* South Ossetian Authorities Target Opposition Financier
* Circassians Fear Adygeya May Become The Next Nalchik
* Will Moscow Be Constrained To Cede The North Caucasus To Ramzan Kadyrov?
* Abkhaz Oppositionist And War Veteran Detained
* North Caucasus Resistance Extends War Into Cyberspace
* Karachayevo-Cherkessia Parliament Rejects United Russia's Proposed Senatorial Candidate
* Is The White Legion Back In Business?

South Ossetian Authorities Target Opposition Financier

In the month that has elapsed since the flawed parliamentary elections that yielded a new legislature subservient to President Eduard Kokoity, the South Ossetian authorities have taken further steps aimed at bolstering his position.

A new constitution is to be drafted that could provide the legal basis for Kokoity to remain in power after his second presidential term expires in November 2011.

Meanwhile, an investigation into the operations of the First Republican Bank, which is owned by Albert Djussoyev, a Moscow-based opposition businessman, has reportedly uncovered numerous financial violations. The authorities have threatened to rescind the bank's license on the grounds that it was issued in violation of existing legislation.

As indicated above, the May 31 ballot was rigged to preclude any opposition representation in the new parliament. In mid-April, South Ossetia's Election Commission refused to register the opposition People's Party headed by Roland Kelekhsayev to participate in the election, but it did register a second party of the same name established days earlier by persons said to be utterly loyal to Kokoity. It also registered only nine of the 10 candidates on the list of the socialist Fydybasta (Fatherland) party, rejecting party Chairman Vyacheslav Gobozov, who headed it.

The conduct of the vote and the outcome confirmed the opposition's worst fears. The Russian dailies "Kommersant" and "Vremya novostei" both reported procedural violations reminiscent of those registered in recent elections across Russia. Voter turnout was given as 81.9 percent, or 52,000 of a total of 56,000 registered voters; Djussoyev rejected that figure as grossly overstated, and claimed that the entire population of South Ossetia today does not exceed 20,000 people.

According to the official results, Kokoity's Unity party garnered 46 percent of the vote, which translated under the proportional system into 17 of the total 34 parliament mandates. The pro-Kokoity People's Party won 22.58 percent of the votes, giving it nine mandates, and the Communist Party 22.25 percent (eight mandates). Fatherland polled only 6.37 percent of the vote, less than the minimum 7 percent required to win parliamentary representation.

The Communist Party and Fatherland both queried the accuracy of those returns. Communist Party leader Stanislav Kochiyev said he had hoped for a larger share of the vote, while Fatherland 's Gobozov alleged widespread multiple voting and other violations and demanded that the Election Commission release voter lists.

Kokoity by contrast termed the voting "absolutely transparent and honest," and announced that he would relinquish some of his presidential powers. Specifically, he said that in future the parliament would have a greater say in forming the government.

In what looked suspiciously like an attempt to buy the Communists' loyalty, Kokoity then proposed Kochiyev as parliament chairman. His candidacy was duly approved on June 19 by 22 votes to 12.

It was Kochiyev who announced on June 23 that the parliament would draft and adopt a new constitution, but he denied that the objective was to enable Kokoity to serve a third presidential term.

What prompted the investigation launched into Djussoyev's bank, and when that probe was launched, is unclear. Djussoyev was quoted on June 26 by kavkaz-uzel.ru as tacitly admitting unspecified irregularities that could incur a financial penalty, but he insisted that they were not of a magnitude to warrant stripping the bank of its license (which was issued by the National Bank of South Ossetia).

Djussoyev recalled that he received permission to open his bank in late 2006 (immediately after Kokoity's reelection for a second presidential term), and that both Kokoity and the unrecognized republic's prime minister attended its formal inauguration in May 2007.

In a lengthy interview with kavkaz-uzel.ru shortly before the May parliamentary ballot, Kokoity gave an exceptionally negative assessment of the construction work carried out by Djussoyev's Stroyprogress company on the Tskhinvali-Dzaurikau natural-gas pipeline.

Circassians Fear Adygeya May Become The Next Nalchik

The 400-plus participants at the congress on June 27 in Maykop of the Circassian public movement Adyghe Khase (Circassian Council) expressed their shared concern at ongoing trends that they fear pose a threat. Specifically, they fear that ongoing police reprisals against young Muslims in towns close to the administrative border with Krasnodar Krai could drive some of the victims to join the Islamic underground.

