IN THIS ISSUE

* Clinton offers the Kremlin friendship, but gets a mixed response
* Bortnikov accuses Georgia of working with al-Qaida against Chechnya and Dagestan
* Azerbaijan signs gas export agreement with Russia
* Tashkent opts for independent domestic electricity supply
* Ankara rejects Israeli criticism over military exercise controversy
** New in the Jamestown blog on Russia and Eurasia (http://www.jamestown.org/blog):
- Ukraine Pre-Election Update

Massive Vote-Rigging Exposed in Russia

Pavel Felgenhauer

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton traveled to Moscow this week in an effort to promote the “reset” in Russian-American relations, to secure collaboration on Afghanistan, Iran and North Korea, and offer the Kremlin ballistic missile defense cooperation and nuclear arms control agreements. However, for the Russians the most important concession is the apparent agreement by Barack Obama’s administration to tone down criticism of the massive suppression of basic democratic and human rights by the Kremlin. Kommersant quoted Michael McFaul (a senior adviser to Obama who co-chairs a new U.S.-Russia working group on civil society issues with first deputy chief of the Kremlin administration Vladislav Surkov) as saying that the U.S. “will not teach Russia democracy.” The newspaper interpreted this as a major change in U.S. policy (Kommersant, October 13).

The U.S. delegation reacted to the publication by using damage control measures. An unnamed State department official was quoted as saying that Kommersant had misquoted McFaul (AP, October 13). The Western journalists accompanying Clinton extensively covered remarks by the Secretary of State during public appearances about how good it would have been, if human rights were observed in Russia. Speaking to students in Moscow State University Clinton said: “People must be free to take unpopular positions, disagree with conventional wisdom, know they are safe to peacefully challenge accepted practice and authority” (Reuters, October 14). “I think all of these issues –imprisonments, detentions, beatings, and killings– are something that is hurtful to see from the outside,” she told Ekho Moskvy (Ekho Moskvy, October 14).

Clinton met privately with democracy and human rights activists. According to Western reports this “tiny community of liberal democrats” was greatly reassured by her defense of democracy and human rights (AP, October 13). However, Russian journalists quoted the same activists differently. Lev Ponomarev, the head of the Moscow-based group “For Human Rights,” observed: “Her presentation was academic; there was no criticism of the authorities, only regret.” The head of the Memorial Human Rights Center Oleg Orlov noted: “It was an exclusively protocol meeting, there was no concrete discussion of anything” (www.newsru.com October 13).

The Clinton-led team has given an impression in Moscow that human rights and democracy is something the Obama administration would like to leave for the Kremlin to decide on its own. The timing of Clinton’s visit was unfortunate, since it coincided with the announcement of the results of the shamelessly rigged local government elections on October 11, held in 75 regions of Russia. In these elections, opposition candidates were refused registration, while independent observers reported massive vote rigging and ballot box stuffing. There was violence in the Dagestani city of Derbent. Yet, the state-controlled electoral officials declared the elections as free and valid, with Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s ruling United Russia (ER) winning practically all the disputed seats, bringing Russia closer to a one party state (www.newsru.com October 12).

In Moscow the official results of the city Duma election gave ER 66.26 percent, Communist KPRF 13.27 percent, pro-Kremlin Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) and Just Russia (SR) – 6.14 percent and 5.34 percent respectively. Liberal Yabloko (that gained more than 10 percent four years ago), secured only 4.7 percent. In the 35 member Moscow Duma ER will have 32 seats and KPRF 3. Exit polls taken by the All-Russian Center for Public Opinion Studies VTsIOM on election day gave totally different figures: EC – 45.5 percent, KPRF –17.7 percent, Yabloko –13.6 percent, SR –8.4 percent (Interfax, October 12). If the elections were not shamelessly rigged, United Russia would still have won a majority, but the Moscow Duma would have been multi-party. It seems that the present corrupt rulers of Russia do not want to even allow the semblance of democracy.

