IN THIS ISSUE

* Medvedev laments the lack of innovation in the Russian economy
* Circassian jamaat swears loyalty to Chechen resistance leader
* Kyrgyz officials advocate reintroducing the death penalty
* Turkey reformulates its policy toward Abkhazia and Georgia
** New in the Jamestown blog on Russia and Eurasia (http://www.jamestown.org/blog):
- Putin’s LNG Dreams

Medvedev and Putin Work on Repairing Their Dysfunctional Leadership

Pavel K. Baev

President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin had a rare face-to-face meeting on the evening of September 30, about which no official information was provided apart from stating that they discussed the “social-political situation in the country.” There is indeed plenty to discuss, as the economy lingers in a deep valley and both leaders point to different paths supposedly leading to sunnier slopes. Putin takes a more positive perspective and tries to talk a recovery into existence while adding a liberal twist to his confident “safe on my watch” narrative (www.gazeta.ru, Kommersant, September 30). Medvedev argues that the habitual system of recycling the oil rent has exhausted its growth potential, and only a breakthrough towards an economy of innovations might extricate Russia from its deepening recession (www.polit.ru, October 2). It is possible to bridge their differences and the meeting in Gorki was most probably perfectly friendly, but neither wants to give any serious thought as to how Russia has arrived in this situation and both attempt to lead without a reliable compass.

Putin has translated his vision for economic revival into the figures in the state budget for 2010, which his government delivered last week to the Duma. It contained no major surprises, as expenditure exceeds income by more than 40 percent, and subsequently the deficit has reached 6.8 percent of GDP, which is supposed to show a modest 1.6 percent increase (RIA-Novosti, September 30). Demonstratively reducing the expenses on the presidential administration and other apparatus, Putin has delivered on his promise to increase pensions, even if this “social emphasis” hardly compensates for the decline in domestic consumption due to falling incomes (www.newsru.com, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 1). The budget envisages no structural economic reforms and prescribes significant cuts in investment, so that its ideology appears to be more populist rather than anti-crisis based (Ekspert, October 1).

Reduction in investment activity, which is typical also for such state-controlled mega-companies like Gazprom, condemns the country to face protracted stagnation, and Putin repeatedly appeals to foreign investors arguing that his government acknowledges “the illusory nature of that blind faith in the state’s omnipotence” (Kommersant, www.gazeta.ru, September 30). This newly-discovered liberalism will hardly convince Western energy “majors,” who look at the Yamal gas fields with interest dampened by reflections on their recent ill-treatment in Sakhalin and Kovykta.

As for Medvedev, he made an ambitious statement on mobilizing the country for modernization against resistance from the “influential groups of corrupt officials and do-nothing ‘entrepreneurs’” in his article “Go, Russia!” which still generates public discussion (www.gazeta.ru, September 10, October 2). The common opinion is that this claim for leadership can only be taken seriously if it is accompanied by action; but Medvedev escaped from this self-laid trap by departing on his state visit to Switzerland, followed by his trip to the United States. Against the well-established pattern, he did not focus on energy matters, but it transpired that without this theme he had little else to say at the U.N. General Assembly or the G20 summit.

Meanwhile, Russian foreign policy has scored several victories, including the confirmation of full authority in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the presentation of a balanced report on the Russian-Georgian war by the European Union (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Novaya Gazeta, October 2). However, Medvedev had no part in these successes, and he did not cut an impressive figure at the military exercises in Belarus next to the khaki-clad President Alyaksandr Lukashenka, and consequently he returned to Moscow without any tangible political gains. The immediate problem for Medvedev is the reshuffling of the cadre that would demonstrate his authority to “hire-and-fire,” which is the main source of power in any bureaucratic system. Replacement of several governors does not quite fit the bill, because the real proof can only be delivered by promoting new people to the higher echelons of federal bureaucracy, while among the regional leaders, the key figure is Moscow’s Mayor Yury Luzhkov, who defends his turf with fierce determination and controls tighter than ever the forthcoming elections to the city Duma (Kommersant-Vlast, September 28).