Khazret Chemso, a member of Adyghe Khase's council, described to the congress how groups of between 10-15 police officers force their way into the homes of practicing Muslims early in the morning and "turn everything upside down" in their search for incriminating objects such as weapons or drugs. Alternatively, they intercept young men as they leave the mosque, force them to lie face down on the ground, search them, and then let them go.

Asked to comment on the situation, Adyghe Khase Chairman Arambiy Khapay said that no one should be persecuted for his faith. He said that at present there are no grounds for the development in the republic of "aggressive forms of Islam. We are not Chechnya, or Ingushetia, or Daghestan."

At the same time, he warned that unless such harassment ceases, Adygeya could be the target of an attack by Islamic militants comparable to that on the Kabardino-Balkaria capital, Nalchik, in October 2005. Most of the young fighters who took part in that attack had similarly been subjected to arbitrary harassment and violence by the police.

The congress approved unanimously a proposal to convene a roundtable discussion of police persecution of young Muslims. The republican government, Interior Ministry, prosecutor's office, and the presidential administration will be invited to participate.

A second key issue debated at the June 27 congress was the all-Russian census to take place in October 2010. Khapay said Adyghe Khase's council has already adopted a resolution recommending that Adygeya's Circassians designate their nationality in the census questionnaire both as Circassian, and by the ethnonym Adyg. He had told kavkaz-uzel.ru earlier that the Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachayevo-Cherkessia chapters of Adyghe Khase will issue analogous recommendations to the Circassian population of those two republics.

The congress also adopted an appeal to the leaders of Adygeya, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Karachayevo-Cherkessia to revive the Parliamentary Assembly that comprised representatives from all three republics.

It is not clear whether and in what detail the congress discussed the proposal discussed at the Congress of the Circassian People in Cherkessk last November to redraw internal borders within the Russian Federation to create a Circassian republic that would comprise the regions of the North Caucasus where Circassians live compactly. Adygeya's Circassians, who account for around 24 percent of the republic's population of around 450,000, are in favor of creating such a republic. Khapay said at the congress last November that he sees "no alternative" to doing so.

But Circassians in Kabardino-Balkaria, who are the largest ethnic group within that republic (55 percent), profess to be perfectly content with the status quo. A session in Nalchik on June 5 of the Kabardino-Balkaria chapter of Adyghe Khase again formally rejected the idea of a unified Circassian republic.

Meeting with Khapay and other prominent Adyghe Khase leaders on the eve of last week's congress, Adygeya President Aslancheryy Tkhakushinov stressed that "we have an interest in the activities of Adyghe Khase remaining a positive consolidating force" in dialogue between ethnic groups. In other words, don't rock the boat.

Will Moscow Be Constrained To Cede The North Caucasus To Ramzan Kadyrov?

Moscow's heavy-handed approach to neutralizing the Islamic resistance in the North Caucasus is fundamentally flawed and, ultimately, counterproductive.

The Russian armed forces and Interior Ministry troops have for the past five-six years sought to combat that low-level insurgency by launching localized counterterrorism operations against suspected militants. In many cases, the targets prove, too late, to be innocent civilians.

Indeed, the single-minded recourse by Defense and Interior Ministry forces to arbitrary and disproportionate violence against civilians, in particular devout and nonviolent young Muslims, was the single most weighty factor behind the emergence of new jamaats (militant groups) in Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachayevo-Cherkessia, Stavropol Krai, and southern Daghestan.

Opposition politicians in the North Caucasus have long argued that Moscow's strategy only serves to compound the problem it is intended to solve, insofar as "violence breeds violence." Discussing the situation in Ingushetia in a May 10 interview with the radio station Ekho Moskvy, Ingush oppositionist Magomed Khazbiyev warned that "as long as security services and death squads continue to force their way into private homes and detain lads who then disappear without trace, as long as they continue gunning down young men on the street in broad daylight, this violence will not end. There will be counterstrikes, explosions, acts of terrorism, [young people] will head for the forest [to join the resistance]. In this region no one will succeed in restoring order by brandishing his sword -- a different approach is needed."

Similarly, Daghestan's President Mukhu Aliyev has repeatedly argued that "religious extremism" cannot be eradicated by force; that more sophisticated propaganda campaign is needed to demonstrate the flaws in extremist "Wahhabi" ideology; and that the police should use violence only as a last resort.