While Clinton was still in Russia, the KPRF, LDPR and SR opposition parties in the State Duma staged a walk out to protest against the rigging of the elections. The party leaders are demanding a meeting with President Dmitry Medvedev and the dismissal of election officials and governors that carried out the massive electoral fraud (RIA Novosti, October 14). This demonstration of defiance is unprecedented in modern Russia. The State Duma under Putin’s regime has been a rubber stamp parliament totally submissive to the Kremlin. LDPR and SR are pro-Kremlin parties, but now they see that if the present massive rigging is repeated during the next national elections, they face political oblivion as the transformation into a one-party state is completed. In a strange coincidence this week the pro-Kremlin LDPR leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky defended democracy in Russia with more passion than Clinton.

McFaul’s interview published by Interfax does not leave an impression that Kommersant grossly misinterpreted his words. McFaul spoke with elation on working with Surkov to promote U.S.-Russian civil society cooperation, about new understandings on Iran, North Korea and Afghanistan. He compared the Obama policy towards Russia with that of Ronald Reagan (Interfax, October 13). Surkov is known in Russia as the prime architect of the suppression of democracy. McFaul told Interfax that he shares the fears of human rights activists in Russia, but only as an individual, not as an official. Reagan was a shrewd politician and a winner. The present Obama policy towards Russia is more reminiscent of the cynical realpolitik of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger that eventually ended in failure –as did the Clinton visit (today Kissinger is a friend of Putin).

During Clinton’s visit Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov insisted that any talk of sanctions against Iran at this stage is counterproductive (RIA Novosti, October 13). At the same time, a U.S. official told reporters that Medvedev expected Iran to implement its promises on its nuclear program and if it did not “there should be sanctions” and that this was “reassuring” (Reuters, October 13). Lavrov in most cases knows better than Medvedev, since the future Russian foreign policy is decided by Putin –whom Clinton did not meet. While giving noncommittal reassurances, Moscow will be waiting to see what other concessions the Obama team may offer.

Georgia Rejects FSB Chief’s Charges of Supporting Terrorism in the North Caucasus

The Jamestown Foundation

Georgian officials have denied accusations made by the head of Russia’s main security agency that Georgian special services have aided al-Qaeda-linked terrorists in Russia’s North Caucasus.

Federal Security Service (FSB) Director Aleksandr Bortnikov, who also heads Russia’s National Anti-Terrorist Committee (NAK), claimed during an NAK meeting October 13 that the committee had seized “audio” evidence from militants in the North Caucasus showing that that they, together with “al-Qaeda” emissaries, established contacts with representatives of Georgia’s special forces who “participated in the training and transfer of terrorists to the territory of Chechnya.” Bortnikov also charged that Georgia is constantly attempting to “deliver weapons, explosives and financing for subversive acts on high-security sites in Dagestan –first and foremost on oil and gas pipelines.”

Bortnikov said that since July, 19 terrorist attacks had been averted and the activities of 178 “bandits” cut short in Russia, including those of “a certain ‘Doctor Muhammed’ who comes from Algeria and whom al-Qaeda sent to Russia to coordinate terrorist activities in Dagestan.” Still, the FSB chief said that despite steps taken by local authorities, militants in the North Caucasus have stepped up their activities, resulting in an increase in the number of attacks on law-enforcement and security officials. He also said that rebels have revived the practice of using suicide bombers, adding that a suicide bomber who had planned to carry out an attack during Moscow’s City Day celebrations had been detained (www.vesti.ru, Interfax, ITAR-TASS, October 13).

Georgian officials immediately and vociferously denied Bortnikov’s charges. “It is an absurd, baseless, ridiculous statement, but it is not new in terms of Russian propaganda,” Georgian National Security Council Secretary Eka Tkeshelashvili told the Reuters news agency (Reuters, October 13).

Georgia’s foreign ministry said on October 13 that Russia’s claims that Georgia had aided al-Qaeda were “utterly false” and a cause for “serious concern.”

In a statement posted on its website, the ministry said Bortnikov’s accusations were part of a “hysterical campaign” being carried out by the Russian government “to accuse Georgia of creating the catastrophic situation in the North Caucasus, for which Russia itself is to be blamed.” The statement added: “The propaganda noise stirred up by the Kremlin on the normalization and stabilization of the situation [in North Caucasus] has failed to cover up the actually existing disastrous situation in the region, in particular, the fact that the conflict raging in the North Caucasus has entered its most acute stage. The Kremlin is aware that its attempts to bring the situation under control are vain and [by] employing [already] tested Soviet methods [it] tries to disguise its hopelessness by using the factor of an external enemy.”

