IN THIS ISSUE

*Gorbachev laments the “mockery” of Russian democracy
*Ingush opposition figure murdered
*…while Moscow struggles to stabilize Ingushetia
*Turkey signs strategic cooperation agreement with Kazakhstan
**New in the Jamestown blog on Russia and Eurasia (http://www.jamestown.org/blog):
- Eurasia Energy Brief

Kremlin Masterminds Mass Election Fraud

Yuri Zarakhovich

On October 11, the United Russia party, led by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, won more than 7,000 local elections in 75 of its 83 regions. President Dmitry Medvedev hailed United Russia’s victory as showing that the party had a “legal and moral right” to run the regions (www.kremlin.ru, October 12).

Others were outspoken in their criticism. “Obvious falsification of the election returns showed …that to all practical purposes the institutions of democratic elections in Russia are wiped out today,” stated the liberal Yabloko party (www.yabloko.ru, October 19). Overwhelming evidence indicates that United Russia won the elections by blatant and open fraud (Kommersant, October 15). Three parliamentary parties other than United Russia –the Communist Party, the Kremlin’s old stooge Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party and Putin’s loyalist-cum-opposition to the Kremlin Just Russia– staged a demonstrative walkout from a Duma session to record their protest.

The former Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev observed: “If people, who are so well-disciplined, cautious and close to the government, risked taking such a step, that means that confidence in elections as a political institution has been lost completely” (Novaya Gazeta, October 19). Calling the elections, “the mockery of the people,” Gorbachev concluded: “The people are not coming to vote. What kind of democracy is that, if the people are not taking part in it?”

Though the “rebellious” parties quickly chose to return to the Duma to bargain for their private pound of flesh, the issue of “what kind of democracy” exists, or rather where this type of “democracy” might lead the country, remains high on the Russian political agenda, pushing observers to make dire conclusions.

Indeed, the popular Moscow-based Moskovsky Komsomolets daily speculated on October 19: “If a voter cannot express his will via elections, or if he concludes that he has done so and the regime has ignored his vote,” then that voter “will take to the streets,” as events in Tbilisi and Kyiv have shown. But if the authorities want an Orange Revolution in this country, then all they have to do is to continue to act in the same spirit that they are doing now” (Moskovsky Komsomolets, October 19).

While highly critical of the United Russia party, Gorbachev carefully chose to avoid fingering its leader Putin as the main culprit who has presided over dismantling whatever had once passed for democracy in Russia. While decrying the fraud and deception that might eventually push the people to take to the streets staging an “Orange Revolution,” Moskovsky Komsomolets concluded that “the main political resource of Putin always consisted not of ‘the FSB guns’ but respect and support from a large part of society.” Therefore, the paper maintains, his supporters who believe that they have to falsify elections to continue to boost him may now be doing more than any of his opponents to achieve exactly the opposite.

This sounds so very familiar! “The good Czar surrounded by bad boyars” has been the standard explanation of Russian ills for centuries. In the last century, actually, this plea transformed into: “Stalin does not know!” Amazingly, this explanation often came from the same people who saw Stalin as God, Vozhd and Genius. But how would God and Genius not know? Consequently, it is unclear as to how Putin would not know what his handpicked supporters are up to. And why Putin, who controls the process and would have his party win, according to all the pre-election polls, felt it necessary to rely on fraud?

It appears that this is not simply because Putin is a confirmed control-freak, but he does not indeed respect those institutions that he had rolled back over the decade of his rule: free elections; free press; and society’s self-organizations. Putin does not respect such institutions for quite practical reasons: unpredictable election returns; media reports and public control will effectively curb the unbridled control of the Putin-led establishment over Russia’s assets, primarily over her hydrocarbon riches.

Invoking the specter of a possible Russian Orange Revolution seems quite far-fetched. The Russians will hardly self-organize on such a sophisticated level in the foreseeable future. The prospects are bleak: more plausible is the Russian “bunt” (rebellion), senseless and merciless,” to quote Pushkin, or rather a series of such disjointed bunts. However, even more feasible is the option of Russia repeating the fate of the Soviet Union –and simply falling apart. That could be the most likely result of election fraud and other political tools used by Putin. In the September 10 article “Forward, Russia!” broadly advertized as his liberal manifesto, President Medvedev called for sweeping reform and drawing correct conclusions from the economic crisis, lest Russia remains a backward raw resources economy. On October 19, Medvedev complained to a high level Kremlin conference that: “Nobody sees any changes, or that we have drawn any conclusions from the crisis” (www.kremlin.ru, October 19).

