IN THIS ISSUE

* Medvedev considers transforming the defense industry
* ... while Moscow fears renewed U.S.-Georgia military cooperation
* Yanukovych outlines pro-Russian foreign policy
** Visit the Jamestown blog on Russia and Eurasia (http://www.jamestown.org/blog):
- Islamic Militants and Ukraine

Medvedev Contemplates Modernizing the Russian Defense Industry

Roger McDermott

On October 26, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev met the leaders of the defense industry, to consider its future and address issues that emerged in September during the Zapad 2009 joint Russian-Belarusian military exercises. He visited the Mashinostroyenia open joint-stock company in Reutov, one of the defense industry leaders, and said that what he found there was atypical of the condition throughout the defense industries. Medvedev made no reference to the company’s prestigious K300P Bastion-P mobile coastal defense missile system, which was lavishly praised by the defense ministry controlled Zvezda television on November 1. His omission further highlighted that this was no mere PR opportunity for the president to berate the defense industry, without any further action. The meeting occurred in two parts: public discussion followed by a closed door session. However, his public comments provided some clues concerning the modernization priorities and measures to make the industry more competitive and enable it to develop new weapons and equipment (Zvezda TV, November 1; Interfax, October 26).

Medvedev identified the key issues facing the defense industry. Despite considerable expenditure, little progress has been made in its modernization, which he described as “patching the holes.” Directors and state agencies must reduce prices to make their products worth procuring, and lower running costs. The legal regulation of state defense procurement needs to be improved, formulating clearer rules on planning and placing such orders. Research and development, he suggested, should reflect the state prioritizing promising new models, avoiding wasting time and resources on old products or those that are simply never used. Lastly, the strategic goals for the future of the defense industry are shaped by the structural transformation of the armed forces, which will be completed by December, meaning that the procurement of modern weapons and equipment is becoming more urgent (www.kremlin.ru, October 26).

During the same meeting, the Deputy Defense Minister Vladimir Popovkin reinforced this message to the defense industry in order to facilitate the modernization of the “new look” armed forces. He pointedly criticized the slow rate at which new weapons are purchased. This failed to arrest the “decline in the technological standard of the existing stock of weapons.” Popovkin explained that “considering the state of the enterprises and problems related to staff, production, technology and financing, it is becoming difficult to re-equip the armed forces with modern weapons in the timeframe that has been set without a fundamental modernization of the military-industrial complex and providing greater sources of innovation,” (Interfax, October 26). The defense industry leaders no doubt perceived an intention to turn a reforming eye on them, since the announcement that Moscow is negotiating procuring a Mistral-class helicopter carrier from France, expected to be agreed by mid-November (RIA Novosti, October 31).

Popovkin noted that as a result of streamlining expenditure, this year the proportion of funds spent on repairing old equipment has been reduced to 16 percent or 20 percent less than originally planned. This enabled the armed forces to receive “nine strategic missiles, six space vehicles, 43 combat aircraft, 41 combat helicopters, a frigate, three launchers for the Iskander missile system and 13 missiles for it.” Moreover, it will facilitate the deployment of a mobile missile system in 2010, and launching eleven space vehicles. Purchases of ground equipment for the GLONASS satellite system has doubled, while shortly procuring 17 combat aircraft, 48 helicopters, and completing the construction of two submarines and commencing the construction of five ships (Interfax, October 26).

While the streamlining Popovkin referred to is bearing fruit, it is clear that the modernization demanded by the reform of the conventional armed forces will require deeper and more systemic measures. Industry and Trade Minister Viktor Khristenko advocated domestic production on a partly commercial basis, in order to enhance the defense industry’s capacity to fulfill state orders. Given the “lessons learned” from the Russia-Georgia War in August 2008, which exposed among other weaknesses those in communications, navigation and reconnaissance; it is evident that this is at least trickling down into the new structures (Interfax, October 26).

On October 19, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff Lieutenant-General Yevgeniy Meychik said that work is underway to introduce a military internet throughout all units: “We are striving for a military internet to cover our armed forces. This is our future, and we are moving towards it.” He also noted that by 2011 every serviceman and combat vehicle will have individual radios, allowing each brigade commander to “communicate directly with every information object on the battlefield.” Experimental models of the Akveduk and Granit radios were used in the Kavkaz, Ladoga, and Zapad 2009 exercises (Vremya Novostei, October 21).