In a June 25 interview with RFE/RL's Russian Service, former Ingushetian President Ruslan Aushev, who was awarded the Hero of Russia medal for his service as a general with the Soviet Army in Afghanistan in the 1980s, compared Moscow's current approach to the North Caucasus with the Soviet strategy that led to the emergence of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Aushev said he cannot comprehend why Russian leaders continually stress their commitment to bringing peace to the Caucasus, and at the same time act in such a way as to make the situation worse.

Mounting Violence

Developments over the past six weeks risk exacerbating the situation in the North Caucasus even further. Following a suicide bombing in Grozny on May 15, Chechen Republic head Ramzan Kadyrov travelled to the Ingushetian capital, Magas, where after talks with Ingushetian President Yunus-Bek Yevkurov he announced that the Interior Ministries of the two republics would coordinate activities aimed at locating and killing a group of Islamic militants believed to be hiding out in the mountainous wooded country that straddles the border between Chechnya and Ingushetia.

Those coordinated efforts did not, however, result in the hoped-for breakthrough. In late May, Ingushetian police arrested a group of 15 men they branded armed militants, only to release them days later after admitting they had not violated the law in any way. Announcements that resistance commander Doku Umarov could have been killed or seriously injured in a clash on May 28 proved premature. As of mid-June, at least 19 members of the various Chechen law enforcement and security bodies had been killed in sporadic attacks, and 26 wounded.

Kadyrov on June 10 put resistance losses at 28 dead, and issued orders to senior Chechen government personnel not to take any vacation until the campaign is successfully completed. One week later, on June 17, Kadyrov ordered police to wipe out all resistance fighters on the territory of the two republics within two weeks. Then on June 27, he told Rossia television that after talks with the Russian Interior Ministry he has issued orders to wipe out all remaining resistance leaders on Chechen soil within one month.

Setting such arbitrary (and mutually contradictory) deadlines is, of course, ludicrous, all the more so in light of the difficult terrain and the ease with which the militants move from one clandestine underground bunker to another. One Chechen Interior Ministry special forces (spetsnaz) officer explained to kavkaz-uzel.ru on June 3 that those bunkers are deep underground, with roofs consisting of several layers of timber thick enough to withstand a direct artillery hit. They are covered on the surface with turf, so that it is possible to walk over one without ever suspecting it is there. Moreover, those bunkers have several entrances, and the approaches to them are mined.

Some of the resistance bases are almost luxurious. One militant told RFE/RL's North Caucasus Service recently that he had spent time in one that had its own generators and steam baths, and that the fighters kept sheep and goats to provide food. This would represent a quantum leap forward from the situation in 2006, when Umarov told RFE/RL's North Caucasus Service that he had to reject all but the most physically resilient volunteers to join the resistance ranks, as the weaker ones would be unable to survive the punishing conditions in the mountains, in particular the cold.

The Chechen spetsnaz officer told kavkaz-uzel.ru that the pro-Moscow Chechen forces are trying simply to cordon off forested areas to prevent the militants from obtaining supplies. He admitted that such attempts are futile, given the impossibility of blocking every single access path.

No Threat To Insurgents

The lack of success in the joint operation to date reflects not just the difficulties of locating the enemy, but also a marked lack of enthusiasm and commitment on the part of the military and police. Since the formal announcement in mid-April of the end of the so-called counterterrorism operation in Chechnya, police and Interior Ministry forces deployed there from elsewhere in the Russian Federation no longer receive the special bonuses to which participation in such operations entitles them, even though the physical conditions in which they are fighting have not changed.

The news agency kavkaz-uzel.ru on June 19 quoted a resident of Chechnya's southern Shatoi district as describing how the pro-Moscow forces arrive in convoy, pitch their tents, and then simply wait until they are recalled to base. He confirmed that there is a group of militants in the area, but said that to the best of his knowledge there had been no "serious clashes" between insurgents and the military since the joint operation began five weeks earlier.

Kavkaz-uzel.ru also quoted on June 18 a local NGO activist who claimed to have been informed by several Chechen law enforcement officials directly involved in the ongoing operation that the situation is not as propitious as the republic's officials would have people believe. He said the military do little more than surround patches of terrain, but do not risk advancing deep into the hills where the militants' bases are located for fear of land mines and ambushes. Consequently, the militants feel in total control.