Why? The prisoner Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the former Head of the Yukos oil company, destroyed and appropriated by Putin’s top associates, and one of the most lucid Russian businessmen wrote in his article published by Vedomosti on October 20: “modernization of Russia is impossible without democracy, political reforms and broad public support” (www.newsru.com, October 20). That is indeed the reason why nothing will ever work, until Putin and Medvedev’s politics of election fraud and tight control are over.

Maksharip Aushev’s Murder Followed his Renewed Criticism of Status Quo

The Jamestown Foundation

The longtime Ingush opposition leader and businessman Maksharip Aushev was shot to death in Kabardino-Balkaria yesterday (October 25). The incident took place around 9:30 a.m., local time, on a road near the village of Nartan in Kabardino-Balkaria’s Chegemsky district. The unidentified attackers fired more than 60 rounds from Kalashnikov automatic rifles into the Lada Priora car Aushev was driving, killing him instantly. A woman traveling with him in the car, 29-year old Tamzila Zeitova –described in some reports as his sister, in others as his cousin– was wounded in the attack. She was taken to the hospital in critical condition (ITAR-TASS, www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, October 25). Ingushetia’s president, Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, said Aushev’s murder was aimed at destabilizing the republic, promised to do everything within his power to solve the crime and expressed condolences to Aushev’s family. Russia’s Prosecutor-General Yuri Chaikia, has taken personal control over the murder investigation (www.newsru.com, October 25).

Maksharip Aushev blamed security forces for the abduction of his son and nephew in separate incidents in 2007 and went into opposition against Ingushetia’s then president, Murat Zyazikov. He took over the Ingushetiya.ru opposition website in 2008 after its owner was shot to death in police custody. However, after Moscow removed Zyazikov and replaced him with Yevkurov, Aushev spoke positively about the new president, ceased active involvement with the opposition and even joined an expert council set up by the office of the Russian government’s human right ombudsman, Vladimir Lukin (www.washingtonpost.com, October 25; New York Times, October 26).

Still, Aushev maintained close relations with Ingush opposition leaders like Magomed Khazbiev and remained critical of government actions. That criticism grew in intensity in recent months. In an article published on September 7 by the new Ingush opposition website Ingushetiyaru.org, Aushev said the opposition had suggested to Yevkurov when he came to power that he fire a number of officials in the republic who had been appointed by Zyazikov, among them Ingush interior ministry officials accused of various illegal actions, including “death squad” activities. Aushev wrote that while Yevkurov said he supported the suggestions and would act on all of them within two months, the new Ingush president “was not able to, not allowed to or did not want to remove from office the main people responsible for destabilizing the situation in Ingushetia, who are bound up with the corrupt retinue of Zyazikov.”

Noting that these people remain in their positions or received new government posts, Aushev wrote: “The situation in the republic, contrary to expectations, has cardinally changed for the worse. There is murder after murder: people are shot in their offices, on the streets, in houses; the siloviki dump bodies disfigured by torture, imitating a fight against members of the NVF’s [illegal armed formations].” Aushev wrote that he and his followers “do not plan to adopt a conciliatory position or stop insisting on the right to life, security and the protection of each compatriot,” adding that opposition leaders, who have held no official positions, are not responsible for the current situation in Ingushetia. “Russia has lost control in the region and a blood-stained map has formed in place of the formerly peaceful Ingushetia,” he wrote (www.ingushetiyaru.org, September 7).

Kavkazsky Uzel reported that Aushev told the website about an attempt to abduct him in Ingushetia on September 15, made by unidentified armed people traveling in armored personnel carriers who blocked the roadway, and said it was “a miracle” that he was able to get away. The incident apparently took place in the city of Magas (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, October 25; www.newsru.com, October 26). According to the New York Times, during a recent interview with an Australian television station, Aushev spoke of receiving “very strong information that I was going to be killed” (New York Times, October 26).