The allegations against Georgia were the product of “fevered brains,” the Georgian foreign ministry said. “To meet its own imperialistic demands, the Kremlin will use any pretext in order to maximally [stir up] tension across the Georgian borders and create a suitable background for carrying out military provocations against the peaceful democratic country,” the statement continued.

The Gazeta.ru website quoted the speaker of Georgia’s parliament, David Bakradze, as telling journalists that the only place in Georgia where there are “illegal armed formations” – the standard Russian term for rebel groups – is in the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and that those particular groups are pro-Russian. “The problem for Georgia in this context is Abkhazia and Tskhinvali and those illegal formations that were created by Moscow’s own hands,” Bakradze said. “Today Russia faces the danger of an explosion in this region, and it needs to find an excuse,” he explained. The website quoted Tkeshelashvili as saying it could not be ruled out that Bornikov’s statement was deliberately timed to coincide with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s meeting in Moscow with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, which also took place on October 13.

One of the leaders of Georgia’s opposition, Irakli Alasaniya, said that if Bortnikov was claiming that Georgia was hosting terrorists in the Pankisi Gorge, that region is closed off to terrorists. “During the time that I was deputy minister for state security, a counter-terrorist and anti-criminal operation was carried out there, as a result of which there are no longer armed formations or persons suspected of connections with terrorists organizations located there,” Gazeta.ru quoted Alasaniya as saying. “I think these accusations are groundless. However, it is obvious that the Russian Federation is starting a new information war,” Alasaniya continued. Nika Laliashvili, the head of the Christian Democratic faction in Georgia’s parliament, predicted that the next step by Russia would be a military strike on Georgia (www.gazeta.ru, October 14).

Azerbaijan-Russia Gas Agreement: Implications for Nabucco Project

Vladimir Socor

On October 14 in Baku, Azerbaijan’s State Oil Company president Rovnag Abdullayev and Gazprom CEO Aleksei Miller signed an agreement on Azerbaijani gas exports to Russia. The move is a logical follow-up to the June 29 agreement, signed by the same company chiefs –in the presence of Presidents Ilham Alyiev and Dmitry Medvedev in Baku on that occasion– on the main principles of the gas trade between the two countries (EDM, July 2, 17).

This agreement turns Azerbaijan for the first time in history from an importer of Russian gas into an exporter of gas to Russia –albeit with small initial volumes– thanks to growing internal production in Azerbaijan. If understood and handled appropriately by the European Union and Turkey, this event can lend impetus to the E.U. and U.S. backed Nabucco pipeline project, notwithstanding European media speculation that Russia is pre-empting Nabucco’s Azerbaijani gas supplies.

The documents just signed involve a framework agreement for the years 2010 to 2014 and a sale-and-purchase contract for 2010. During this first year Azerbaijan shall export at least 500 million cubic meters (bcm) of gas to Russia through the Baku-Novo Filya pipeline, for use in Russia’s North Caucasus territories. Azerbaijan may increase that export volume during 2010, at its discretion. The gas may originate in any of Azerbaijan’s fields (Trend Capital, www.day.az, October 14).

The Russian purchase price is not publicly specified. According to Abdullayev at the signing ceremony, the price-setting formula “suits the Azerbaijani side” – apparently a hint that the price is in line with the anticipated European netback prices for 2010. This had been Baku’s objective all along in the negotiations. Miller had proposed to buy Azerbaijani gas at $350 per one thousand cubic meters in the lead-up to the June 29 preliminary agreement.

Azerbaijan used to import Russian gas until as recently as 2006 through the old Baku-Novo Filya pipeline, which runs for approximately 200 kilometers along the Caspian Sea coast from the Russian border to Baku. This line will now be used in the reverse mode to carry Azerbaijani gas to Russia. The volume envisaged for 2010 will use only a fraction of this pipeline’s Soviet-era capacity. In addition, Azerbaijan is preparing its own section of the old Mozdok (Russia)-Gazimahomed pipeline, for possible reverse-use as a gas export outlet to Russia (Trend Capital, October 1).

