging elections.” Zhirinovsky demanded Luzkov’s dismissal and the appointment of a government minister by Medvedev to directly rule Moscow and its region. Zhirinovsky’s invective was reported by the closely censured Russian state television. A source in the Moscow government told journalists that the attack on Luzkov was approved by the Kremlin despite “Zhirinovsky and Luzkov having good personal relations.” A recent poll by the Levada Center shows that 61.4 percent of Russians believe Luzkov is indeed corrupt (Vedomosti, October 27).

The Russian nation may believe its leaders are crooks, but the public remains mostly passive. On October 31 another attempt at peaceful public protest by human rights activists in Moscow was violently dispersed by the riot police OMON units, while a “Russian march” by extreme nationalists was allowed to proceed on November 4. In both events, the number of participants was limited (Interfax, November 4). However, the authorities are not taking any chances. Last week, during an international police exhibition, Interpolitekh 2009, in the outskirts of Moscow, the riot police OMON held public exercises using a water cannon, teargas and shock grenades “to assault a social protest by impoverished senior citizens (pensioners),” as the event was described in a press release given to journalists. Later the interior ministry announced that reporters had distorted the facts –the OMON “attack” was aimed at “socially disturbed citizens,” but not “pensioners” specifically. It was reported that an interior ministry junior official as well as an Interfax reporter were punished for this alleged misreporting (Vedomosti, Kommersant, October 30).

The KPRF leader Gennady Zuganov has announced that the communists will stop being a “loyal opposition” and instead begin a campaign to demand the resignation of Putin and his government, while supporting Medvedev. Zuganov conceded that Medvedev’s public criticism last week of communist terror during the rule of Josef Stalin in the 1930’s and 1940’s “was disturbing,” while Putin’s known support of Stalinism was acceptable. But still, the KPRF wanted to side with Medvedev to exploit the presumed differences between him and Putin (Vedomosti, Kommersant, November 2). The masses may still be passive, but the growing tension within the elite is unnerving.

Chechnya: Again the Epicenter of Insurgent Violence in the North Caucasus?

Cerwyn Moore

In recent months, federal operations in Ingushetia and Chechnya, as well as punitive security measures in Dagestan have gained momentum (ITAR-TASS, October 28). Official announcements indicate that these operations have hampered the ability of the insurgents in the North Caucasus to sustain large-scale attacks in the “year of the offensive” announced by rebel leader Dokka Umarov in May (www.kavkazcenter.com, May 17). Nonetheless, while local sweep operations have led to the deaths of a considerable number of so-called militants, daily attacks in Chechnya, as well as low-level violence in parts of Dagestan and Ingushetia indicate that inter-generational change along with repressive federal policies have created the conditions in which support for attacks against federal authorities has not diminished.

In a recent announcement by Chechen Interior Minister Ruslan Alkhanov, he noted that nearly one hundred and fifty members of illegal armed formations were killed in federal operations since April. Reportedly, the majority were killed in Chechnya (RIA Novosti, November 2). In a similar press statement in September, the Ingush President Yunus-Bek Yevkurov announced that scores of militants had been killed in a series of sweep operations (RIA Novosti, September 14). While human rights organizations have long expressed doubts over official data on alleged militant activity, far from illustrating that local counter-insurgency sweeps have been successful, the number of deaths attributed to counter-terrorist operations in Ingushetia and Chechnya indicates that the insurgency retains a measure of localized support. Moreover, the sophisticated clandestine support network now includes a hitherto limited capability to conduct attacks within Chechnya, bolstered by a younger generation of volunteers who have now joined the ranks of the insurgency over the last few months (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, October 1).

In order to counter this trend, weekly reports announce the deaths of key figures in the insurgency by the federal authorities. The localized “special operations” have led to some sporadic successes including, most recently, the death of a jamaat leader from Khasavyurt in a shootout in the Dagestani capital, Makhachkala (ITAR-TASS, November 2). Nearly two months earlier, Ingush officials announced the death of Rustam Dzortov, in a shootout following a special operation by federal units (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, September 5). Dzortov was reportedly involved in the assassination attempt on the Ingush President Yevkurov in June (RIA Novosti, September 5).

