IN THIS ISSUE

* Zapad 2009 looks forward and backward
* Head of Dagestan's Khasavyurt district murdered in Moscow
* Baku ponders the future of Gabala as part of U.S. missile defense
* Turkey tests its national attack helicopter
** New in the Jamestown blog on Russia and Eurasia (http://www.jamestown.org/blog):
- Unconstrained, Russia Eyes More Georgian Territories

Ten Years of Anti-NATO Exercises by Russian and Belarusian Armed Forces

Jacob W. Kipp

On September 26 the official publication of the Russian ministry of defense Krasnaya Zvezda announced the beginning of the second phase of Zapad 2009 (West 2009), a large-scale combined arms exercise conducted in Belarus. This phase of the exercise lasted from September 26-29 and involved more than 12,500 troops, over 100 aircraft and helicopters, 4,000 pieces of military equipment including tanks, armored personnel carriers, self-propelled artillery, tube artillery, self-propelled multi-rocket launchers, and ground-based SAM systems. The focus of the second phase of the exercise, according to Krasnaya Zvezda, was on air defense operations (Krasnaya Zvezda, September 26). The air defense activities involved the interception of enemy aircraft, and the firing of S-200 air defense missiles at the Telemba Range in Chita Oblast. The exercise also witnessed Russian Special Forces operating in conjunction with Belorussian territorial troops against invading forces.

On September 28, Dmitry Litovkin, a prominent defense journalist, published a long article on Zapad 2009 under the title: "The Exercises Got Caught in the Net." Litovkin's play-on-words referred to the fact that this exercise was to be a test of the new brigade-centric organization of the ground forces and would involve the implementation of the concept "network-centric warfare," which the author described as a U.S. concept associated with "the large-scale use of electronic reconnaissance and target acquisition (satellite, unmanned aerial vehicles, etc.) and the use of cellular groupings that can move quickly around the theater of military operations and attack the enemy's flanks or rear" (Izvestia, September 28).

Litovkin described Zapad 2009 as an exercise designed to counter the specific threat faced by Russia and Belarus in their western strategic direction, which he differentiated from those in the eastern and southern strategic directions. In the western strategic direction Russian forces will face "innovative armies employing the forms and means of non-contact warfare involving the latest forces and means." This unnamed opponent is clearly NATO. In fact, Litovkin speaks of Russian forces confronting "an opponent armed to NATO standards in the Georgian-Russian confrontation over South Ossetia last year" (Izvestia, September 28). In the eastern strategic direction Russian forces will likely face a multi-million-man army with a traditional approach to the conduct of combat: linear deployments with large concentrations of manpower and fire power on different axis. In the southern strategic direction Russian forces expect to confront irregular forces and sabotage groups fighting a partisan war against "the organs of Federal authority," i.e., internal troops. the border patrol, and the FSB.

In the course of the preparations for Zapad 2009 the Russian armed forces moved by rail and air a considerable combined armed force into Belarus in the course of five days. The units deployed included: a battalion from the 51st Regiment of the Airborne Forces stationed at Tula; the 15th, 21st, and 23rd Motorized Rifle Brigades of the 2nd Combined Arms Army of the Volga-Ural Military District, and a battalion from 4th Independent Tank Brigade of the Moscow Military District.

Since the first large-scale post-Cold War exercise Zapad 1999, NATO has been the explicit threat for all major exercises on the western strategic direction. What is different in Zapad 2009 is the focus on a more maneuverable high-technology force capable of rapid deployment into theater and the conduct of non-linear precision-strike warfare. Ten years ago Zapad 1999 ended with the first use of nuclear weapons to "de-escalate" a NATO-Russian conflict when a conventional defense failed. Zapad 2009 might still end in the same fashion, but the conventional phase in this case has been extended, and involves a shift towards network-centric warfare and precision-strike systems in a counter-attack against the "aggressors."

Critical assessments of Zapad 2009 and the simultaneous Ladoga 2009 conducted by Russian forces alone will provide good indicators regarding the direction and success of Russian military transformation, especially the level of training of the force and its capacity to integrate new technology. After what Aleksandr Goltz characterized as "the eleven lost years" of military reform in 2004, the Russian General Staff, on the basis of combat experience in Georgia, seems intent on organizational reform -specifically the shift from a division-based ground force, to one based on 85 maneuver brigades, and upon technological rearmament to reflect the requirements for the informatization of warfare and the conduct of non-linear, non-contact operations.

One key innovation with long-term consequences is the decision to purchase advanced weapons abroad, including over a dozen UAV's from Israel. Deputy Defense Minister Vladimir Popovkin in a recent interview in Krasnaya Zvezda spoke of accelerated weapons procurement in 2009 and noted increased acquisitions of aircraft, helicopters, tanks, and other armored systems. He also emphasized the need to modernize the strategic nuclear forces, begin the mass production of precision strike weapons including the short-range ballistic missile, the Iskander, precision munitions for the Grad and Smerch Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, and the development of improved digital maps and global positioning technology based on GLONASS. He noted that it would take 3 to 5 years to train the crews to use such systems and to integrate them into military doctrine (Krasnaya Zvezda, September 23).