Gas extraction in Azerbaijan is set to reach 27 bcm for 2009 (www.day.az, October 8). The rate of increase could have been faster, but has been affected by slowed development at the giant Shah-Deniz offshore field. That slowdown in turn reflects delays on the Nabucco pipeline project and Turkish government obstructions to a gas agreement with Azerbaijan. These two factors have postponed the opening of Azerbaijan’s gas export route to the West. In this situation, Azerbaijan can only open an export route to Russia while awaiting progress on Nabucco and with Turkey.

Meanwhile, Azerbaijan remains committed to the Nabucco project. The government and the State Oil Company are consistently reaffirming Baku’s readiness to supply 7 bcm per year for that pipeline’s first phase. Construction work on Nabucco is now expected to start in 2011, for the first gas to flow by 2015 from Azerbaijan to Europe.

Consequently, Baku has set the time-frame of the agreement just signed with Gazprom to expire in 2014, so as to release Azerbaijan from obligations to Gazprom after that year. Miller, however, declared at the October 14 signing ceremony explicitly that Russia wants to prolong this agreement after 2015, and for larger volumes of Azerbaijani gas. That would pose risks for Nabucco. The October 14 agreement does not.

This agreement, however, reiterates and amplifies certain lessons for the E.U., Turkey, and U.S. that were in the June 29 preliminary agreement. Azerbaijan’s move can actually help concentrate minds all-around on the Nabucco project, bearing the following considerations in mind.

First, the volumes committed to Gazprom are meager and the time-frame does not impinge on the Nabucco project, assuming that Azerbaijan retains the necessary Western support to pursue Azerbaijan’s own Western choice. Awaiting Nabucco’s commissioning, it makes sense for Azerbaijan to use the existing pipeline(s) to Russia for exporting Azerbaijan’s growing surplus of gas during the interim period until 2014.

Second, this agreement does not allow Gazprom to compete against Nabucco for Azerbaijani gas. But the situation could change in Russia’s favor, if Turkey’s AKP government insists on its extortionate terms for the purchase of Azerbaijani gas and its transportation through Nabucco. By the same token, Washington and the reshuffled European Commission, now entering a new term of office in Brussels, are being reminded that they need to lift that logjam in Ankara.

Third, Baku’s agreement with Gazprom is a reminder to Ankara that Azerbaijan does not totally depend on the Turkish gas market or the Turkish gas transmission route. From Azerbaijan’s standpoint, adding a Russian export outlet –albeit a small one– is an export diversification move, away from Turkey’s perceived monopoly on transportation, which the AKP government seeks to abuse. Azerbaijan can also use the Baku-Astara pipeline to Iran, or swap arrangements with that neighbor country, during the interim period until 2014.

Fourth, Baku is successfully ruling out Gazprom’s wish to re-export Caspian gas to European countries, at a profit to Russia and at the expense of Caspian producers. Baku has stipulated that its gas shall be used in Russia’s North Caucasus. And if the Russian purchase price is consistent with European netback prices (as envisaged at the time of the June 29 preliminary agreement), Baku will have achieved a strategic gain. Turkey’s AKP government would place itself in an embarrassing position by insisting on worse terms than Russia has now consented to Azerbaijan. Across the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan will have set a useful precedent for Turkmenistan to also demand European netback prices from Gazprom. If Russia declines to meet that benchmark, then a part of Turkmen volumes would become available for the proposed trans-Caspian link to the Nabucco project.

Uzbekistan Challenges Regional Electricity Supplies Network

Erica Marat

Kyrgyzstan’s growing list of troubles has recently been further complicated by yet another predicament. Tashkent has announced that Uzbekistan is likely to leave the Central Asian power supply cascade in the coming months. According to Tashkent’s official interpretation, Uzbekistan can now provide its population with enough locally generated electricity and does not need to be part of the network created during the Soviet period. This means that Kyrgyzstan’s south and parts of Tajikistan will experience severe electricity shortages due to the break in regional cycles.

The Toktogul hydro-power plant (HPP) cascade is part of a regional power supply network which runs through all five Central Asian countries. It delivers electricity produced by Toktogul HPP to southern areas of Kyrgyzstan through Uzbek territory. Electricity produced in Kyrgyzstan flows through 220 kV and 500 kV transmission lines that pass through Uzbekistan. Several years ago, Uzbekistan began the construction of the Novo-Angren thermal power plant, aimed at producing enough electricity for the residents of the Ferghana Valley. Tashkent’s decision to break the old connections was announced abruptly and caught the Kyrgyz government unprepared.

