The worldwide economic crisis that started shortly after the Russian invasion of Georgia last August has been a major concern for policy makers and analysts all across the globe. More recently, developments in and around nuclear-armed North Korea that adamantly refuses to give up its nuclear ambitions and delivery capabilities and in Iran after the disputed presidential elections that brought about mass protests unseen after the 1979 Islamic Revolution have largely overshadowed downward spiraling Russo-Georgian relations.

Before trying to ask more fundamental questions about the geopolitical ambitions of the current Russian leadership, I would like to address the issue of where we are now. With the hot phase of the Russo-Georgian war already history, Russia still enjoys the spoils of the war. Russian troops occupy Georgia's Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region (a.k.a South Ossetia), including parts of the territory that had never been under de-facto Russian control before the war - such as Upper Abkhazia, Akhalgori district and dozens of Georgian villages within the Tskhinvali region. Russia is building military bases and military infrastructure on those territories. Georgian citizens are not allowed to return to their homes after having been subjected to ethnic cleansing by regular and irregular Russian forces.

After Russia used its objection in the consensus-based Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and has, most recently, vetoed a resolution on Georgia in the UN Security Council both OSCE and UN observing missions in Georgia have been terminated. With the OSCE and the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) now gone, the only remaining international body is the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM-Georgia) that as a civilian mechanism under the European security and defense policy was established in September 2008. But Moscow has been consistently denying access to its observers to enter the swaths of Georgian territory under Russian occupation. Since Russia has no direct means to influence decisions within the EU, the Georgian government hopes that EUMM-Georgia could play a bigger role in the Russo-Georgian standoff and, possibly, would even persuade the Europeans to turn it into a police mission with broader prerogatives in the Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions. 

Tbilisi severed diplomatic relations with Moscow, withdrew from the Commonwealth of Independence States (CIS) in the wake of the Russian military aggression, and almost simultaneously abrogated agreements on Russian peacekeeping missions in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali that laid legal grounds for Russian peacekeeping operations on Georgian territories. The old formats of negotiation automatically became defunct. 

New mechanisms that have emerged after the war ended are almost solely based on the EU mediated six-point plan, negotiated by French President Nicholas Sarkozy, then holding EU's rotating presidency. Although the terms of the agreement, signed by Presidents Sarkozy, Medvedev and Saakashvili are not overtly advantageous to Tbilisi, since they do not require the Russians to fully and unconditionally pull out of all of Georgian territory, they do provide for a Russian withdrawal "to the line where they were stationed prior to the beginning of hostilities." Importantly enough, after Moscow vetoed the extension of UNOMIG, it also killed the only international legal basis for its presence on Georgian soil in Abkhazia. On all accounts, apart from its unilateral recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, not considered legal under international law, Russia has no legitimate right to be present on Georgian territories. 

EUMM-Georgia and a negotiation format in Geneva are the two pillars toward which all diplomatic efforts must be directed in order to replace the Russian troops in the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali. But diplomacy and talks are just one side of the coin.

Russia realizes that its bid for Georgian territories could not be won diplomatically. The United States and the European Union have shown no sign of yielding to Russian pressure. To the contrary, in January 2009 Washington signed a groundbreaking document with Tbilisi, called the United States-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership, and Brussels on its part has recently inaugurated its Eastern Partnership, designed to foster multifaceted relations with the EU's eastern neighbors, including Georgia. Most importantly, and as it is viewed in Russia to its very chagrin, the US-Georgia Charter, among other things, provides for closer cooperation between Washington and Tbilisi on security and military matters. In their many statements, top-level officials in Moscow incriminate the West in supporting and arming Georgia and Georgia's "militarization" is high on Russia's accusation points against the United States and other Western powers. Furthermore, the Kremlin looks very disappointed that even after the August war on Georgia, this country is still considered by NATO as a future member. Until then, the NATO-Georgia Commission serves as the primary forum for regular contacts between Georgia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The Nabucco energy project, too, is viewed in Moscow as a Western scheme directed against Russian geopolitical interests since, if realized, Russia will have to face a powerful competitor in the Caspian and Central Asia. Nabucco would irreversibly deprive Russia of its near-monopoly status on gas exports to Europe. Furthermore, Nabucco, although it is just an energy project, could ultimately thwart Russia's powerful bid for a sphere of influence at the expense of post-Soviet states.