President Dmitry Medvedev, speaking in Kaliningrad during a visit to the exercises on September 28, described them as a threat to no one: "I would like to point out that the aim of our exercise is of a defensive nature. We are not threatening anyone" (RIA Novosti, September 28). However, the Polish defense ministry noted the scale of the maneuvers, their location in Kaliningrad Oblast and Belarus, and the scenario of an attack from the west. Its spokesman said that the defense ministry would monitor the exercises carefully and expressed surprise at the scenario, given the fact that Poland and NATO have no aggressive intent.

Murder of Dagestani District Chief and Top Police Official Raises Tensions in Republic

The Jamestown Foundation

The head of the administration of Dagestan's Khasavyurt district, Alimsultan Alkhamatov, was shot to death on Moscow on September 27. His driver-bodyguard, Nadzhmutdin Mitikov, was wounded in the attack, which took place in the southwestern part of the Russian capital. The head of the investigations unit of the Investigative Committee for Moscow, Anatoly Bagment, said that at least four weapons were found at the scene of the attack, including two Kedr machine-pistols. According to other reports, a Kalashnikov automatic rifle used in the attack was also found at the scene (ITAR-TASS, September 27).

The attackers reportedly fled the scene of the shooting in a Mitsubishi Pajero and a Mercedes S350. Police managed to stop the Mercedes and apprehend its driver, Khabib Budaikhanov, a native of the village of Artlukh in Dagestan's Kazbeksky district. Another two suspects were reportedly detained in western and southern Moscow (ITAR-TASS, www.vesti.ru, www.newsru.com, www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, September 27).

Alkhamatov had reportedly gone to Moscow to be with his 19-year-old son, who was undergoing another operation for injuries sustained in a car accident. Alkhamatov, who had been the target of previous attacks, maintained three armed bodyguards together with his armored Mercedes while in the Russian capital, but the security measures ultimately failed (Kommersant, September 29).

Law-enforcement sources were quoted as saying that Alkhamatov had been the target of three earlier attacks in Dagestan, and investigators reportedly believe the murder was related either to his commercial or political activities (Interfax, September 27, www.regnum.ru, September 28).

The first attack on Alkhamatov occurred at the beginning of 2005, after the then Dagestani President Magomedali Magomedov named him acting Khasavyurt district head. Some observers say Magomedov picked Alkhamatov as a counterweight to the mayor of the city of Khasavyurt, Sagidpasha Umakhanov, who led a group of anti-Magomedov officials known as the Northern Alliance. Alkhamatov was an ethnic Kumyk -the majority ethnic group in Khasavyurt district- while Umakhanov is an ethnic Avar, and tensions between the two groups are high in the district. The roles reversed when Dagestan's current president, Mukhu Aliev, came to power in the republic in 2006: Aliev enjoys friendly relations with Umakhanov, and Alkhamatov therefore found himself on the outside with the republican leadership.

Tensions between the Khasavyurt city and district authorities worsened, reaching a peak in April of this year, when Umakhanov's nephew, Magomed Umakhanov, was shot to death. Members of Alkhamatov's inner circle were questioned in connection with the murder, but subsequently released. Magomed Umakhanov was buried in Dagestan's Kazbeksky district, the native district of both the Umaknaov family and the man detained in connection with Alkhamatov's murder in Moscow, Khabib Budaikhanov (www.rosbalt.ru, September 28).

Meanwhile, at almost the same time that Khasavyurt district head Alimsultan Alkhamatov was murdered in Moscow, the deputy head of the Dagestani interior ministry's criminal investigation department, Lieutenant-Colonel Alim-Sultan Atuyev, was killed along with his nephew, Lieutenant Abdulla Magomedgaziev, by unidentified gunmen in the village of Starye Miatli in Dagestan's Kizilyurt district. The two murders occurred on September 27 within an hour of each other, and Russian news agencies quoted an unnamed law-enforcement source as saying that the two incidents may have been related. The source said "it is impossible to rule out that the crimes might be connected and that it was not a coincidence they were committed on the same day and practically at the same time." The source added that both shootings involved "professional killers" and were meticulously planned (ITAR-TASS, September 28).

Dagestani President Mukhu Aliev's press secretary, Rasul Khaibullaev, said Aliev held a meeting with the republic's law-enforcement and security officials yesterday (September 28) to discuss the Alkhamatov and Atuyev murders. The press secretary said that the meeting's participants agreed that Atuyev had been murdered by members of "illegal armed formations" -meaning rebel groups- and that Alkhamatov was killed by "Dagestanis, not Muscovites." Aliev said he was called just before the meeting by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, who inquired about the situation in Dagestan in light of the murders and asked what aid the federal center might provide.