The former chief editor of the Ingushetiya.ru opposition website, Roza Malsagova, said that Aushev knew that his life was in danger in Ingushetia and had been hiding in Turkey on the advice of his friends. He had traveled home for the marriage of his son and planned to leave Ingushetia for Europe. Opposition leader Magomed Khazbiev claimed that before the attempt to kidnap Aushev in Magas last month, there were two attempts on his life carried out by Federal Security Service (FSB) agents, who were detained but later released. Aushev said the leadership of Ingushetia was responsible for Aushev’s murder and that the opposition will demand that it resigns (www.newsru.com, October 26).

Human rights activists expressed outrage at Aushev’s murder, which was just the latest in a series of murders of opposition figures and rights activists in the North Caucasus. Tanya Lokshina, the Deputy Director of Human Rights Watch’s Moscow bureau, told the New York Times: “What is absolutely clear is that human rights activities, political opposition activities, journalist activities in the North Caucasus have become completely lethal. This is something the Kremlin must look into, and must do something about” (New York Times, October 26).

Moscow Struggles to Stabilize Ingushetia

Mairbek Vatchagaev

The Kremlin is maintaining its policy of trying to impose “external” rule on Ingushetia. The individual assigned to the post of prime minister of the republic is not only an outsider, but also an ethnic Russian. Such actions have aroused indignation within Ingushetia. For example, a leading Ingush human rights activist, Magomet Mutsulgov, publicly announced his disapproval of the federal center’s policies vis-à-vis Ingushetia, calling them an expression of mistrust of the local government on the part of the federal authorities. Mutsulgov expressed doubt that visiting officials could normalize the situation in the republic (www.gazeta.ru, October 16). Websites associated with the opposition in Ingushetia posted material portraying the republic’s new Prime Minister, Aleksei Vorobyov, as a corrupt official. According to these websites, Vorobyov was involved in the release of 15 armed members of the Sufi brotherhood of Batal-Haji Belharoev, who were earlier alleged to be insurgents (www.newsru.com, May 23). Despite Russian media reports that they were captured and detained, all of them were subsequently released without charge. The opposition websites suggest that they simply bought their way out. According to Ingushetia’s President Yunus-bek Yevkurov, he is being accused of precisely the problem that he intends to combat –corruption (www.ingushetia.org, October 17).

Not much is known about the new Prime Minister Aleksei Vorobyov. He was born in Ulyanovsk in 1964 and worked for 10 years for the federal tax service. Also, it is known that President Yevkurov and Vorobyov crossed paths during their military service, which is where their acquaintanceship took root. Vorobyov’s turbulent career in Ingushetia makes it possible that his appointment to the post of prime minister was neither an accidental nor a spontaneous decision. Until February 2009, he served in the capacity of a third-class state advisor to the Ingush president on issues involving the law enforcement agencies. On February 11, 2009, he was appointed as acting chief of the antiterrorist committee in Ingushetia. On March 24, he was appointed as the head of the republic’s Security Council (www.interfax.ru, October 16). According the newspaper Gazeta, no one was able to give any sort of description of Ingushetia’s new prime minister, since he was not known as an independent politician at either the federal or the regional level (www.gazeta.ru, October 16). RBK Daily suggested that the new premier comes from the Federal Security Service (FSB) circles (www.rbcdaily.ru, October 16), which follows the pattern of appointing FSB officers to various positions in the region. It should be remembered that Dagestan’s Interior Minister Ali Magomedov, like Vorobyov, previously held the post of Secretary of his republic’s Security Council. Ali Magomedov was an FSB general.

President Yevkurov also called for the creation of a teip council (a teip is a Chechen tribal organization or clan), which was merely an attempt to create the impression that authorities and society are closely collaborating (www.regnum.ru, October 10). In reality, for a long time the teips have not had the kind of importance in Russian politics that is ascribed to them.