More recently, news reports indicated that Ruslan Alkhanov had personally overseen another “special operation” in the Oktyabrsky district of Grozny, when four would-be suicide bombers, including two women, were killed (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, October 22), and that the Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov himself had actually taken part in a special operation when an armed militant was surrounded in Grozny (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, October 31). This resulted in the death of Ali Khasanov. According to the report, Khasanov was a close ally of Dokka Umarov and the right-hand man of Hussein Gakaev, leader of the Shali jamaat who, along with his brother, are allegedly responsible for the recent upsurge in suicide attacks in Chechnya.

Some months earlier, federal officials announced that a suicide attack on September 12 was conducted by a Chechen man in his early twenties, linked to Muslim Gakaev’s Vedeno jamaat (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, September 15). This was followed on September 16, when a female bomber detonated explosives next to a police vehicle parked at a checkpoint on Putin Avenue in central Grozny (ITAR-TASS, September 16). The explosion wounded two police officers, one of whom later died (RIA Novosti, September 16). Quoting an unnamed source in the local administration, Kavkazsky Uzel reported that the attack was attributable to ideologue Said Buratasky, the Shali and Vedeno jamaats led by Muslim and Hussein Gakaev, as well as two Arab mercenaries named as Yasir and Makhdan (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, September 17). Local authorities indicated that another man, Dragan Dinaev, who was killed near Vedeno on September 15, had, along with “Arab instructors,” also been involved in suicide attacks in Grozny (EDM, September 18). The instructors, Mokhanad or Makhdan, actually refer to the Arab military aide to Dokka Umarov, Muhannad, while references to Yasir refer to Abu Yasser al-Sudani, another long serving military aide and member of the foreign fighter movement involved in the hierarchy of the North Caucasus insurgency. These announcements, often combined with reports by local officials like Dagestan’s Interior Minister Ali Magomedov that more severe suicide attacks had been prevented (RIA Novosti, September 1), seek to divert attention from localized acts of revenge that fuel parts of the insurgency. The implication, much like that advanced by Kadyrov and Dagestani officials, is that the insurgency does not have roots in the local population.

Nevertheless, the insurgents maintain a capability to launch suicide attacks in Chechnya. In late September, rebel websites announced that a suicide attack directed against Kadyrov had failed, when a woman attempted to get through a security cordon in Gudermes. According to the statement, the woman detonated her explosives when stopped by officials (www.kavkazcenter.com, September 28). Then, another suicide attack was averted in Stary Atagi, when a young bomber named as Vakha Malsagov, was spotted acting suspiciously outside a local police station, detonated explosives, killing himself (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, October 1). More recently, on October 21, another suicide attack occurred in Grozny, wounding four policemen (RIA Novosti, October 21). This was followed shortly afterwards by an official announcement that a second suicide attack directed against Kadyrov, this time in Grozny using a car-bomb, had also been prevented (RIA Novosti, October 23). On October 27, a suspected militant resisted arrest and blew himself up, killing one police officer and injuring another (RIA Novosti, October 27). Three days later, another suspected militant detonated explosives, after being surrounded by police in the Leninsky district of Grozny (RIA Novosti, October 30).

This indicates that insurgents across the North Caucasus retain a capability to mount a sustained campaign of violence, which has increased in intensity over the summer months, and remains an ongoing concern for the federal authorities. The upsurge in attacks has been marked by continued attempts to use suicide attacks in Chechnya proper, alongside a broader and somewhat sporadic campaign of attacks in Dagestan and Ingushetia. This may, in the long term, create problems for the federal authorities, as they attempt to counter the upsurge in attacks. Significantly, however, the attacks, rather than being attributable to foreign mercenaries and Arab instructors, indicate that disenfranchised younger groups are becoming increasingly active in the militant underground network, which now operates as a clandestine movement with an undiminished measure of localized support across the North Caucasus.