Aliev said that the situation in the republic is under control, but added: "Certain persons are making attempts to impart a political and ethnic coloring to the crime committed [in Moscow] and thereby destabilize the situation in the Khasavyurt district [and] put pressure on the power structures." The Dagestani president ordered law-enforcement officials in the republic and local administration heads in Khasavyurt district and city to take extra security measures. Kommersant wrote that Alkhamatov's murder "could give rise to a new round of armed conflict in the republic" (Kommersant, September 29).

Obama's Missile Defense Decision Renews Discussion on Gabala in Azerbaijan

Fariz Ismailzade

President Barack Obama's recent decision to scrap plans to deploy elements of ballistic missile defense (BMD) in Poland and the Czech Republic has renewed speculation in Baku over the future of the Gabala Radio Location Station in Azerbaijan. This powerful Soviet-era radar station is currently leased by Russia, and was offered in 2007 by the then Russian President Vladimir Putin to his American counterpart George W. Bush as an alternative to the U.S.-proposed BMD plans in Eastern Europe. At that time, Washington considered the proposal, but never agreed to give up its plans for Poland and the Czech Republic. Subsequently, the potential use of the Gabala station receded (Interfax, September 17).

However, Obama's decision to reset relations with Russia has raised new questions about the Gabala station. The Baku-based political scientist Rasim Musabeyov did not exclude the possibility that the U.S. and Russia might renew talks about the joint use of Gabala. "With the potential threat to the U.S., coming from Iran, it is possible that Washington will decide to pursue a less controversial and cheaper anti-missile detection system with the inclusion of Russia's current capabilities into this system. This will put the issue of the Gabala station back on the table," stated Musabeyov (www.day.az, September 17).

The fact that the Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff James Cartwright reportedly said that the new anti-missile system will be located "somewhere closer to the Caucasus" has fueled such speculation. Some analysts believe that Georgia might be the new location for such an anti-defense system, with whom the U.S. enjoys strong military and political relations. However, the Gabala station might prove to be a less controversial option (www.gazeta.ru, September 17).

The former Director of Operational Test and Evaluation in the U.S. department of defense and current senior advisor at the Washington-based Center for Defense Information Philip Coyle told Trend News Agency on September 18 that the "question of the joint use of the Gabala station remains open." According to Coyle, U.S. intelligence agencies believe that the real threat from Iran is currently presented in the form of its short and medium range missile. Thus, placing a defense system closer to Iran would make more sense. As possible options for such a station, Coyle mentioned the Gabala station, and locations in Eastern Turkey or Armavir in Russia.

There are also those who doubt that the U.S. will agree to the joint use of Gabala station with Russia. Ziba Norman, the Director of the British Transatlantic Institute was quoted by Trend News Agency on September 22 as saying, "It is too early to talk about this Russian-leased radar station becoming part of the U.S. anti-missile defense system." Amanda Akcakoca from the European Policy Center also doubted that the U.S. would agree to the use of Gabala, because Washington will not want "Russians to be able to look into their military documents" (www.day.az, September 25). These views are being closely examined in Baku.

The main factor in this issue remains the reaction of the Azerbaijani authorities. Former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, speaking in Baku on September 17, said that any usage of the Gabala station without the approval of Azerbaijani authorities would put Azerbaijan at risk. Indeed, the Azeri authorities, although having agreed to the Russian proposal in 2007, might hesitate to do so now. President Ilham Aliyev's policy has been to refrain from any direct confrontation with Iran and the possible use of the Gabala station against Iran might meet fierce resistance in Baku.

Nevertheless, Baku wants to keep all its options open. One Member of Parliament from the ruling Yeni Azerbaijan Party Aydin Mirzazadeh told Ekho Moskvy on September 18 that "all sides will win from the joint use of the Gabala station. Azerbaijan will become an important link in the European security system." Meanwhile, the Baku-based military expert Rauf Rajabov suggested exercising caution in relation to any speculation about the joint use of Gabala by Russia and the U.S. until formal proposals are made (Ekho Moskvy, September 18).

Turkey Presses Ahead with its Attack Helicopter Project

Saban Kardas

The test flights of Turkey's national attack helicopters, which will be produced jointly with Italy, were concluded on September 28, producing satisfactory results for Turkish defense officials.

Following a decade of discussions on developing a combat helicopter program, Turkey awarded the bid to produce combat and reconnaissance helicopters to the Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) -the prime contractor- and the Italian AgustaWestland -the subcontractor- in 2007. Under the $3 billion program, 51 (plus 40 optional) helicopters will be produced for the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK). AgustaWestland agreed to transfer technology for the development of Turkey's T-129 ATAK, which will be an improvised version of its A-129 helicopters to meet the Turkish army's specific needs to operate in high altitude mountainous terrain. The first T-129's are scheduled to be delivered to the TSK in 2013 (EDM, June 27, 2008, Today's Zaman, September 29).