Meanwhile, the Kremlin has tried to help President Yevkurov. A well-publicized statement claiming that the attempt on the Ingush president’s life has been solved turned out, unsurprisingly, to blame the attempted assassination of Yevkurov on the insurgents. That statement was made by the Director of the FSB Aleksandr Bortnikov. The attempted assassination was blamed on two slain rebels, Rustam Dzortov (“Abdul-Aziz”) and Abdul-Malika Aliev, who were identified as the heads of the Ingush jamaat (www.radiomayak.ru, October 13). It should be noted that the Ingush jamaat has always had just one unchallenged leader –emir Magas (Ahmed Yevloev). According to the FSB director, “during the last four months 19 terrorist attacks were prevented and almost 200 insurgents were killed in the North Caucasus.”

But it is nearly impossible to determine how many true guerillas and how many innocent victims there were among those killed in the special operations ubiquitously conducted by security forces in the region. Generally, the websites of the opposition present disclaimers regarding the alleged connection of one or another of the victims to the insurgents.

Bombings and armed attacks are everyday occurrences in Ingushetia, with several such incidents sometimes taking place during a single day. For instance, on the night of October 18, the city of Nazran was rocked by a powerful blast. It took place at the home of Adam Taziev, who is believed (by some Moscow analysts) to be a brother of emir Magas. A police officer was wounded in the Malgobek region on the same day. The morning of the October 18 started with an attack on law enforcement personnel: an explosive device went off on a road not far from a bridge across the Sunzha River as a police car was passing. At noon, another blast rang out in the outskirts of Magas. This time, it occurred just two yards away from a police post. There were no casualties among the police in either incident. On the evening of October 18, another explosion was heard in Nazran. All of this happened just 24 hours after a large-scale operation by the security forces against jamaat activities in the republic’s Sunzha district. Four alleged terrorists were killed in the operation: Nazir Gandarov, the brothers Aslan and Sulumbek Machukaev, and a woman, Roza Haiauri.

On October 19, a car rigged with explosives and parked next to government buildings in Nazran was defused. The power of the explosive device was estimated to equal 10 kilograms of TNT (www.rbc.ru, October 19).

It does not really matter where and when the explosions occur. What is more important is that Ingushetia remains the unquestionable de facto leader in numbers of attacks carried out by the armed opposition, despite the authorities’ claims regarding the number of eliminated insurgents. This can be explained by two factors. The first coincides with the opinion of human rights activists that innocent victims are among the people killed by the authorities. The second is that the more operations the security forces conduct in Ingushetia, the more people join the Ingush jamaat.

In any case, one can conclude that the large-scale counter-insurgency operations targeting Ingush rebels launched this past May, in which Chechen policemen have participated, have done nothing to fundamentally improve the situation in republic.

Nazarbayev Supports the Samsun-Ceyhan Pipeline

Saban Kardas

Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev paid an official visit to Turkey on October 21-24, as the guest of his Turkish counterpart, Abdullah Gul. In addition to his meeting with Gul, Nazarbayev was hosted by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, addressed the Turkish parliament, and met with the parliamentary Speaker Mehmet Ali Sahin and leaders of opposition parties. The Turkish and Kazakh presidents signed a strategic partnership agreement which intends to enhance economic and political ties between their countries. Referring to Turkey’s prompt recognition of Kazakhstan after it declared its independence and the cordial bilateral relations since then, Nazarbayev argued that the two countries were already strategic partners. He added that the recent agreements would go a long way toward elevating the bilateral relationship to a higher level (Anadolu Ajansi, October 22).

Nazarbayev praised Turkey’s growing role in global and regional diplomacy, noting that Kazakhstan viewed such developments as beneficial to its interests. In particular, he expressed his support for Turkey’s E.U. membership process, as well as the new strategic partnership between Turkey and Russia.

Gul also complemented the optimistic perspective outlined by Nazarbayev and noted their determination to further improve their bilateral relations, which he defined as “perfect.” He decorated Nazarbayev with a state honorary medal, and called him the Aksakal (wiseman) among the leaders of the Turkic world. Stressing the importance of the signing of the strategic partnership, Gul added that this constitutes the first example of its kind among Turkic speaking countries (www.tcbb.gov.tr, October 22).

Economic cooperation occupied a large part of Nazarbayev’s agenda. By bringing together a large delegation composed of not only government officials but also businessmen, Nazarbayev highlighted the importance he attached to deepening bilateral commercial ties. In that context, he addressed the Turkish-Kazakh Business Forum on October 23 in Istanbul, which was organized by the Turkish Confederation of Industrialists and Businessmen (TUSKON) and Kazakh business associations (Zaman, October 24).