Indeed, by late 2009 Sozvezdiye will complete new generation Azimut-M integrated navigation equipment. It is planned to fit these in command staff and combat vehicles in the second half of 2010. Azimut-M will provide greater accuracy in measurement and ustoychivost raboty (stability in operation), in the context of attempted radio-jamming and can be used where it is difficult or impossible to receive satellite radio-navigation system signals. It is smaller and lighter than earlier versions and offers expanded capabilities at a lower cost. “For the first time, navigation equipment for command-staff and combat vehicles will be manufactured using heteromagnetic technology. It will be fundamentally different from previous generation navigation equipment in terms of its technical characteristics,” according a statement by the design company (Interfax, October 27).

The transition to the new brigades and command structure, which has preoccupied the Russian defense ministry, will in future place greater demands on the defense industry. Modernization, in this sense, has been temporarily eclipsed by the radical force restructuring this year, while concepts such as “streamlining” have yielded only a trickle of new weapons and equipment. The signals from the defense ministry, General Staff, and now more crucially Medvedev, are that prior to the completion of the structural reform, planning is turning to the more arduous task of modernizing the largely obsolete weapons and equipment inventory. To achieve this in the longer term, it will first require deeper adjustments to the defense industry. Thus, on October 26, Medvedev signaled that an equally radical overhaul is needed within the defense industry: it is precisely this “fundamental modernization” that is currently being worked out.

Russia Casts a Wary Eye on Deepening U.S.-Georgia Cooperation

Giorgi Kvelashvili

On October 30, Russia’s Permanent Representative to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, gave an interview to Ekho Moskvy Radio, in which he severely criticized America’s Georgia policy. Quoted by most of Russia’s news agencies, Rogozin said: “No one has abandoned the idea to use Georgia as a counterbalance to Russia…[Georgia is] a toothache or a headache for us in the Caucasus; as far as we are concerned, these attempts will continue” (RIA Novosti, October 30).

When answering the question regarding the future of the relations between Moscow and Washington if the United States deploys military bases in Ukraine and Georgia, the high-profile Russian envoy, a fierce critic of the current leaderships in Kyiv and Tbilisi said, “a few days ago there was a statement by a high-rank representative of the Obama Administration that Washington has no plans whatsoever to establish military bases” in those countries. He apparently meant U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Alexander Vershbow who recently held talks in Tbilisi and made several public announcements. On the one hand Vershbow stated that the Obama Administration does not plan to use territories of non-NATO countries for future air defense installations, but on the other he once again reiterated America’s commitment to Georgia’s sovereignty by saying that “the protection of Georgia’s territorial integrity is a matter of principle for the United States,” and that America wants to have Georgia as “a strong, independent and sovereign partner that will be able to defend itself” (Rustavi-2 TV, October 19).

Rogozin and in fact the entire Russian political establishment seemed puzzled about the United States’ future steps vis-à-vis Georgia’s security. “We do not know what to believe since we have heard so many contradictory statements over the past month and half,” he observed (RIA Novosti, October 30). Rogozin also added that “the Russian side would like to receive more clarity in this regard from the Administration of President Obama.”

Russia’s major concern seems to be the upward trajectory of U.S.-Georgian security and military cooperation, one of the pillars of the U.S.-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership. Joint exercises of the American and Georgian military have already become commonplace. Rapid Response 2009, the latest one, was recently held at Vaziani, one of Georgia’s best-equipped military bases near the capital Tbilisi (Rustavi-2 TV, October 30) The United States has also committed itself to providing Georgia with military planning and training assistance.

Although the declared goal of the exercises was to train Georgians for their participation in NATO’s military operations in Afghanistan (Tbilisi intends to send troops there in December), Russia’s reaction was unusually swift and critical, making clear its deep suspicion about the role of the American military in Georgia. In Rogozin’s words, “any military activities near the Russian borders causes Moscow’s concerns, especially when they involve the American military” (Rustavi-2 TV, October 31). Moscow’s envoy to NATO also added that “there must be an agreement between Russia and NATO as soon as possible to create trust between us.” It seems Moscow’s worst nightmare would be an American military presence in Georgia that would entirely thwart the current Russian leadership’s geostrategic aspirations regarding “a zone of privileged interests.”