The helicopter program is seen as one of the flagship projects for Turkey's flourishing defense industry, as it will involve not only the transfer of advanced technology, but also the integration of various domestically developed weapons and communications systems. Moreover, since Turkey's TAI will have the exclusive rights to market and sell the final product worldwide, the project is particularly attractive for Turkey. Through this and other ambitious national weapons programs, it aims to emerge as a major player in the global arms industry. Pakistan, Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates and Jordan have reportedly expressed their interest in purchasing the T-129 (Anadolu Ajansi, September 25).

A prototype of the T-129 held its first test flight at AgustaWestland's facilities in Milan during a ceremony attended by several Turkish and Italian politicians, military officers and bureaucrats. During the ten-minute long test flight, which was performed with no weapons systems installed, the new T-129 flew at varying speeds and performed general maneuvers. The CEO of AgustaWestland Giuseppe Orsi said that tests with the helicopter equipped with a weapons system are expected to be conducted in 2010. Turkish officials observing the tests expressed satisfaction with its results. Turkish Defense Minister Vecdi Gonul maintained that although it was only a prototype, the T-129 carried out maneuvers that no other helicopter in its class could perform. He expressed hope that once the firing systems are also installed, these platforms will take their place in the inventory of the Turkish army as one of the most valued assets. He also added that "the successful test flights" will boost the marketability of the T-129 worldwide and other countries might show interest in procuring the helicopter (Anadolu Ajansi, September 28).

The Turkish pilot that flew the T-129 found its maneuverability to be superb. Noting that he had flown American Cobras, he argued that the T-129 performed better than other helicopters in the Turkish army's inventory. Both Orsi and TAI General Manager Muharrem Dortkasli stressed that the first test flights were performed ahead of schedule and that the program will be concluded on time in 2013. Orsi praised the technological capabilities of the TAI and through this project added that the Turkish aviation industry will enhance its place in helicopter rotor technology (Anadolu Ajansi, September 28).

Turkish and Italian officials' emphasis on the smooth progress of the project even ahead of the deadline is significant, given the growing determination of the Turkish military to meet its attack helicopter needs. The Turkish army has reported deficiencies in its operations against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) as a result of the delays in the helicopter program, especially after the escalation of the terrorist campaign in recent years. Since the helicopters within the Turkish military inventory are aging and the completion of the national helicopter program will take several more years, the Turkish army has expressed interest in acquiring additional strike helicopters as a stop-gap measure. In this context, it has earmarked the procurement of either Russian or American platforms (EDM, June 17). If the T-129 program could proceed at full speed, it might address the need for such additional purchases.

The local contribution is a major source of pride in Turkey. The avionics and weapons systems of the helicopter are being designed indigenously and will be produced domestically. Roketsan will supply its indigenously developed anti-tank missiles, Cirit and Hydra. In a large-scale project involving over 300 Turkish engines, Turkey's leading defense electronics company ASELSAN developed the mission computer and targeting, navigation, communication and electronic warfare systems. The T-129 will be equipped with advanced anti-tanks missiles, as well as air-to-air stinger missiles (Zaman, September 26).

A remarkable advantage of the T-129 over the Italian A-129 is its engine. Since the Turkish army found the A-129's performance unsatisfactory due to its weak engine power, the T-129 will be equipped with a more powerful engine. The T-129 will use an engine originally developed by LHTEC, a joint venture between U.S. Honeywell and the British Rolls Royce, for the abortive Comanche helicopter project. The new engine allows the T-129 to operate in high temperatures and altitudes. Although some skeptics raised questions as to whether the new engine might create compatibility issues, Turkish officials rejected such criticism. It was noted that the engine is used by four countries with satisfactory performance. According to the Turkish press, even the Italian army was considering the idea of switching to this engine on the A-129's (Anadolu Ajansi, September 25, Hurriyet, September 29).

Although Turkish officials emphasize that Turkey will be able to export the new helicopter, it still remains unclear whether it actually possesses full rights over its worldwide sales. Since the engine will be supplied by a U.S. producer, exporting the T-129 to third countries will require obtaining U.S. export licenses, which might imply a de facto veto.

Despite the positive reports on the test flights, it will be necessary to wait until the T-129's are fully developed and put into action in Southeastern Anatolian terrain to more fully evaluate their performance. In another ambitious weapons procurement project, although Gonul found the performance of the Israeli UAV's excellent during their test flights (EDM, November 3, 2008), they failed to meet the expectations of the Turkish army in its operational use (EDM, December 18, 2008).

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