The very fact that the ongoing crackdown in Chechnya and Ingushetia is localized undercuts its effectiveness, as long as fighters can move freely from Chechnya to Daghestan, and from Ingushetia to Kabardino-Balkaria. Announcing the joint operation on May 17, Kadyrov proposed that Daghestan's police and security forces too should coordinate their activities with those of the other two republics.

Daghestan's leaders initially ignored that call for three-way cooperation. Then on May 20, Interior Ministry spokesman Colonel Mark Tolchinsky told kavkaz-uzel.ru that his ministry knew nothing about it. He said his ministry "can fight terrorists and extremists without Kadyrov's help," and implied that its methods are more selective and persuasive and less brutal than those of his Chechen colleagues.

Kadyrov Takes Charge

Kadyrov made the same argument for regional cooperation on June 10, implying that in contrast to Chechnya and Ingushetia, the heads of other North Caucasus republics and their law enforcement bodies are not making a great enough effort to prevent young people from joining the resistance. He called on the presidents of Daghestan, North Ossetia, Karacheyevo-Cherkessia, and Kabardino-Balkaria to show "understanding" and cooperate to "restore order."

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev delivered a similar message at a June 9 session of Daghestan's Security Council convened to discuss the assassination four days earlier of the republic's interior minister, Lieutenant General Adilgirey Magomedtagirov. The Daghestan-based Shariat jamaat subsequently claimed responsibility for that killing. Medvedev affirmed that "work to restore order, to destroy the terrorist rabble must be continued regardless of what regime is in force. We must continue this work on all the territories of the Southern Federal District, the North Caucasus, independently, I stress this, of the legal restrictions [in force]."

Kadyrov told journalists on June 23 that during his meeting with Medvedev the previous day in Moscow, just hours after the assassination attempt on Ingushetian President Yevkurov, Medvedev ordered him to intensify the crackdown on the resistance in Ingushetia. "I will personally control the operations...and I am sure in the near future there will be good results," Reuters quoted Kadyrov as saying.

That statement triggered outrage and resentment across Ingushetia, with Interior Minister Ruslan Meyriyev reportedly refusing point-blank to take orders from Kadyrov. Whether other republican interior ministers would do the same or fall into line is not clear.

In light of Kadyrov's megalomaniac tendencies, his clear ambition to assume control of the "power" agencies in Ingushetia, and possibly also other North Caucasus republics, in effect relegating republic heads to mere economic managers while creaming off for his own purposes a chunk of the subsidies those republics receive from the federal center, is alarming. Any additional powers that Moscow formally bestows on him cannot be simply annulled if/when the crisis that served as the rationale for granting them in the first place is resolved.

In that respect, Medvedev's argument to the effect that there is no need for a formal legal basis for intensifying the crackdown on "terrorists" could conceivably be interpreted as reflecting an awareness within the Kremlin of the very real dangers of legalizing in advance any actions Kadyrov undertakes outside his own republic.

In fact, as recently as two months ago, it seemed that Moscow was seeking on the contrary to circumscribe Kadyrov's freedom of maneuver in conducting operations against the resistance. On May 8, "Vremya novostei" reported that a new Russian security committee was being mulled that would coordinate the activities of the various federal "force" agencies in Chechnya. That committee would be subordinate either to the Security Council or to the commander of the Russian Interior Ministry Internal Forces, with the former seen as likely to adopt a harsher line than the latter.

On the other hand, Moscow may have an entirely different task in mind for Kadyrov: that of catalyzing a new war with Georgia with the ultimate aim of ousting President Mikheil Saakashvili. Kadyrov boasted on June 23 in an interview with Vesti-24 television that if Medvedev as commander in chief of the Russian armed forces gives the go-ahead, he is ready to "restore order" in neighboring states if Russia's enemies seek to use Ingushetia, Daghestan, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia as bases from which to destroy the Russian Federation from within.

In late April, Russian military commanders in Chechnya alleged that Chechen fighters were again using Georgia's Pankisi Gorge as a rear base, as they had done in 2000-01. Georgian Foreign Ministry official Zurab Kachkachishvili promptly denied those allegations, but Moscow could still opt to adduce the alleged Chechen militant presence as the pretext for a new incursion onto Georgian territory.

If Medvedev were to give Kadyrov such a crucial assignment, however, and Kadyrov succeeded, Medvedev would be hard-pressed to refuse him overlordship of the entire North Caucasus as a reward.