Medvedev may be a master of Kremlin intrigue, but he is clearly stuck with the dilemma of having too few loyalists, who remain rather indifferent to the ideology of “innovation,” and mistrust the awakening reformers who would never prove sufficiently loyal. The Institute of Contemporary Development (INSOR) has tried to position itself as the key think-tank for Medvedev’s strategy, but their economic recommendations are combined with a plea to sack Vladislav Surkov, the deputy head of the presidential administration, who is in charge of PR (Ekho Moskvy, October 2). Medvedev, however, remains reluctant to relax control over the crucial media instrument –the three national television channels– and keeps Surkov close, not daring even to replace the top speechwriter (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September 30).

Focusing on technical innovations, like replacing old-fashioned light bulbs with more energy efficient “new light,” Medvedev admits with some disappointment that these impressive designs “are not actually in use anywhere yet.” What he does not want to admit is that it takes far more than a presidential order to create real demand for innovations in the deeply depressed and bureaucratically suppressed economy. The vibrant forces of economic competition remain distorted by the inter-penetration of business and politics, and the rigid political system of Putinism is incompatible with competition, as its master confirmed by asserting that the outcome of the 2012 presidential elections will be decided in a heart-to-heart talk between himself and Medvedev (www.gazeta.ru, October 1).

It is the report on the causes of the August disaster at the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydropower station released last Saturday that has shed new light on the political issues of modernization. It assesses in great detail the risks associated with the rusting legacy of Soviet industrialization, and implicitly demonstrates the unpromising basis for an imaginary breakthrough to a high-technology economy. The real significance, however, lies in the fact that it was prepared by Igor Sechin, a key Putin henchman, and names as one of the main culprits Anatoly Chubais, who despite his errors of judgment is a bona fide reformer (www.lenta.ru, October 4). Many “modernizers” have become guilty by association, which means that Medvedev is left to drag his failing presidency to the conclusion that he was right about the inability of the system to cope with the crisis but wrong about its capacity for reforming itself.

Adygeya: the New North Caucasus Hot Spot?

Mairbek Vatchagaev

With the Adygeya jamaat announcing their intent to swear loyalty to Dokka Umarov, the chain of regional underground resistance groups has been completed and now spans the North Caucasus continuously from the shores of the Caspian to the Black Sea. The announcement came after years of persistent doubts about whether the Adygeya group even existed.

The idea of establishing an insurgency unit in Adygeya was first voiced by Shamil Basaev during his “field audit” tour of the North Caucasus four years ago, in early 2005 (www.kp.ru, March 21, 2005). During the next few years, many opined that the group may indeed exist, but nothing was heard of its activities. In the wake of the Nalchik events in October 2005, some analysts believed that the Adygeya group may become the next regional hotspot (The Jamestown Foundation conference, “Sadullaev’s Caucasian Front: Prospects for the Next Nalchik,” April 14, 2006). For a variety of reasons, that prediction did not come true, not least due to the assassinations of the rebel leaders Abdulhalim Sadullaev (on June 17, 2006) and Shamil Basaev (on July 10, 2006). The subsequent restructuring of the entire resistance movement resulted in some fragmentation and losses among the jamaats (mostly for Karachai and Nogai Steppe groups).

The first reports of the Adygeya jamaat surfaced when the Interior Ministry and Federal Security Service (FSB) departments in Krasnodar Krai announced the arrest of Asker Setov (aka Emir Abdel Wahab), who the government said was the leader of the jamaat –a peculiar statement, considering that all this time the government was doing its utmost to deny the existence of the group (www.segodnia.ru, August 17). Setov was captured on October 9, 2008 during a document check at a checkpoint in Krasnodar. During a failed attempt to escape he opened fire, killing one and wounding three interior troops. The local government touted Setov’s arrest and sentencing in August 2009 as having nipped the Adygeya jamaat in the bud. Meanwhile, the mufti of Adygeya and Krasnodar Krai, Nurbi Emizh, claimed that, in his view, there was no presence of Wahhabism or other extremist strains of Islam in Adygeya (www.rosbalt.ru, October 13, 2008). Emizh added that Setov’s action were purely criminal, with no religious motivation to speak of.