Nowhere else do all the above mentioned points of interests of the United States, the EU, NATO and Nabucco clash so severely with Russia's imperial aspirations as at the gateway to the Caucasus, the Caspian and Central Asia, where Georgia for its fortune or misfortune is located. Unlike some who argue that Georgia was the weakest link and that was why it was attacked last August in the first place, I think that Georgia's location is the key why Russia has been treating it so much differently from all of the other points to the east all the way to the Chinese border. The Russians do know with all their heart that if they succeed in cracking Georgia, points to the east would ultimately and with almost no reservation fall under their imperial mastery. The always boisterous North Caucasus too would be securely checked and tamed if the Russians controlled the land south of the mountain range. 

What is going to happen next? Will Russia stop in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali? Russia feels that it has almost no time to relax now and restart its imperial grand strategy sometime in the future. It would if it could, but a NATO expansion is looming, U.S. engagement with Georgia is becoming more and more profound, and the Nabucco project no longer seems to be just a myth. Indeed, economic hardships caused by the global financial crisis do not bode well for Russia and yet another war would not benefit the Russian economy either. But would the economic benefits of foiling the Nabucco project not outweigh short-term advantages of remaining at peace with its neighbors? Would stopping NATO at the Black Sea coast now not buy Russia more time in the future when it embarks on new strategic designs toward super power domination. Russia has on many occasions made it clear that it is the sole master of the post-Soviet space and would do everything it can to not allow the newcomers such as the US and the EU to undermine Moscow's "legitimate" presence in the region.

Several important events will be taking place in the immediate future: Georgia's Foreign Minister Grigol Vashadze will travel to Washington to meet with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and will specifically discuss the implementation of concrete provisions of the U.S.-Georgia Charter. Then in July President Barack Obama will travel to Moscow to meet with his Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev before both attend a G-8 summit in Italy. There are signs that Georgia will be high on his agenda as well.

By the end of June, in the North Caucasus, the Russians will start large-scale military exercises, Kavkaz-2009, involving some 8,000 troops. The First Deputy Defense Minister and Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Makarov will be personally in charge of the exercises. Similar exercises held last year were shortly followed by a war against Georgia.

Will Russia be so audacious as to once again attack Georgia this year? No expert, unfamiliar with the plans of the Russian leadership could make an informed point. At the same time, Russia's long-declared geopolitical ambitions, the ejection of the two international missions from Georgian soil, the use of veto on the Security Council resolution, a military buildup in the occupied Georgian regions, and large-scale exercises just across the Georgian border are omens that could not be neglected. 

Before the August war Moscow unsuccessfully used non-military, mostly economic, diplomatic and propaganda tools to undermine President Saakashvili's government. Miraculously - not least because of the massive Western support - the Georgian government had survived, and even the defeat of the Georgian military on the battlefield did not allow the Russians to cause anarchy and chaos across Georgia that would decimate and ultimately overthrow Saakashvili's government.

American and Western support is crucial for Georgia to remain an undivided and sovereign nation. This involves political, diplomatic and military assistance. Most importantly, the Kremlin should be unequivocally told that another war against Georgia would have dire consequences for Russia, resulting in its full isolation. Georgian military capabilities are not in the position to be a powerful deterrent against Russian invasion and just diplomatic means seem to be insufficient to deter Moscow either. Georgia's membership in NATO, when the time comes, will become the line Russia would never cross, but until then a militarily strong Georgia backed politically, diplomatically and economically by the U.S. and the EU seems to be the only viable option for the West if the Russian imperial expansion has to be checked at the regional level.

* Giorgi Kvelashvili holds a Master's degree in International Relations from Yale University, and currently serves as a research assistant at the Jamestown Foundation