Abkhaz Oppositionist And War Veteran Detained

Colonel Valmer Butba, who during the 1992-93 war and after headed a counterterrorism unit that sought to thwart attacks in Abkhazia's southernmost Gali district by Georgian guerrilla formations, was detained on June 26 in Gali by a group of armed men commanded by a senior Abkhaz Interior Ministry official after a weapon was discovered in his car.

Butba was accompanying his namesake Beslan Butba, who heads the opposition Party of Economic Development (PERA), of which Valmer Butba too is a member. Beslan Butba is considered a possible challenger to incumbent Sergei Bagapsh in the presidential election scheduled for December 12.

The PERA and five other political organizations, some of which joined last month in a concerted campaign criticizing Bagapsh for his approach to relations with Russia, issued an open letter to Bagapsh on June 29 calling for Valmer Butba's immediate release. They argued in his defense that the security situation in Gali remains precarious, and that he has been targeted in the past by Georgian guerrillas, including Dato Shengelia's Forest Brothers.

The statement branded Butba's detention "the start of a wave of political reprisals by the authorities against opposition forces and a provocation aimed at destabilizing the political situation" in the run-up to the December presidential ballot. They called for his immediate release from detention.

North Caucasus Resistance Extends War Into Cyberspace

For years, the ideologues of the Chechen resistance have used the Internet to communicate their ideas and their military successes in the ongoing fight against Russia to a broader audience both within Russia and abroad.

In addition to kavkazcenter.com, the official site of the North Caucasus resistance, several of the local military jamaats that have emerged over the past five years have their own websites, which are updated daily. Daghestan's Shariat jamaat has its own website, jamaatshariat.com, as does the Ingush resistance (hunafa.com).

Over the past 10 days, however, the resistance has gone one step further, hacking and temporarily disabling official sites in Daghestan and Chechnya and posting on them statements of responsibility for attacks on senior officials in Daghestan and Ingushetia.

On June 20, Daghestan's Shariat jamaat hacked the Daghestan site of the Russian news agency RIA and posted on it a claim of responsibility for the killing on June 5 in Makhachkala of Daghestan's interior minister, Lieutenant General Adilgirey Magomedtagirov. That claim by the amir of the Gimri sector of the Daghestan Front, Ibragim Gadjidadayev, was originally posted on kavkazcenter.com on June 11.

The riadagestan.ru site remained inaccessible for several days while technicians restored it. Then on June 23, it was hacked for a second time, and a statement posted appealing to pro-Moscow police and security personnel in the North Caucasus to acknowledge their Muslim identity and join the ranks of the resistance.

That statement, which was also first posted on Kavkaz-Center (on June 10), was signed by the self-styled "Fighting Group 13 of Mujaheds Of The Combined Kabarda, Balkaria, and Karachai Vilayet" of the North Caucasus emirate proclaimed in late 2007 by resistance commander Doku Umarov.

The second website to be hacked and disabled was that of the Chechen Ministry of Information, chechnya.today.com. Late on June 26, a "special operative group of fighters" posted on it a statement claiming responsibility for the failed June 22 attempt to assassinate Ingushetian President Yunus-Bek Yevkurov. In addition, it warned Chechen Republic head Ramzan Kadyrov (of whose personality cult chechnyatoday.com is a key component) that "he will be the next" target.

The site was restored within 24 hours, but attacked a second time late on June 27. This time, the hackers posted video footage of resistance fighters denouncing as far from the truth Kadyrov's repeated claims that the back of the resistance has been broken. As of midday June 29, chechnyatoday.com was still not available.

Karachayevo-Cherkessia Parliament Rejects United Russia's Proposed Senatorial Candidate

Fourteen members of the pro-Kremlin United Russia faction in the Karachayevo-Cherkessia Republic (KChR) parliament have been reprimanded for rejecting the candidate proposed by the presidium of United Russia's General Council to represent the KChR in the Federation Council.

The candidate in question, Vyacheslav Derev, is a Cherkess; the parliament deputies in question are mostly Karachais. The incident could negatively impact on the already strained relations within the KChR between the Karachais, who account for approximately 38 percent of the republic's total 427,400 population, and the Cherkess minority, who number no more than 11 percent.