In regard to Georgia’s NATO membership which Moscow apparently wanted to undercut by invading Georgia, Russia also failed to achieve a desired outcome. Although the prospect of Georgia’s membership might seem more distant now than would have been in the absence of the Russian military aggression, it is not at all taken by NATO’s enlargement agenda. In Vershbow’s words, as reported by Russian media, “it is extremely difficult to say” when Georgia will join NATO and in Washington’s view the process “could take years” (Regnum, October 29). Meanwhile, Washington’s and its allies’ support for Georgia’s NATO choice remains unchanged. On October 30 the Georgian media reported NATO’s Spokesperson James Appathurai as saying that “the improvement of relations between the Alliance and the Russian Federation will not hinder the process of Georgia’s and Ukraine’s integration into NATO” (Rustavi-2 TV, October 30).

Russian anxiety about Washington’s deepening cooperation with Tbilisi is perfectly understandable. Despite Moscow’s incessant attempts to bring Tbilisi back to its geopolitical orbit, Georgia, is now further from Russia than ever before. Even the war that Russia waged against Georgia in August 2008 failed to produce the outcome Moscow very much hoped for, namely, a regime change that would bring to power a pro-Russian leadership in Tbilisi or create anarchy and instability throughout Georgia. Quite the contrary happened during the course of the war. Georgia abruptly withdrew from the Moscow-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States, to which Russia purportedly extends its “zone of privileged interests,” severed diplomatic relations with Moscow and in an even more surprising development signed the Charter on Strategic Partnership with the United States a few months later, in January 2009. Economically - while trade with Russia is steadily declining as a result of Russian backed economic embargo on Georgian products- trade relations with Turkey, the United States and other NATO and European countries are on the rise, further distancing Tbilisi from Moscow’s political and economic orbit.

Ukrainian Presidential Candidate Viktor Yanukovych: Foreign Policy Priorities

Taras Kuzio

Viktor Yanukovych was put forward as a presidential candidate at the congress of the Party of Regions on October 23 (www.partyofregions.org.ua, October 23). Yanukovych’s foreign policy can be gauged from several policies that he and his party have previously supported and the content of his January 17, 2010 election program “Ukraine For the People!” (www.yanukovych.com.ua, October 28).

During the October 23 congress, Yanukovych promised to provide Ukraine with a “new foreign policy” as a non-bloc state pursuing its “national interests” (Ukrayinska Pravda, October 23). Yanukovych’s foreign policy would be more pro-Russian than the pro-Western multi-vector pursued by President Leonid Kuchma in 1994 to 2004. In Kuchma’s first term, Ukraine actively sought cooperation with the U.S. and NATO and he announced in 2002 Ukraine’s intention to seek NATO membership, while one year later he sent Ukrainian troops to Iraq. Moreover, Yanukovych is more anti-NATO than Kuchma who was more cognizant of the Russian threat, whether in the 1990’s when Moscow refused to recognize Ukraine’s borders until 1997-1999, or when it made territorial claims on the island of Tuzla in 2003. Kuchma cut short a visit to Brazil to visit Tuzla as commander-in-chief ready to rebuff a potential Russian invasion.

In a visit to Brussels on September 14, 2006, Prime Minister Yanukovych told NATO that Ukraine was not interested in receiving a Membership Action Plan. Kuchma made Ukraine into one of the most active members of NATO’s Partnership for Peace program and no protests ever took place that halted annual joint military exercises in Ukraine. Since 2005, the Party of Regions and its Crimean Russian nationalist-separatist allies have held protests that have on occasion halted joint exercises with NATO (EDM, September 18, 2006).