However, the only kernel of truth in the mufti’s statement was that Asker Setov should not be called the leader of the Adygeya jamaat based on the strength of police announcements alone. It is a longstanding tradition with the police and FSB, dating back to the Chechen war in 1999, that all arrested and killed insurgency fighters must necessarily have the rank of a leader in order to make the police operation look especially meaningful. At the time, the interior ministry claimed that the police operation discovered rebel bases with ammunition and provisions (www.kavkazcenter, January 23). In its own way, the government acknowledged that the hunted group was a well-established unit with its own bases in Adygeya’s mountains.

According to the FSB Director Alexander Bortnikov, since January 2008 through September of the same year (i.e. the date of Asker Setov’s arrest), his agency pre-empted 69 terrorist attacks alone, including the planned strikes in Sochi and Anapa (http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/142862/). Obviously, the perpetrators were not isolated individuals but rather an organized group that focused its efforts on undermining Sochi’s Olympic dreams.

Less than a month after Asker Setov’s trial, the Adygeya group known as Jamaat al-Gharb addressed Adygeya’s Muslims through the websites maintained by supporters of the insurgency. The group announced its decision to swear an oath of loyalty to the Emir of the Caucasus Emirate Dokka Umarov and become an integral part of resistance against Russia in the North Caucasus (www.kavkazcenter.com, September 23). If this statement is not just a propaganda move on the part of the rebel group, it will certainly tilt the balance of power in the region in favor of the resistance movement. What makes this region particularly sensitive is its proximity to the site of the 2014 Sochi Olympic Winter Games.

Finally, recent reports from Adygeya drew attention to the violence against the Russian residents of the republic. Russians comprise over 60 percent of the population in this small North Caucasus enclave while ethnic Adygs, commonly referred to as Circassians, make up only 26 percent of the total. The latter’s minority status thus becomes an additional challenge in their path toward strengthening their ancestral homeland.

On August 4, unidentified perpetrators sawed off and threw away an Orthodox cross mounted on one of the highest points in Adygeya, the Fisht Mountain. On August 11, yet another desecrated metal cross was seen near the highway entrance into the city of Maikop (www.regnum.ru, September 16). Local Muslims disapprove of Christian monuments erected in their ancestral homeland. The director of Adygeya’s Slavs’ Union NGO, Nina Konovalova, believes that desecration of Christian memorials was not perpetrated by mere vandals. She said she is certain that these were the acts of people who want to destabilize the situation in the region (www.regnum.ru, September 16).

These events, however, are not rooted in inter-faith tensions. The real reasons can be traced back to the nineteenth century, when Circassian lands were colonized by the Russian Empire. Both sides of the conflict have their own vision of a solution. The ongoing national conscience revival, spurred with the assistance of the expatriate Circassian community, 5-7 million of whom live in neighboring Turkey, may mean that the nationalistic and Islamic sentiments are likely to become the main weapons in the arsenal of ethnic Adygs seeking to apply pressure on non-Adyg residents of the republic.

The combination of these factors may indicate that a new hotspot in the North Caucasus could be on the verge of erupting. An additional external factor may come from a radical change of policy by the Georgian leadership: while two years ago President Mikheil Saakashvili considered himself above contacts with his North Caucasus neighbors, today he seems to be keen on establishing close relationships with the same. In time, the region may well seek to replace its alliance with Russia in the north with a new southerly focus on Georgia.

Kyrgyz Officials Seek Renewal of the Death Penalty

Erica Marat

The Secretary of the Kyrgyz Security Council Adakhan Madumarov and the Chairman of the National Security Service (SNB) Murat Sutalinov recently proposed legalizing capital punishment. Both officials reject standards promoted by Western organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (www.akipress.kg, September 23). According to both security officials, in the context of Kyrgyzstan, not only is capital punishment needed, but executions must be staged publicly.

The death sentence was abolished in Kyrgyzstan in the early 1990’s under the former President Askar Akayev. Recent discussions around reinstating the death penalty are reminiscent of a similarly outrageous proposal to legalize polygamy, which surfaced in the late 1990’s and more recently in 2007. Both represent a departure from democratic thinking in Kyrgyzstan and reveal the weakness of the NGO community. Although polygamy was never formally accepted by the Kyrgyz parliament, it set a precedent for politicians to renew debates about such change.