It is unclear how Bishkek will provide electricity for its entire southern region should Uzbekistan implement its decision. Although some analysts have warned the Kyrgyz leadership about the probability of this scenario, no action was taken to avert the crisis. Instead, the Kyrgyz Minister of Energy Ilias Davydov rushed to visit Uzbekistan following the announcement of the decision.

The Kyrgyz government has already begun its winter electricity rationing throughout the country. The government promised that electricity cuts would be shorter and less frequent than last year. However, last winter was fairly mild and colder temperatures might hit the country this year.

Uzbekistan’s decision in favor of greater energy independence reveals the inability of the Central Asian states to benefit from regional trade. The move appears more politically motivated than based on economic considerations. Uzbekistan is openly against upstream Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan constructing new HPP’s. New dams might leverage both countries with greater control over water resources. Yet, the Uzbek government prefers to prevent these new projects in neighboring countries, rather than make an effort to negotiate new terms for inter-state collaboration.

Kazakhstan’s government is also considering leaving the Soviet constructed regional electricity network to establish an autonomous domestic power supply. This will add an additional burden to Kyrgyzstan’s north (www.ferghana.ru, September 28). Yet, unlike Tashkent, Kazakh government representatives insist that they will delay their decision to avoid destabilizing northern Kyrgyzstan.

Meanwhile, the Kyrgyz government’s management of water resources remains plagued with corruption. The construction of the Kambarata HPP’s on the Naryn River lacks transparency. Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev recently signed a bill allowing Kambarata to be privatized or to be used by the government as collateral for loans (www.akipress.kg, October 14). This means that the plants might be privatized by either local or foreign private companies. The bulk of the Russian $2 billion credit was allocated for the construction of the Kambarata-1 HPP last February. However, as to how these funds will be spent and when the HPP will be constructed remains undisclosed by the government.

One possible solution for Kyrgyzstan to meet the challenges it faces in the regional energy trade is the construction of the Central Asia-South Asia (CASA) 1,000 mega watt (MW) energy project that would connect Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan in one single network. The project would allow all countries to benefit from such cooperation. Even Russia, as the major investor in Tajikistan’s Sangtuda-1 HPP and the Kambarata HPP, would gain from the project.

However, the participating countries still need to find investors for the project. Major international organizations, among them the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, are ready to invest in the CASA 1,000 MW project. Given Bakiyev’s corrupt management of the hydropower sector, he might see international investment flowing into neighboring countries bypassing Kyrgyzstan. According to one Bishkek-based representative of an international organization, since Bakiyev came to power in 2005, it has become virtually impossible to implement reform in the country. “The Kyrgyz government is deeply in debt, while most money is redistributed among state actors and state contractors” the expert told Jamestown.

According to regional experts, Uzbekistan might not be able to fully supply its population with only local electricity production. Furthermore, Tashkent might reverse its decision and remain part of the regional network in the short term. The ongoing tension between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan has shown yet another side of the mutual antagonism between the leaders of both countries. It has also highlighted the weak national governance in both states. Unfortunately, the population suffers the most from this predicament.

Postponed Military Exercise Tests Turkish-Israeli Cooperation

Saban Kardas

Turkish-Israeli relations face a new test over Ankara's decision to change the format of a joint international military exercise to a national exercise. Following some Israeli officials' charges that the move was based on political motivations, the Turkish side called on Tel Aviv to behave more sensibly.

Turkey has held the Anatolian Eagle exercise regularly since 2001 in an attempt to promote closer air defense cooperation among friendly nations, including the United States and Israel. The exercises were scheduled to be conducted in three different stages throughout the year. However, the Turkish Chief of the General Staff General Ilker Basbug announced on October 7 that in consultation with other participants, the international part of the third stage of the exercise, which was to be carried out on October 10-23, would be postponed. Instead, the exercise would be executed as a national operation in the central Anatolian city of Konya (www.tsk.tr, October 7).

Israeli media reports quoted Israeli military officials who were arguing that the participation of Israel in the drills, which would have included the United States and NATO, was prevented as a result of the recent row between Turkey and Israel over its offensive into the Gaza Strip earlier this year. They maintained that the United States and Italy withdrew from the exercises in reaction to Israel’s exclusion by Turkey (Jerusalem Post, October 11). A statement from the Israeli Defense Force Spokesman’s Office argued that “the exercise was postponed due to a Turkish decision to change the composition of the participants and not allow the Israeli Air Force to participate, a decision we were informed of only several days ago” (www.israelnationalnews.com, October 12).