In fact, formally the Party of Regions has never opposed Ukraine’s membership in the E.U., unlike NATO; but, equally they have not taken any steps to move Ukraine towards E.U. membership. Yanukovych repeatedly attacks the “Euro-romanticism” of his Orange Revolution opponents, whether Viktor Yushchenko or Yulia Tymoshenko, believing that Ukraine’s relations with the E.U. should be “pragmatic.” Yanukovych told the October 23 congress that he would support a “new common market” with the E.U. and the CIS. Ukraine and the E.U. are likely to sign a Free Trade Zone (FTZ) next year, a step that became possible only after Ukraine joined the WTO in 2008 (www.partyofregions.org.ua, October 23). One reason as to why the process of joining the WTO took three years after Ukraine was recognized by the U.S. and E.U. as a market economy was that the Party of Regions did not vote in 2005-2006 for the legislation that was required to join the WTO.

The Party of Regions has avoided joining any political group in the European parliament, unlike Tymoshenko’s Fatherland and Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine (members of the center-right European People’s Party) or the Socialist Party (members of the Socialist International). All three members supported the Orange Revolution and Yushchenko’s election. The Party of Regions leaders, such as Mykola Azarov, are strong supporters of Ukraine fully joining the CIS single economic space. Kuchma only supported joining the first stage: a free trade zone.

Yanukovych has also adopted Moscow’s position on the Georgian leadership. The Party of Regions initiated a parliamentary commission into the supply of arms to Georgia that backed Russian claims concerning Viktor Yushchenko militarily supporting the Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili. It was Kuchma who had started a military relationship with the former Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze –not Yushchenko. Kuchma initiated the GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova) regional group on the basis of common threats from Russian-backed separatism and energy dependency on Russia. Three of the GUAM members had frozen conflicts and a fourth, Ukraine, had a potential separatist conflict in the Crimea. During the 2006-2007 Yanukovych government it showed little interest in GUAM.

Yanukovych is unlikely to pursue alternative sources of energy in order to reduce Ukraine’s dependency on Russia, a major factor behind GUAM’s creation, and would not support supplying the Odessa-Brody pipeline with Azeri oil (using it in a south-north direction, rather than north-south with Russian oil). Yanukovych would invite Russia to join the pipeline modernization agreement signed by Tymoshenko and the E.U. in March. Yanukovych might also revive use of the corrupt RosUkrEnergo gas intermediary that Prime Minister Tymoshenko successfully fought against in 2006-2008 and finally removed in 2009 from Ukraine’s gas relationship with Russia. An influential gas lobby took control of the Party of Regions in 2007-2008 and corrupted party politics, parliament and the presidential secretariat. Energy corruption has proven a major factor in undermining Yushchenko’s presidency (Ukrayinska Pravda, February 12).

Crucially, Yanukovych is leader of a party whose main bases of support are in Ukraine’s two most pro-Russian regions: Donbas and the Crimea. Yanukovych has faithfully followed the Russian position of blaming Ukraine’s leaders for the deterioration of bilateral relations with Russia; for example, backing complaints in President Dmitry Medvedev’s August letter to Yushchenko. Yanukovych has supported Russia’s lobbying effort to extend the Black Sea Fleet’s lease of Sevastopol indefinitely beyond 2017 (Kyiv Post, October 24).

Kuchma was a strong opponent of separatism in Ukraine and abroad. For example, he would never permit pro-regime centrist parties to support separatism. Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka and other CIS leaders have not recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Party of Regions and the Communist Party supported their independence in votes in the Ukrainian and Crimean parliaments. Indeed, 140 out of 172 Party of Regions deputies supported the Ukrainian parliamentary vote, but it failed to be adopted, unlike in the Crimean parliament, where the For Yanukovych bloc has a majority. In the Crimean parliament the Party of Regions is aligned with Russian nationalist-separatists in the For Yanukovych bloc. In the Kuchma era, the ruling centrist party in the Crimea (Kuchma’s party), the People’s Democratic Party (NDP), would not have developed such close links with Russian nationalist-separatists.

Yanukovych’s and Kuchma’s multi-vector foreign policies are fundamentally different, pro-Russian rather than pro-Western and would take Ukraine back even in relation to the Kuchma era. Yanukovych’s foreign policy is also different from Tymoshenko’s pro-Europeanism and Arseniy Yatseniuk’s isolationist nationalism. Ukrainian voters, therefore, have a clear-cut choice between three distinct courses in foreign policy.

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