As part of its efforts to diversify the Kazakh economy and reduce its dependence on energy, Kazakhstan is considering investments in alternative sectors. Through such policies, the Kazakh leadership wants to reduce its dependence on imports and increase the country’s export potential. Here, it realizes that it has a lot to learn from the Turkish experience, considering the drastic steps Turkey has taken toward industrialization. Therefore, Nazarbayev visited some Turkish organized industrialized zones and met with Turkey’s leading industrialists and businessmen. He invited them to invest in the Kazakh economy, especially agriculture, textile and pharmaceuticals (Hurriyet, October 24).

Referring to over $25 billion foreign investments channeled into Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev argued that Turkey’s investment, which amounted to $1 billion, remained unsatisfactory and needed to be increased to reflect the closer ties political and cultural ties between the two brotherly countries. Moreover, he referred to the two sides’ willingness to raise the bilateral trade volume from the current $2.5 billion to the level of $5 billion annually. Turkish government officials urged Kazakh and Turkish businessmen to raise the trade volume to $15 billion by 2012 (Anadolu Ajansi, October 23).

In the early post-Cold War era, Turkey’s policy of developing proactive policies toward its ethnic kin in Central Asia was driven by the Turkish presidents of the time, Turgut Ozal and Suleyman Demirel. After years of rather downgraded relations with the region, which many Turkish analysts attribute to Turkey’s previous President Ahmet Necdet Sezer’s low-profile leadership, Gul is again leading efforts to build strong political and economic ties. He prioritizes improving ties with Kazakhstan as reflected in his remarks that “if necessary I [and Nazarbayev] would visit each other three to four times each year” (Cihan, October 23).

Given its stable political system and prosperous economy, Ankara views Kazakhstan as a natural partner in Central Asia and treats it as one of the cornerstones of Turkey’s policy in fostering cooperation within the broader Turkic world. Turkish commentators stress the crucial role of cooperation between Turkey and Kazakhstan for boosting closer economic, cultural and political integration among the Turkic-speaking countries. They refer to the leading role the two countries played in the creation of the Turkic-speaking Countries Cooperation Council, which was initiated at the summit of the Turkic-speaking countries held earlier this month, as well as their harmonious cooperation in other international organizations (www.orsam.org.tr, October 19). This perspective is also shared by Gul and Nazarbayev as reflected in their statements. Likewise, the Kazakh Ambassador to Ankara Bagdad Amrayev, noted that such projects initiated by Turkey and Kazakhstan “may be viewed as the beginning of work for a genuine integration between Turkic republics” (Today’s Zaman, October 21).

Beyond these objectives, Kazakhstan attracts Turkey’s attention given its enormous oil, gas and uranium reserves. As a country emerging as a major player in energy policies, both as a consumer and as a transit route, Turkey has joined other countries rushing to strike energy deals with Kazakhstan. Recently, the French President Nicholas Sarkozy traveled to Kazakhstan to sign multi-billion dollar energy deals. During Sarkozy’s visit, it was announced that Kazakhstan would increase its exports of oil via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which runs through Turkish territory (Cihan, October 6).

Indeed, cooperation in the field of energy transportation was another issue that received attention from both sides. Referring to Turkey’s recent ambition of becoming a global energy hub, Nazarbayev expressed his willingness to transport Kazakh oil and gas via Turkey. In particular he said that he would support the Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline project together with Russia (ANKA, October 22), which was rejuvenated recently following Russia’s participation (EDM, October 23). Gul also expressed his satisfaction with Kazakhstan’s commitment to support the Nabucco natural gas pipeline.

Nazarbayev’s expression of support for the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline was greeted in Turkey as a move that will enhance Turkey’s role in energy politics and create many job opportunities (Cihan, October 25). However, the discussions taking place in Turkey miss the point that Kazakhstan’s commitment to the Samsun-Ceyhan might come at a certain cost. It will require the transportation of crude through routes controlled by Russia, and might deepen “Moscow’s already strong leverage on Kazakhstan and on Western oil companies operating there” (EDM, October 23).

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