Local experts rushed to label this proposal as “abhorrent and disgusting.” According to this view, the proposal was designed to show that any dissent against the regime might lead to serious consequences. Kyrgyz experts believe that restoring the death sentence is aimed against opposition leaders, high profile criminals or religious extremists. Alongside this proposal, the Security Council has recently recommended that law-enforcement agencies should widen their list of religious extremist groups and include Tablighi Jamaat along with Hizb-ut-Tahrir. Religious extremists will thus be persecuted as criminals (www.akipress.kg, September 23).

In the past year several political opponents of the regime have fled Kyrgyzstan in order to escape pressure from the government. Most recently, a Member of Parliament from the opposition Social Democratic Party Bakyt Beshimov fled the country. His fellow party member Kubanychbek Kadyrov has also reportedly left after the local prosecutor stripped him of his political immunity.

The proposal also reflects the growing political leverage exercised by military and security officials in Kyrgyzstan. Madumarov, a self-proclaimed ideologue, also suggested improving the content of local television channels and reducing the amount of material depicting violence. Both high ranking security officials regard the death sentence as a means to combat political discontent. Local NGO’s have expressed concern with the proposition. The return of capital punishment, according to them, will be implemented without any additional reform of the judicial system, which is currently marred by corruption. Often criminals are released on bail, while innocent people fall victim to corrupt persecutors. Kyrgyz civil society views were published mostly by the foreign media, while Kyrgyz newspapers have increased their coverage of Islamic extremist movements in Kyrgyzstan (www.akipress.kg, September 23).

However, Madumarov and Sutalinov’s behavior suggests that they favor the death sentence. Abandoning the death sentence several years ago reportedly put greater material burden on Kyrgyz prisons. As Madumarov said while making his controversial proposal “why should society pay for people who commit crimes against them?” Meanwhile, Sutalinov promised that after 2-3 executions, the crime rate might fall (www.svpressa.ru, September 29).

Whether capital punishment will be legalized in Kyrgyzstan remains to be seen. Years after abandoning the death sentence, its status was finally fixed in the constitution in 2007. This was one of the major achievements of international organizations operating in Kyrgyzstan. As one former member of the Kyrgyz defense ministry told Jamestown, the West’s other important achievement was to place the penitentiary system under the ministry of justice, as opposed to the interior ministry. However, since then prison conditions have not improved and the rights of prisoners have also continued to deteriorate. The killing of the Member of Parliament Tynychbek Akmatbayev during a prison revolt in October 2006 was linked to this inefficient reform. Akmatbayev visited Bishkek prison to calm rioters, but the prison guards were unable to protect him from aggressive prisoners.

Opposing reforms facilitated by the West has become a popular trend among Kyrgyz politicians during the past few years. Resisting the influence of international organizations and instead following the “Kyrgyz” way now often appears to be their strongest argument. These tendencies resemble similar behavior among Russian political circles that see Western influence as disrupting local culture. Ironically, Madumarov uses the U.S. law on the death sentence as an example for Kyrgyzstan.

Patriotism and good behavior among the masses, in turn, is reinforced by the ruling party Ak Zhol. The party decided to make singing the national anthem mandatory for Kyrgyz citizens during national holidays (www.ferghana.ru, September 29). Kyrgyz citizens will have to sing the anthem standing with one hand placed on their chest. How this new rule will be enforced remains to be determined.

Turkey Considers the Status of Abkhazia

Emrullah Uslu

In response to a question as to whether Ankara and Moscow have reached a deal to recognize Abkhazia and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated: “Russia will not enter a deal implying the recognition of Northern Cyprus in exchange for Turkish recognition of Abkhazia” (Zaman, October 4).