However, in an exclusive interview with CNN the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu also contributed to the controversy. Although a U.S. embassy representative in Ankara said that the exercise was only postponed, the CNN report considered the developments as effectively “scrapping” the exercises. Moreover, the report interpreted Davutoglu's remarks to mean that Turkey deliberately excluded Israel from the exercise, “partly because of Ankara’s criticism of Israel’s Gaza offensive almost a year ago” (www.cnn.com, October, 12).

In a written statement, the Turkish foreign ministry stressed that the developments were clearly communicated to Turkey’s partners and it would be incorrect to attribute the cancellation of the international part of the exercise to any political motives. The statement also added that the remarks and evaluations by Israeli officials were unacceptable and Turkey invited them to use their common sense (www.mfa.gov.tr, October 12). According to the Turkish press, diplomatic circles in Turkey were also disturbed by the CNN report, which they described as a misrepresentation. They maintained that the cancellation of the exercises was not meant to punish Israel in any way, but they were purely technical (Today’s Zaman, October 13). The announcements by the foreign ministry and the chief of staff, however, did not explain the reasons that led Turkey to reconfigure the exercises as a national activity. Other Turkish press sources, citing unnamed officials, however, maintained that “there was government pressure on the military to postpone the drills (Hurriyet Daily News, October 12).

The joint Turkish-Syrian High Level Strategic Council meeting which was held this week also added to discomfort on the part of Israeli officials (ANKA, October 13). Responding to reporters' questions on these developments following his meeting with his Syrian counterpart Velid Muallim in Aleppo, Davutoglu reiterated that everyone in the region should behave sensibly. “Israel should respect sacred values. If they show respect, a peaceful environment will emerge in the region,” Davutoglu added. Muallim praised this decision and argued that “this decision reflects Turkey's stance against Gaza. It pleased us” (Cihan, October 13).

Speaking to al-Arabiya television in an interview, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan also said “we listened to the voice of our people,” and excluded Israel from the exercise. His comments were confirmed by a Turkish government spokesman on Wednesday (www.worldbulletin.net, October 14).

The recent row over the Anatolian Eagle exercises mirrors another controversy earlier this year. When Turkey held its first ever military exercises with Syria on the joint border in April, Israeli officials expressed their displeasure, with the Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak describing the exercises as “disturbing.” Again the Turkish government and military officials reacted to these remarks, raising bilateral tension (EDM, May 1).

Whatever the real motivations behind Ankara's decision to change the format of the Anatolian Eagle military exercise, this episode shows the growing sense of mistrust between the two countries that were once considered as forming an undeclared alliance in the region. Despite the formal statements from both sides aimed at healing the damage caused by Turkey's harsh reaction to Israel's military operations in Gaza, as epitomized by Erdogan's walkout from the Davos meeting (EDM, January 30), it appears that it will be difficult to revert back to the pre-Davos period. Since Davos, Tel Aviv has expressed clearly its reluctance to accept Turkish mediation between Syria and Israel, arguing that Turkey has lost its impartial position (EDM, July 23).

Following the latest row, Israeli defense sources and analysts maintained that Tel Aviv might seek to retaliate against such actions by Ankara. They suggested that Israel might reconsider the sale of advanced weapons systems to Turkey, and that the Israeli lobby might cease to support Turkey against the Armenian lobby’s activities in Washington over the alleged Armenian “genocide” issue. Israeli analysts maintain that such controversial steps by Ankara raise questions as to whether Turkish foreign policy has been reoriented toward the Middle East (Jerusalem Post, October 12). This question is increasingly being asked in Western political circles. Indeed, in implicit confirmation of the arguments of the skeptics of the new Turkish foreign policy, as Turkey’s relations with Israel worsen, it has started to deepen ties with its Arab neighbors, including Syria (EDM, September 18). The AKP will come under increasing pressure to convince its international partners that its new openings in foreign policy to normalize ties with the Middle East is complementary to its traditional foreign policy priorities, and not a drift from its Western orientation.

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