Latent tensions between the republic's two titular nationalities resurfaced last fall when the republic's new president, Boris Ebzeyev (a Karachai) violated an unwritten agreement that the post of prime minister should go to a Cherkess, while the posts of vice president and parliament speaker go to Russians, who are the second-largest ethnic group (33.6 percent). Instead, Ebzeyev named a Greek, Vladimir Kayshev, as prime minister.

One first deputy prime minister (Muradin Kemov) is a Circassian and the second (Ismail Aliyev) a Karachai; of the two deputy prime ministers, one (Murat Khartsyzov) is an Abazin and the second (Djanibek Suyunov) a Nogai. The cabinet consists of three Karachais, two Russians, two Abazins, one Greek, one Circassian, and one Ossetian.

Derev is the brother of legendary Cherkess businessman Stanislav Derev, who was elected mayor of Cherkessk in 1997, and ran in 1999 for president against incumbent Vladimir Semenov, losing in the second round runoff. Stanislav Derev died in July 2006, and was given a hero's funeral. Vyacheslav Derev took over his brother's various businesses after his death.

United Russia is the largest faction within the KChR parliament elected in March of this year, with 56 of the total 75 deputies. Ebzeyev discussed senatorial candidates with all parliament factions, and United Russia reportedly approved Derev's candidacy. On June 16, however, 27 United Russia lawmakers proposed an alternative candidate, Cherkess businessman Ali Makhov, who had also been a member of Stanislav Derev's election campaign team in 1999; but five of them withdrew their support for Makhov the next day.

Ebzeyev formally proposed Derev's candidacy at a special parliament session on June 17 and appealed to lawmakers to be guided by "reason" in voting on it.

But in a secret ballot, only 26 of the 68 deputies present voted for Derev, while 42 voted against him. The Russian news agency Regnum quoted independent expert Murat Gukemukhov as explaining that many people still associate Vyacheslav Derev with the violent standoff triggered by the 1999 presidential ballot, even though they have no objections to him personally.

Makhov was one of the 14 United Russia lawmakers whom the party's local leadership reprimanded; two others, Abdulakh Tokov and Umar Laypanov (both Karachais) risk expulsion from the party. Parliament faction head Yury Krivobokov has been ordered to ensure that faction members toe the party line in the next vote; it's still not clear whether Ebzeyev will again nominate Derev.

Is The White Legion Back In Business?

A land-mine exploded near the village of Eristsqali in Georgia's Tsalendjikha district, close to the border with Abkhazia, on June 21, damaging an ambulance that was accompanying a motorized patrol by the members of the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM). The ambulance driver, a Georgian national, died later that day of his injuries.

It was the second explosion in or near Eristsqali targeting the EU monitors: Two Georgians were killed in the fall of 2008 when an explosive device detonated in the vicinity.

The EUMM was deployed to Georgia in late September in line with an agreement signed in Moscow earlier that month by French President Nicolas Sarkozy, representing the EU, and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. The 200-plus unarmed EU monitors replaced Russian troops withdrawn from the border areas between Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the rest of Georgia.

In the mid and late 1990s, Russian peacekeepers deployed under the CIS aegis in Abkhazia were repeatedly the target of landmines laid by Georgia's clandestine White Legion guerrilla formation. That band, composed primarily of Georgians forced to abandon their homes in Abkhazia during the1992-93 war, launched a spectacularly unsuccessful attempt in May1998 to reconquer Abkhazia by force.

The White Legion, and a second such group, the Forest Brothers, continued their low-level attacks on both Russian peacekeepers and Abkhaz civilians until early 2004, when the new leadership of President Mikheil Saakashvili moved to demobilize and disarm them.

But in November 2005, Jane's Intelligence quoted White Legion chief Zurab Samushia as arguing the need to revive the guerrilla movement in the Gali district of southeastern Abkhazia to protect the ethnic Georgian population there. In an interview published in the "Georgian Times" on March 17, 2008, Samushia said he planned to revive the Legion, which would operate on Abkhaz territory and seek to disrupt preparations for the 2014 Olympic Games in Sochi.

In January 2007, the Russian news agency Regnum reported that Georgian Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili met unofficially on several occasions in Zugdidi, western Georgia, with three local warlords to discuss creating a new, 1,500 man military unit to fuel unrest in Abkhazia's southernmost Gali district. That report was never independently confirmed.

URL: http://www.rferl.org/archive/Caucasus_Report/latest/963/963.html

Copyright (c) 2009. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.