The debate was originally triggered by an article written by Paul Goble in the Moscow Times on September 16. Goble argued that: “There appears to be a chance that Turkey, despite denials by its officials, might break the embargo against recognition because of Ankara’s desire to play a greater role in the South Caucasus region, its own long-standing experience as the only country to recognize the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus, and the influence of its own Abkhaz and Circassian communities.” He based his argument on the intention of the Turkish Foreign Minister Akhmet Davutoglu to visit Abkhazia in order to “get acquainted with [that republic] and attempt to regulate its relations with Georgia,” while he continued, “thus potentially positioning Turkey to play a role paralleling the one it has offered to play between Azerbaijan and Armenia.” Two days later, Unal Cevikoz, the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs in the Turkish Foreign Ministry, who is of Circassian descent, visited Sukhumi and met with the Abkhazian Foreign Minister Sergey Shamba. While Turkish officials said that Ankara had informed Tbilisi about the visit and had not changed its policy of supporting the territorial integrity of Georgia, Cevikoz’s visit raised hopes in Sukhumi (The Moscow Times, September 16).

Regarding Cevikoz’s visit to the region, Davutoglu said that the existence of the Abkhaz community in Turkey compels Ankara to consider how to resolve this problem. “We know very well that having peace and stability in the South Caucasus region without achieving this in Georgia is very difficult. With these thoughts and perspectives, Turkey will continue making efforts toward the resolution of the Abkhazian conflict, as it has done in previous years” Davutoglu explained (Today’s Zaman, September 8).

Goble’s analysis also triggered a new debate within Turkey. The Turkish media ran optimistic stories about the possibility of such mutually beneficial recognition policies (Vatan, September 21). However, Turkish analysts are skeptical that Turkey would want to recognize Abkhazia or that Russia would choose to recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (www.turksam.org, September 27).

Recently, Lavrov joined the debate and revealed Moscow’s position: Russia will not enter any deal implying the recognition of Northern Cyprus in exchange for the Turkish recognition of Abkhazia. “We are not inclined to enter any deals following ‘scratch my back and I'll scratch yours’ logic. These are two absolutely different stories. These are different situations from the historical, moral and humanitarian points of view. Any bargaining is out of the question. Each situation should be considered in its historical context,” Lavrov added (www.russiatoday.ru, October 3).

It seems that Lavrov’s emphasis on history may indicate that Ankara could be interested in establishing some form of relations with Abkhazia. Historically tens of thousands of Muslim Abkhazians moved to the Ottoman empire, as part of a larger Muslim migration process from the Caucasus in the nineteenth century. Approximately 500,000 Abkhazian descendents now live in Turkey. In addition, other Caucasus communities in Turkey have close relations with Abkhazians. The only exception is the Georgian descended Muslim communities in Turkey. Due to their over representation in critical government institutions, such as the National Intelligence Organization (MIT), the Turkish armed forces, and their nationalist outlook, Abkhazians retain significant lobbying power in Ankara.

By emphasizing the historical perspective, Moscow might expect help from these communities in order to generate pressure on the Turkish government to establish some form of relationship with Abkhazia. Cevikoz’s visit to Sukhumi may indicate a policy shift in Ankara. In 2007, when the Abkhaz leader Sergey Bagapsh wanted to visit Turkey to meet with the Abkhaz diaspora, the Turkish government refused to issue a visa and President Abdullah Gul at the time stated that “I can only reiterate in this regard that Turkey supports Georgia’s territorial integrity” (www.civil.ge, November 21, 2007).

The crucial question remains: since 2007, what has changed that has required Turkish diplomats to visit the region? Hasan Kanpolat, a Turkish analyst who has close relations with the Turkish foreign minister, pointed out what had led the government to revise its outlook toward Abkhazia:

“During a period in which Abkhazia’s independence process has begun to gain momentum, Cevikoz could not have gone to Sukhumi to engage in efforts to restart a peace process between Abkhazia and Georgia. Therefore, we can presume that, to prevent Abkhazia from unifying any further with the Russian Federation, Ankara may have asked Tbilisi to allow a controlled relationship with Abkhazia. To be more explicit, the door may be opened to preventing Georgia from intercepting ships on humanitarian missions or those involved in trade traveling between Turkey and Abkhazia using the Black Sea” (Today’s Zaman, September 17).

Kanpolat further argues that Ankara sees that a close relationship with Abkhazia would eventually produce a similar multi-dimensional relationship with Cypriot Turks in the eastern Mediterranean. Abkhazia in this case would become an accessible Black Sea coastline for Turkey.

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