Bakiyev Promotes his Son to Key Post

Erica Marat

On October 29, Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s son Maksim Bakiyev was promoted to lead the Central Agency on Development, Investment, and Innovation (www.akipress.kg, October 29). The agency was formed as a result of Bakiyev’s recent government reform and is entitled to control all foreign financial inflows, including aid and credits. The agency’s responsibility also includes the control of major national hydroelectric and gold companies.

The president’s decision to promote his son to an important post resembles other Central Asian presidents’ wish to extend their family rule and, possibly, create a successor from among its members. In Tajikistan, for instance, President Emomali Rakhmon’s son Rustami was elected as the deputy head of the Youth Union and mooted as a potential successor in 2020 (EDM, August 20).

As Kyrgyz political activist Edil Baisalov noted: “The Bakiyev [family] is planning a dynastic succession. But today this [promotion] signifies a long-term ‘program’” (www.baisalov.livejournal.com, October 29). Baisalov argues that Maksim made key decisions when a new government was formed last week. As part of his latest government reform, the president decreased the number of ministries and parliamentary structures (www.akpress.kg, October 28).

The leader of the opposition party Ata Meken, Omurbek Tekebayev, described the recent changes in the government and parliament as Bakiyev’s “privatization” of the state (www.parus.kg, October 28). From U.S. assistance to Russian credit –all finances will now be in the hands of the president’s son, Tekebayev commented. “This way, a parallel budget is created in the country –the parliament and government will not be able to oversee it”, the leader concluded.

In the past year Bakiyev has transformed the National Security Service into a powerful special service agency with extended authority over public life. The president’s brother Zhanysh and another son Marat, both heads of security structures, ensure that the regime is protected from the police level to national army and intelligence structures. However, both relatives are not as powerful as Maksim when it comes to managing the country’s financial and cadre politics.

Maksim is in his early thirties and is one of the country’s wealthiest entrepreneurs. He will be qualified to run for president after Bakiyev’s second term expires in 2014. Maksim began his modest entrepreneurial activity when Bakiyev served in various government posts during the reign of the former President Askar Akayev. However, his career was significantly advanced after Bakiyev came to power on March 24, 2005, as a result of mass protests against Akayev. At that point, Maksim helped his father finance his campaign by covering some costs such as distributing cell phones to Bakiyev’s staff members. Since then, reportedly, Maksim quickly gained informal control over all major national enterprises, including water and hydroelectricity management. Before becoming head of the agency, Maksim had already benefited from revenues collected on Manas, where the U.S. transit base is located.

Meanwhile, it remains unclear how Russia’s $2 billion credit, of which roughly one-fourth has already been allocated to Kyrgyzstan, will be spent. Initially, the credit was intended for the construction of the Kambarata-1 hydropower station, but the whole process of credit spending is opaque. Today, the Kyrgyz hydroelectricity and thermal electricity production facilities can barely meet the requirements of the local market. The government has already started rationing electricity and water supplies as of October 1. Conveniently, Bakiyev blames the global economic crisis for affecting the lives of the Kyrgyz (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 29).

With Maksim secure in his new post, doing business in Kyrgyzstan will become virtually impossible for those failing to comply with the regime’s rules. Bakiyev’s son has acquired the legal means for controlling entrepreneurs in Kyrgyzstan in addition to his already powerful informal influence. Local opposition leaders’ access to the business environment will be closely monitored. Finally, Maksim will be able to regulate the external financing of local NGO’s.

Maksim’s new position has made Kyrgyzstan’s political life more predictable. He will continue ascending the political ladder and become the regime’s domestic and foreign policy representative. But Akayav’s experience has shown that having family members participate in important decisions makes it difficult for the leader himself to maintain his control over the country. Loyalists flocked around Akayev and his wife, as well as his other family members, and created multiple camps within the state. Shortly before the collapse of the Akayev regime, it was no longer possible to identify who exactly among Akayev’s staff was ready to genuinely support the president. As a result, Akayev’s government disintegrated within a few hours on March 24, 2005. The next few years will show whether Bakiyev faces similar risks.

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